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This thesis describes the Community Investment Programme (CIP) and investigates 
its practicability in three pilot projects in South Africa where it was implemented.  
 
CIP is a community development programme that was conceptualised by Dr Norman 
Reynolds, a development economist. From 1994 onwards, he became disillusioned 
with the fact that the new democratic government did not address the structural 
problems in the South African economy, which left the majority of the poor trapped in 
the so-called second economy of South Africa. He conceptualised a programme, CIP, 
which aims to develop this second economy so as to ensure that all South Africans 
may participate meaningfully in the economy.  
 
CIP is advocating a people-centred development approach, where communities 
themselves take the lead in their development. Communities make their own 
decisions and decide how to use community development budgets, called ‘rights 
programmes’ in CIP, which are spent to stimulate the emergence of working local 
economies. The implementation of CIP should be a learning process, where the 
community gets the space to learn, make mistakes and rectify them. In addition, CIP 
aims to address all aspects of human development, not only economic development. 
Hence, if CIP is implemented by communities, it will contribute to the self-esteem 
and dignity of individuals and communities.  
 
The three pilot projects encountered a number of issues in the implementation of CIP, 
as described in theory by Reynolds. After analysing those, this research reaches a 
number of conclusions that should be taken into account when implementing CIP in a 
community. CIP is seriously needed in South Africa and if the recommendations of 
this research are taken into account, it could be very powerful in addressing the 







Background, problem statement, methodology and ethical 
considerations 
 
1.1 Background to the research proposal 
 
The late Dr Norman Reynolds, a development economist who worked in several 
countries and global institutions1, developed a programme called the “Community 
Investment Programme” or, in short, CIP.  The programme has its roots in the 
structural problems of the South African economy, caused by colonisation, apartheid 
and globalisation. According to Reynolds, CIP contains a strategy that could bring 
development and ensure economic liberation for all South Africans.  
 
Why is Reynolds saying that economic liberation should be brought to all South 
Africans? 
 
Today, South Africa is an upper-middle-income country (World Bank 2013), along 
with countries such as Brazil, China, Malaysia and Mexico, with one of the highest 
Human Development Indices in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 2013). Despite this 
relative wealth, large numbers of the country’s population is trapped in endemic 
poverty2. The National Development Plan, Vision for 2030, compiled by the National 
Planning Commission in the Presidency and launched in 2011, states (National 
Planning Commission 2011b:1): 
 
…for many poor South Africans, there is still much that looks the same, 
highlighting serious shortcomings in our development path. While we have 
made some progress in reducing poverty, poverty is still pervasive and we 
have made insufficient progress in reducing inequality.  
                                                          
1
 He worked in Zimbabwe, India, the United States and South Africa, amongst others, for the World 
Bank and the Ford Foundation. 
2
 According to Statistics South Africa, 39% of people in South Africa are poor. Here ‘poor’ means 
living below the national poverty line, which is R418 (using 2009 prices) per person per month 
(National Planning Commission 2011b:3). Reynolds said poverty lines were indecent in any case as no 
person could live a decent life on an amount specified by a poverty line and indeed, R418 per person 
per month is not sufficient for a decent life. In addition to the 39%, many other people have only 




To understand why so many South Africans are still poor, 20 years after apartheid, we 
should look at the structural economic problems created by South Africa’s history, the 
worst of these being the emergence of a ‘dual economy’. 
 
Since 1652, South Africa was colonized first by two European countries, Britain and 
the Netherlands, and afterwards by European settlers (apartheid or internal 
colonisation). From the beginning, these Europeans followed the global economic 
trends, which in the 17th century meant expansion of the own territory with the aim of 
enriching the nation by exploiting new territories, including the people living in these 
new territories. This first wave of globalisation was followed by a call for free trade 
after the independence of the United States in 17763, which was not necessarily 
looking to expand its territory, but rather to find markets for its produce. After World 
War II, the US and newly created institutions like the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank called for free capital flows, to increase the US borrowing 
capacity.  The push for more trade liberalisation and free capital flows succeeded 
further when the oil crisis hit the world later in the 20th century (Korten 2006, part 
III)4. 
 
This colonisation of South Africa (before and during apartheid) resulted in 
exploitation and oppression of its population5 and resources, resulting in the fact that 
blacks could not participate meaningfully in the economy. The majority of South 
Africans were kept out of the mainstream of the economy by means of inferior 
education, restricted opportunities for self-development and restrictions on movement 
and trade. They were controlled and marginalised, so that a small minority could reap 
the profits and benefits of the resources of the country on the back of cheap and 
unskilled labour. Land was taken intentionally with the aim of destroying traditional 
income systems from agriculture and cattle herding, so that, in the end, there was no 
other means to make a living but to work for the Europeans (Macozoma 2003:12; 
                                                          
3
 http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/timeline.htm (accessed on 2 July 2013) 
4
 See more detail in the literature review in chapter 2. 
5
 Before Europeans came to the territories that are now called ‘South Africa’, the population was black 
people, san people and khoikhoi people. With the Europeans also came slaves from Asia and 
elsewhere, resulting in a mixed population. For ease of reference in this research, when I speak of 
‘blacks’, I speak of all non-white South Africans. When I speak of ‘whites’, I speak of white South 
Africans who came to South Africa from 1652 onwards.  
3 
 
Reynolds 2005a:iv).  
 
During apartheid, this situation was intensified as blacks had to live in certain areas 
where business activities were restricted. Outside these designated areas blacks were 
not allowed to trade, nor could they own commercial property or run more than one 
business in the designated areas (Green 2008:402). All local markets were forbidden 
and only a few government-controlled wholesale markets were allowed, excluding 
blacks. Blacks had to travel to areas where white people lived to buy necessary 
products. Local production died due to a lack of local demand and entrepreneurship 
was erased. Education was offered in the Bantustans, but on a low level as the 
apartheid government would not invest in decent education while only low-skilled 
workers were needed for the mines (Reynolds 2004b:5-7).  
 
This led to, firstly, the emergence of the so-called dual economy, with one developed, 
so-called ‘first’ or ‘modern’ economy and one underdeveloped, marginalised ‘second’ 
economy (Reynolds and van Zyl 2002:4-19). Others refer to just one economy, with a 
more developed and a more marginalised part (Frye 2006:8). This type of economy 
emerged during colonisation and apartheid and persists to the present day. In fact, the 
policies of the South African government perpetuate the situation. It is not the 
purpose of this research to discuss the concept ‘dual economy’, so the concept is used 
as a metaphor for the so-called two economies, either seen as two separate economies 
or as one economy with a developed and marginalised sector.  
 
Secondly, this situation led to the loss of competence and self-esteem amongst black 
people, as they had to live in marginal areas with inferior education and health 
services, resulting in a further lack of competence. Blacks could not meaningfully 
take part in a working economy. However, they were part of the economy as 
providers of cheap labour and buyers of products and services, so the first economy 
was dependant on blacks. The areas where blacks lived in the so-called second 
economy were in turn dependent on the first economy for products and services, 
resulting in limited local production and job opportunities in the areas where they 
lived. Apartheid also caused a loss of social fabric in the black communities due to 




In 1994, when apartheid ended, the new South African government’s main task was to 
eliminate remaining discriminatory practices, including promoting the participation of 
blacks in the economy. But, 20 years after apartheid ended, so many black people are 
still poor and living in the so-called second economy under marginal conditions. Why 
is this the case?  
 
Since 1994, the new South African government has developed and implemented 
economic strategies and programmes like the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Plan (GEAR), the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), Local 
Economic Development (LED), the National Growth Path (NGP) and the National 
Development Plan (NDP) in order to address the structural problems of apartheid and 
to bring economic development to all South Africans6. Some successes were 
achieved, especially with regard to improving South-Africa’s global competitiveness 
and macro-economic stability, improving access to water, electricity and housing for 
the poor. But, with regard to the reduction of poverty and inequality, the picture looks 
less positive – with the levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality increasing in 
the period 1994-2000. From 2001 onwards, poverty levels were slightly reduced, but 
the inequality gap keeps on growing and people stay jobless (Bhorat et al. 2006:1; 
Leibbrandt et al. 2009:14-18)7.  
 
The first socio-economic policy of the post-1994 government was the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP). It had two main objectives, namely to address 
socio-economic injustices of the past and to alleviate poverty (ANC 1994:1.2.9):  
 
No democracy can survive and flourish if the mass of our people remain in 
poverty, without land, without tangible prospects for a better life. 
 
The RDP was based on the Freedom Charter and influenced by different stakeholders, 
including a report from the ANC’s macroeconomic research group (MERG) called 
                                                          
6
 I focus here on the socio-economic measures the post-apartheid government took, as these are most 
relevant for this research. 
7
 The percentage of South Africans living below the national poverty line was 40.6% in 1993, 41.3% in 
2000, 33.2% in 2004 and 39% in 2011 (Leibbrandt 2009:14-18; National Development Plan 2011:3).  
5 
 
‘Making democracy work8’, the ANC’s alliance partners (COSATU and the SACP), 
the Independent Development Trust (IDT) and the ANC’s department of economic 
planning, which was then headed by Trevor Manuel (Davis 2003:35; Green 2008:353; 
Visser 2004:6). In the transition period, many discussions took place on the economy, 
but by 1994 a consensus had formed that it should be a mixed economy based on the 
models followed in Scandinavia (Green 2008:339-341). The RDP was a compromise 
between the neoliberal strategy of the former apartheid government, the wishes of the 
private sector, who wanted a more market-led economy along neoliberal principles, 
and the socialist orientation of the ANC and its alliance partners, the SACP and 
COSATU9. The RDP stressed that development should be people-driven, meaning 
that communities should drive development and have a say in policy development and 
the implementation of projects relating to them (ANC 1994: principle 1.3.3; Pieterse 
2003:124-125). The new South African nation was to become a developmental state, 
focusing on the redistribution of economic power to the benefit of all South Africans 
(ANC 1994; Gevisser 2009:249; Macozoma 2003:15; Visser 2004:6-8).  
 
It is important to note the role of the IDT. The idea of people-driven development 
came from the IDT under the then leadership of Wiseman Nkuhlu. However, the IDT 
talked about ‘people-centred development’ meaning that people would drive their 
own development. The new South African government, however, changed it to 
people-driven, meaning that the government would drive development as it was given 
the mandate ‘by the people’ in the democratic elections. Government members 
believed that, now that they were in charge, they, the government, would help the 
people and therefore there was no need for NGO’s, CBO’s and direct participation by 
communities in development. The IDT implemented very innovating development 
programmes in the period 1990-1994, where people participated directly in 
management and in planning, and where they had access to resources. The IDT was 
transformed into a government body after 1994, implementing government 
                                                          
8
 MERG was established in 1991 and launched an Economic Framework for South Africa in 1993, 
called ‘Making Democracy Work’. The Framework suggested that the state should play a large role in 
the economy, to ensure both sustainable economic growth and a better quality of life for the majority of 
the population. It advocated a mixed economy, with a strong but slim state apparatus.  A lot of 
resistance came from the business community, but the Framework had considerable influence on the 
RDP (Davis 2003:35). 
9
 During apartheid, many ANC activists spent time in communist countries such as the Soviet Union, 
Cuba and Eastern Europe, with the result that many ANC politicians are influenced by 
socialist/Marxist thinking (Johnson 2009:74-75). 
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programmes and abandoning its innovating development programmes (interview 
Respondent 5; Jagoe 2012:1; Nuttall 1997:166-167, 207). 
 
The RDP office, led by Jay Naidoo, was closed down in 1996. Many thought it was 
closed because of the introduction of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) programme, a neoliberal macroeconomic policy accepted by the South 
African government. However, the ANC said it had never wanted a separate office for 
‘a government strategy’, which is what the RDP was, but preferred it to be executed 
by a government department. It was a separate office only because COSATU had 
insisted on it, as they feared the RDP would otherwise be forgotten (Green 2008:394). 
The transitional finance minister, Derek Keys, allocated a budget to the RDP office to 
pacify COSATU and other stakeholders, but he knew that the RDP would be 
incorporated in an existing government department (Green 2008:418). Mandela said 
in 1996, when he announced the closure of the RDP office, that the RDP was not the 
responsibility of some specialised department but the compass which guided all 
government activities (Green 2008:425). The RDP was then placed under the 
Department of Land Affairs. Manuel said that the RDP was the vision and GEAR was 
the instrument to implement it. The success of the RDP would depend on the 
successful implementation of GEAR (Green 2008:453, 457). 
 
GEAR’s main focus was economic growth, with a reduced role for the state in the 
economy, reduced government spending, privatisation of state assets and a more 
flexible labour market (National Treasury 1996:2, 4-5). GEAR was produced by a 
team of economists who started working on it late in 1995 under the guidance of 
Thabo Mbeki, then deputy president and responsible for economic policy. The ANC 
had called for the formation of a single, central, macroeconomic policy in 1995, to 
pacify investors, guide the economy of South Africa and ensure that the RDP could be 
implemented. The thinking behind GEAR was that the market would maximise 
growth, which would trickle down to the poor and make resources available for the 
government to redistribute. With GEAR, South Africa moved away from being a 
developmental state. The injustices of the apartheid era had to be addressed within the 
7 
 
paradigm of globalisation10. Trevor Manuel, who became finance minister in 1996 
and was then tasked with the implementation of GEAR, was part of this team (Everatt 
2003:83; Green 2008:432-441). In 1996, when the rand crashed and markets lost 
confidence in the South African economy, the ideal opportunity was presented to 
launch GEAR (Gevisser 2009:249-251; Macozoma 2003:19). The policy shift was not 
discussed with the unions in advance; it was presented to Parliament as a fait 
accompli. This, combined with the closure of the RDP office and the later non-
delivery of GEAR on poverty and inequality, has caused fierce and lasting criticism 
against GEAR (Green 2008:441-445, 446-447). 
 
GEAR did bring macro-economic growth and stability (however, only after a few 
years), but it did not create enough jobs, did not improve living conditions for poor 
South Africans and actually increased inequality. The extra tax income from 
improved economic growth was used to provide more services, infrastructure and 
programmes like the Public Works11 Programme, the Integrated Development 
Planning process12 and others, but Reynolds argues that these do not necessarily lead 
to local economic development as poor areas have little local demand. It did not 
succeed as a growth and development strategy and it did not undo the structural 
injustices of the past, a goal which could at any rate not be expected of ‘the market’ 
(Hoogeveen et al. 2006:60; Mhone 2003:45-46; Reynolds 2005a:iv-v, 22). The 
reasons are as follows: Firstly, the South African borders were opened for products 
and services from more advanced economies, resulting in job losses as South African 
industries could not compete (e.g. the textile industry). Secondly, by creating a more 
liberal, global and service-orientated economy, more workers with high skills and 
                                                          
10
 I shall not discuss here why the ANC government moved to a neoliberal economic policy. The aim 
of this background is to show that many South African blacks are, 20 years after apartheid, still not 
‘economically free’ and remain or became even poorer. The government’s economic policies failed to 
address the poverty situation and unemployment adequately. The reasons are that the ANC government 
inherited a weak economy, was challenged by a new international context where socialism had 
collapsed and neoliberalism was on the rise, as well as internal ANC politics (those in powerful 
positions wanted a neoliberal economy) (Davis 2003:44-48). 
11
 The Public Works Programme (later called the Expanded Public Works Programme) is a government 
programme aimed at providing poverty and income relief through temporary work for the unemployed 
to carry out socially useful activities. The Expanded Public Work Programme was launched in April 
2004 to promote economic growth and create sustainable development. The immediate goal of the first 
phase of the programme was to help alleviate unemployment by creating at least 1 million job 
opportunities (http://www.epwp.gov.za/, accessed on 22 September 2013). 
12
 IDP is a local planning instrument from the government; it gives effect to the Agenda 21 principles, 
namely involving the local community in development planning. Municipalities are responsible for the 
IDP and should, through consultation, prepare such a plan on an annual basis.  
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fewer with low skills were needed. Jobs were lost in manufacturing and agriculture, 
where many low-skilled and semi-skilled workers were employed. These workers 
could not readily find other jobs as they were unemployable in the service economy. 
Unskilled workers are in abundance in South Africa due to the historical imbalances. 
Thirdly, many jobs that were created, pay such low wages that a family cannot live on 
them. Fourthly, the people themselves were not invited to participate in development 
planning as the government thought they could do everything themselves (interview 
Respondent 5). It is known that the non-participation of beneficiaries in development 
projects contributes to the failure of projects, waste of resources and non-
development. Lastly, and maybe the worst result of GEAR, is that the system of cheap 
labour created under apartheid has persisted, now not to serve the interests of the 
white minority, but those of the market (Aliber et al. 2006:2-5; Frye 2006:6-9; 
Macozoma 2003:26; Pieterse 2003:126). 
 
The government has made a structural mistake by focusing on the development of a 
service-orientated economy, which left the poor high and dry. The expected trickle-
down effect did not materialise. Legum (2003:2) says that GEAR served capital 
markets rather than the South African economy. Also Reynolds and van Zyl (2002:4-
5, 34) say that the structural imbalances in the South African economy have not been 
recognised in policymaking after 1996, causing another round of marginalisation. 
 
Thabo Mbeki never really admitted the failures of GEAR but, from 2003 onwards, he 
started using the concepts ‘dual’ and ‘second’ economy more frequently (Neves and 
du Toit 2007:1). Mbeki presented the dual economy as a double-storey house where 
the rich live on the upper floor and the poor on the lower floor – with no ladders to get 
upstairs (Reynolds & van Zyl 2006:1). The first floor, or first economy, is the global, 
international, competitive economy which creates growth for South Africa and where 
very little state intervention is needed. The lower floor, on the other hand, is 
marginalised, has little economic activity and is home to people with low skills levels. 
These people are dependent on the first economy and the government for jobs, goods 
and services.  
 
With this reasoning, Mbeki argued that GEAR actually worked very well for the 
South African first economy, but not for the second one. He was, of course, under 
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pressure from the ANC’s alliance partners and international agencies to admit that 
GEAR did not work, and this reasoning gave him a clever way out (Neves and du Toit 
2007:3). He argued therefore that GEAR worked, but that some changes were needed 
for the second economy. Mbeki advocated a developmental role for the state in the 
second economy, focusing on delivery and investment in education and skills so as to 
create the ladders for the poor to advance to the upper floor. This thinking was 
reflected in the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), 
an economic policy which followed GEAR and stayed mostly loyal to GEAR. 
ASGISA addressed some of the weaknesses of GEAR, again recognising the role of 
the state, state-owned enterprises and state investment (Gevisser 29:310; Gumede 
2007:113, 140). More infrastructural and social spending and the promise to improve 
the capacity of local governments were to result in better job creation and, in this way, 
poverty reduction. Another way used by Mbeki and the then government to credit 
GEAR, was to refer to problems of ‘incapacitated local governments’, who did not 
know how to spend their funds and so failed to deliver services to their constituencies. 
There is some truth in this as local governments did (and do) often struggle to get 
their acts together. Local government does have a critical role to play in local 
development and service delivery to the people (Gevisser 2009:310; South Africa 
2006a). 
 
There are a number of problems with Mbeki’s and ASGISA’s reasoning. Firstly, the 
functioning of the first economy itself and the nature of GEAR, which created many 
problems, were never questioned. For example, the first economy will never create 
enough jobs for all. A service-orientated economy was established with GEAR, 
borders were opened for cheap products from elsewhere and the manufacturing 
industry declined. Also, new technology and capital-intensive mass-production 
methods replaced manual labour. In this way, the first economy actually caused 
serious job losses. Secondly, teaching people skills in the second economy is not 
going to help if those skills will not gain them jobs. And not everyone will be able to 
move to the first economy, due to inability or unwillingness. As long as no changes 
occur in the first economy, there cannot be changes in the second economy as the 
nature of the first economy reinforces the problems. Thirdly, the interventions 
government made in the second economy from 2003 onwards were ad-hoc, ill-
designed ‘projects’ spread over the country, such as the Public Works Programme. 
10 
 
There never was a structured, well conceptualised programme put in place (Aliber et 
al. 2006:14-15; Reynolds and van Zyl 2002:12). Even the NDP, which accentuates 
the failure of government to create jobs and reduce poverty, makes no mention of 
GEAR causing the failure. Instead, it mentions the failure of government capacity and 
coordination, along with external shocks such as the financial crisis, as the reasons for 
failure (National Planning Commission 2011b:4). 
 
Besides these ‘larger’ development policies of the government, there were also 
smaller projects which directly targeted the poor. One of these was the Poverty Relief 
Programme (PRP) of the Department of Social Development. This project disbursed 
funds to community-based projects, but the project failed as government officials 
remained in control of implementation and disbursement (Everatt and Gwagwa 
2005:28).   
 
When President Jacob Zuma took office in April 2009 another framework for 
economic development was launched, namely a framework for the New Growth Path 
(NGP), which could be seen as the government’s new economic policy. This 
document outlines strategies on how decent jobs, growth and equity may be created. 
However, it does not propose major economic changes, focusing instead on increasing 
infrastructure development, skills development and ease of doing business, all in line 
with ASGISA (Economic Development Department 2010). Besides the NGP, 
government also instructed a newly created body in the Presidency, the National 
Planning Commission (NPC), to diagnose the socio-economic state of the South 
African economy and to come up with a plan to address the identified problems. The 
diagnosis was very frank: since 1994, government has failed to overcome poverty and 
inequality. The remedy, proposed in the NDP, is refreshing and, in fact, it embodies 
many elements of CIP. Trevor Manuel, the NPC chairperson, said in his launch 
speech:  
 
There will be a paradigm shift from a delivery model to a capabilities 
approach. Development is about creating the conditions, opportunities and 
capabilities that enable people to lead the lives they desire. Communities take 




The National Development Plan (NDP) specifically says that a new approach is 
needed, one that moves away from a passive citizenry receiving services from the 
state to one where people are active champions of their own development, and where 
government works effectively to develop the capabilities of people to lead the lives 
they desire (National Planning Commission 2011b:2-3). The NDP was launched in 
August 2012 and endorsed by the ANC at its 53rd national conference in Mangaung in 
December 2012. However, it remains to be seen if its implementation will bring 
change. The NDP objectives are long-term, with results expected by 2020 and others 
by 2030. In any case, CIP perfectly fits this new NDP approach and it would be an 
ideal programme to roll out community development and fight rural poverty.  
 
Why would government suddenly suggest such a new approach? Because they have 
realised that they, the government, cannot solve poverty and service delivery on their 
own. They tried very hard for many years, and still people are frustrated, now turning 
against the ANC and the government itself, as witnessed by the many service-delivery 
protests by ordinary citizens since 2010. So, government realises it should involve 
communities in their own development. If that fails, they have only themselves to 
blame – providing an incentive to keep each other accountable. The government’s 
role should be to facilitate. 
 
But the good news for the poor since Zuma assumed office is perhaps lost in the 
growing government corruption during the same period. The president seems to 
endorse corruption by making statements such as that there is nothing wrong with a 
ruling party doing business with the state. At an ANC birthday dinner early in 2013, 
he even said that business has to invest in the ANC if it wants to prosper (Mail & 
Guardian 2013a). This could imply that businesses who invest in the ANC could be 
rewarded, which is clearly unacceptable. Zuma was also indirectly responsible for the 
replacement of the Scorpions by the Hawks, who are less independent and not as well 
equipped for corruption investigations (Mail & Guardian 2008). Some commentators 
even opine that Zuma has ‘corrupted the soul of South Africa’ (Mail & Guardian 
2013b). There is a direct link between corruption and poverty as corruption diverts 
resources from the poor to the pockets of a few. It leads to further inequalities and 
increasing poverty. According to the Council for the Advancement of the South 
African Constitution (CASAC), 30 billion rand is lost to corruption on an annual 
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basis. The only way, CASAC argues, to stop corruption is to let the people govern 
and decide on resources so that corrupt officials cannot divert the funds (CASAC 
2011:1-8). A similar opinion is shared by interview Respondent 5, who says that 
communities should be involved in their own development and decision-making so 
that they can keep themselves accountable and that money is not disappearing through 
corruption. And, of course, Reynolds says the same, arguing that people should take 
the lead in development. 
 
This brief socio-economic history of South Africa brings us to the Community 
Investment Programme or CIP. Dr Norman Reynolds, who developed CIP, claimed 
that it was the ideal programme to develop the economy of South Africa: counter-
balancing globalisation with greater localisation initiatives, focusing on the domestic 
economy and allowing people to participate meaningfully in the economy (Reynolds 
2007:5). Reynolds, a development economist and former chief economist in 
Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe from 1980 to 1986, came to South Africa in 1991, 
where he immediately started playing a role in socio-economic policy-making. He 
was a member of the steering committee of the National Consultative Forum on 
Drought under the IDT, which designed and overviewed the implementation of the 
Relief and Development Programme for the drought years in the beginning of the 
nineties13. This programme, executed under the IDT, was a pioneer development 
programme that saw the drought as an opportunity to also develop the rural 
communities. It gave each participating community a budget and the freedom to 
decide what to do with it. This led to immediate local ownership of projects, and real 
participation and freedom for black communities14. The drought programme 
influenced the post-apartheid RDP. ‘Putting budgets on offer to communities’ is one 
of the main principles of CIP, and I shall come back to some examples later in this 
research (interview with Respondent 5; Jagoe 2012:1-2).  
 
It is clear from the philosophy and modus operandi of the IDT that Reynolds was 
influenced by their approach. The IDT was established in February 1990 by then 
President De Klerk and started under the leadership of Jan Steyn. The purpose of the 
                                                          
13
 Minutes of the first meeting of the steering committee of the National Consultative Forum on 
Drought, 24 July 1992 (available in Reynolds’s library) 
14
 (Author unknown), Drought Relief and Poverty Alleviation, draft for comment, 1991 
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trust was to increase socio-economic development in the country. From the start, the 
IDT operated in the spirit of Another Development Theory (see 2.2.5). For example, 
the rural development programme initiated by the IDT focused on moving 
communities from dependency towards self-reliance. The IDT genuinely wanted to 
involve communities in decisions about their own future and they were breaking new 
ground in this regard – this was never done before in South Africa. Budgets were put 
on offer to communities and local trusts were established in the IDT’s school 
programme, which would own schools and development projects. The drought 
programme and the role Reynolds played also fitted this philosophy (Nuttall 1997:49, 
75, 89). 
 
After 1994, Reynolds was advisor to the South African government on the rural 
development framework. He worked for several years with local government all over 
the country, monitoring the impact of GEAR. He saw that the poor could not 
participate in the economy and that GEAR did not substantially reduce poverty and 
inequality. Over the years, Reynolds’s thinking culminated in CIP. In 2004, when 
Mbeki’s second term had started and there were no signs that he would consider 
another economic policy, Reynolds launched ‘the People’s Agenda’15. This was a 
South African think-tank advocating alternative economic policies, including CIP, 
that would include the poor. The then national department for provincial and local 
government (dplg16) appointed Reynolds in 2005 as advisor to rewrite the South 
African Local Economic Development (LED) Policy and Programme (interview 
Respondent 3). In line with ASGISA, the dplg was tasked to look at how local 
government could improve and assist in reducing poverty in South Africa. As 
indicated above, Mbeki saw the failure of local government as one of the reasons for 
continuing poverty. He thought that by improving the capacity of local government 
and developing a shared framework for local economic development (LED), poverty 
would be reduced significantly (South Africa 2006a). Reynolds wrote parts of the new 
LED white paper in 2005 and his biggest influence in it is the fact that CIP was 
included in the white paper as one of the four strategies for LED, under the name 
                                                          
15
 The concept of ‘People’s Agenda’ features also outside South Africa, amongst others in the US and 
in Thailand. In this research the People’s Agenda refers to the South African think-tank established by 
Reynolds to advocate pro-poor participative economic policies for South Africa. 
16
 This national government department is now called the Department of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs (CoGTA). 
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‘Sustainable Developmental Community Investment Programme’ (interview 
Respondent 3).  
 
In 2006, the white paper17 on LED for the period 2006-2011, was launched (South 
Africa 2006a:20-22, 29-32). To date, this white paper has been only partly executed 
and CIP has not yet been rolled out. The reasons are firstly that LED is located in the 
wrong department (dplg and now CoGTA) where no dedicated people are assigned to 
LED. Secondly, the budget provided for LED is very small and to execute the whole 
white paper would be impossible with dedicated resources. Thirdly, Reynolds’s ideas 
were seen by some in the then dplg as controversial and he did not have much support 
within the dplg. Only a few understood his ideas and translated them into less 
controversial language to be able to include them in the white paper. And fourthly, the 
government then and now does not want to give substantial power away to the people. 
This was the opinion of Reynolds himself and it was confirmed later by interviews 
with respondents 3 and 5.  Respondent 3, however, said that now that the government 
was aware that it could not develop the country alone, as is acknowledged in the 
NDP, it might allow projects where budgets are put on offer directly to communities, 
for example, and allow communities more responsibility.   
 
At the same time the white paper on LED came out in 2006, a few CIP pilot projects 
started privately, aiming to show government that CIP actually worked. I was 
involved in the implementation of one of these pilots in 2006 and 2007.  
 
After the launch of the white paper, a director in the dplg was assigned to come up 
with a plan to roll out CIP on a national level, starting in a few areas to pilot the 
model and assisted by Reynolds. In the midst of starting up this process, Reynolds 
passed away unexpectedly in December 2007. A few months later, the director in the 
dplg resigned. Another director took over and brought colleagues of Reynolds 
together to assist him with the roll-out of CIP on a national level. I was part of this 
team of colleagues who took over from Reynolds and advised the dplg.  
 
                                                          
17
 A white paper is the official predecessor of official government policy.  
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We know now that the socio-economic policies of South Africa post-1994 did not 
work well for the poor. We also know that Reynolds knew that and tried to influence 
the dplg and the South African government to do something about it, and that he 
succeeded with the new LED white paper in 2006. However, two problems emerged, 
one being Reynolds passing away the other being government politics, which bring us 
to the problem statement of this research.  
 
Firstly, after Reynolds’s passing in December 2007, the dplg and Reynolds’s 
colleagues continued working on a national plan for CIP, as outlined in the LED 
white paper.  However, the working group struggled to come up with a national action 
plan to roll out CIP. They did not seem to agree on what CIP was and everybody had 
different interpretations. Reynolds was not there anymore to bring clarification. There 
was also no document that described CIP in detail. In addition, some problems 
emerged in the CIP pilots. I was then involved in the implementation of one of the 
pilot projects and in close contact with the other one and both projects collapsed. 
Reynolds passed away in the middle of implementation and he could no longer advise 
and rethink the idea into a workable model. In the middle of 2008 another CIP project 
was started at the South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal. The implementers did not want to 
repeat the mistakes of the previous pilot projects, but how to achieve that? 
 
Secondly, in September 2008 President Mbeki was recalled by the ANC and a 
number of ministers were replaced, including the minister of the then dplg, F.S. 
Mufamadi. He had supported the new white paper and CIP from the beginning, as he 
understood that existing government policies were not enough to include the poor 
meaningfully in the economy (interview Respondent 3). The newly appointed 
minister, Sicelo Shiceka, seemed not interested in the white paper and CIP (interview 
Respondent 3). In addition, the director in the dplg, which was responsible for the 
roll-out of CIP, resigned and another director that supported CIP was re-employed to 
another unit. Consequently, all efforts to implement CIP came to a standstill at the 
end of 2008.  
 




This brings us to the problem statement of this research. Inspired by the first problem 
described above (no document available that described CIP in detail), I thought it 
would be useful to conceptualise CIP in an understandable document, which could 
assist practitioners with the implementation of CIP. Also, the problems that emerged 
in the collapsed pilot projects seemed to indicate that the implementation of CIP was 
very difficult, and perhaps not even feasible. But is this really the case? And could 
these problems not be overcome, or anticipated? Reynolds strongly believed that CIP 
worked and, knowing his experience and background, could he be so wrong? 
Therefore, during 2009 I identified the need to conceptualise CIP in an 
understandable document for implementation, and to indicate if CIP could actually 
bring economic development to all South Africans, as Reynolds claimed.  
 
In 2011, when the NDP was launched, I was further inspired as CIP is a perfect fit 
with the philosophy of the plan, which is to make people champions of their own 
development. The relevance of having a document available conceptualising CIP 
became suddenly very relevant, as CIP could be presented to government as a 
programme to implement some of the ideas of the NDP. 
 
And then in November 2013 Siyavuna Development Centre, the NGO facilitating the 
implementation of the CIP pilot project at the South Coast in Kwa-Zulu Natal, won 
the Mail & Guardian’s annual ‘Driver of Change Award’. This award acknowledges 
development projects that are innovative and have a real impact on the lives of the 
poor involved (Southern Africa Trust 2013). This award will attract a lot of interest to 
Siyavuna Development Centre and CIP, and hence, this research becomes even more 
relevant as it could be used when implementing new CIP projects.  
 
1.3 Objectives and research questions 
 
The two objectives of the research are as follows: 
 
1. Conceptualise and analyse the critical characteristics of CIP  
 
This research will analyse Reynolds’s thinking with regard to CIP and, in addition, 
study CIP pilot projects. Currently, Reynolds’s work on CIP is fragmented into many 
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short papers, articles, stories and the like. The idea is to conceptualise the way in 
which Reynolds envisaged CIP, obviously coloured by my own interpretation as the 
researcher, but staying as close to his thinking as possible. CIP as envisaged by 
Reynolds will be described in chapter 3. The feasibility of CIP will be informed by 
studying three CIP pilot projects, two that collapsed (chapter 5) and one that is still 
running (chapter 6). In chapter 7, I will then reconceptualise CIP based on the 
findings and analysis thereof in chapter 5 and 6. 
 
The following research questions should be answered: 
 
• In which development streaming does CIP fit, and why (see chapter 2)? 
• Why is CIP proposed as a model for economic development in South Africa 
(see chapter 1 and 2)? 
• Does CIP bring something new to the development debate (see chapter 2 and 
7)? 
• What are the characteristics of CIP? What is CIP (see chapter 3)? 
• Why did two CIP projects collapse and why is the third CIP project still 
successfully running after three years? Was it because the CIP model was not 
viable, or because of implementation mistakes (see chapter 5 and 6)? 
• Is CIP a realistic development programme for South Africa (see chapter 7)? 
 
2. Conceptualisation of CIP in an understandable form as a basis for 
implementation 
 
In chapter 7, I will reflect on the characteristics of CIP as how they turned out in the 
three CIP pilot projects. Hence, this chapter will compare the analysis and findings 
made in chapter 5 and 6 with CIP as conceptualised by Reynolds in chapter 3. The 
purpose of this is to see, firstly, if CIP as envisaged by Reynolds was fully 
implemented or tested in the pilot projects. Secondly, to determine which 
characteristics of CIP caused problems when they were implemented and why. Lastly, 
to indicate recommendations with regard the implementation of CIP to ease its 
implementation in future and hence conceptualise ‘a possible new model’ for 
community development, namely CIP (7.5). 
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1.4 Relevance for the discipline of development studies  
 
CIP aims to bring development for all South Africans. It is therefore relevant to the 
discipline of development studies, which focuses on development. For CIP, ‘bringing 
development’ means to improve the livelihood of poor South Africans and make their 
lives more sustainable. This is done by not only improving their economic position, 
but also by looking at other aspects of human development such as taking their own 
decisions, regaining their self-esteem, managing their own resources and 
independence from government grants. It is about people developing to their full 
potential in respect of their own needs and interests. According to the Indian 
philosopher Amartya Sen, development is about enhancing ‘human capabilities’, 
namely that which people can be and can do (UNDP 2011b). CIP also stresses that 
people should ‘take charge’ of development and decide for themselves what they 
want and how they want to achieve it. This indicates that CIP relates to Another 
Development Theory and Community Development Practice, which is further 
discussed in chapter 2. CIP also links with the post-Washington consensus18, which 
stressed, amongst others, that policy making should be much more flexible and 
dynamic by letting people affected by policies participate in the making of those 
policies (Geerts 2009:8).  
 
CIP complements Alternative Development Theory and Community Development 
Practice as it proposes an innovative way of implementing ‘development’ in a 
community. This will be described in detail in chapter 3 and chapter 7. 
 
The purpose of academic research is also to influence policy development in its 
expertise area. CIP is therefore relevant to the discipline of development studies as it 
tries to influence economic development policy in South Africa. Reynolds always 
hoped that CIP would become part of the economic policy of the South African 
government with regard to the development of the second economy. It is therefore 
hoped that this research will be used to influence the South African Government to 
                                                          
18
 The post-Washington Consensus is a development theory that emerged in the early 1990s as a 
critique of the Washington Consensus. Both these theories serve a particular way of thinking by the 
global elites, related to economic development and based on neoliberal economic ideas (Stewart 
2007:9). However, the post-Washington consensus, influenced by this critique of development, 
recognised that developmental states and their people should play a bigger role in economic 
development, not leaving all to the market (Geerts 2009:8). 
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adopt CIP and use it as its programme to implement some of the objectives of the 




1.5.1 Research paradigm 
 
The aim of the research is to conceptualise CIP as a basis for implementation in South 
Africa. This was achieved by questioning the CIP model and observing practical 
applications. The research is concerned with the way in which the social world is 
interpreted, understood, experienced, produced or constituted. The research paradigm 
is therefore interpretative, meaning that the reality is interpreted, understood or 
experienced. I therefore interpreted the data I gathered to conceptualise CIP. I stayed 
as closely as possible to the data and to CIP as Reynolds had envisaged it. As the 
researcher, I was aware of and critical of my own role as researcher.  
 
With regard to methodology, I used triangulation, meaning that I employed a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. In human sciences research, 
qualitative methods are usually used because its methods of data collection are 
flexible towards the social contact present at data production and the data collection is 
richer, so that analysis and explanation are more holistic than in quantitative research. 
However, I believe that in some instances quantitative methods may enrich qualitative 
methods and, therefore, I used quantitative methods as well.  
 
With regard to the type of study, it is a combination of exploratory research and 
explanatory research. The literature review is explanatory research so as to understand 
why many South Africans are still living in dire poverty and to help build my case for 
an alternative development model, like CIP. The exploratory research aims to 
understand the CIP programme by studying Reynolds’s material and by searching for 
new information to complete the programme by interviewing his colleagues. CIP and 
the CIP projects have not been researched before and, after data collection and 
analysis, I questioned the CIP characteristics as envisaged by Reynolds (chapter 3) 
and formulated ways of  implementing CIP successfully without falling into certain 
traps, as well as ways of making it more realistic (chapter 7). The CIP material from 
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Reynolds is new material that has never been published, but it is his intellectual 
property. I will acknowledge this throughout the research.  
 
1.5.2 Brief description of CIP projects 
 
I have conducted research on three CIP pilot projects. The first commenced in 2006 in 
Huntington, a small village near the Kruger Park in the province of Mpumalanga. 
This was the first CIP pilot project and Reynolds was himself involved in the 
implementation process. It collapsed at the end of 2007. In March 2007, a second CIP 
pilot project was implemented, in Tsakane near Ladysmith in the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal. This project was implemented by the uThukela Mzinyathi Christian 
Council (TMCC), assisted by two volunteers from Belgium (me and my husband). I 
was part of the implementation of the project during the first eight months and 
Reynolds acted as an advisor. My husband remained involved in the project until it 
collapsed at the end of 2008. A third CIP pilot project was started in the middle of 
2008 near Margate on the South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal and is still running today. 
My husband became the main facilitator of this project. 
 
A more detailed description of each project area will be given in chapters 5 and 6. It is 
important to understand the context of each project as this in some instances has 
played a critical role in the failure or success of the project. 
 
1.5.3 Data collection and analysis 
 
Data was collected by empirical and non-empirical research. The literature review and 
the first conceptualisation of CIP was done by non-empirical research, namely by 
studying available literature and information from Reynolds. The literature review 
gives an understanding of the issues and debates in development studies. It will help 
to explain why there is still so much underdevelopment in Africa and South Africa 
and build a case for CIP as an alternative programme for community development. 
Literature was also reviewed for the third chapter, namely documents from Reynolds 
to describe the CIP programme as he envisaged it. This chapter was enriched by 
empirical research in the form of semi-structured interviews with colleagues of 
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Reynolds. Afterwards, data collection took place in the existing CIP projects, by 
empirical research in the form of interviews, questionnaires and focus groups.  
 
Data analysis was done in an interpretive manner, staying as close to the data as 
possible in the most objective manner possible. This process already started when 
data was collected and when interviews were transcribed. An interpretative 
framework was developed (see chapter 4) which is used to analyse the data from the 
interviews and the questionnaires. 
 
I am aware of my own role as the researcher in interpreting Reynolds’s documents, 
analysing data and conceptualising the CIP programme. Time for reflection was built 
in and also soundboard moments with relevant people (my supervisor, ex-colleagues 
of Reynolds, my husband and others). This aspect is even more important due to my 
personal involvement in the implementation of the CIP project in Tsakane, along with 
my husband. He was also involved in the implementation of the CIP project at the 
South Coast. Hence, critical reflection, objectivism and triangulation with other 
resources were used in this study. 
 
1.5.4 Ethical considerations 
 
Firstly, I upheld high ethical standards and full integrity of my own and research 
participants’ work and research. I duly respected all intellectual property and provided 
adequate referencing where needed. 
 
Secondly, the informants who were interviewed were informed about the purpose of 
the interview and the research I was initiating. They could voluntarily indicate their 
willingness to be interviewed. I also sent each of the informants an information note 
before the interview took place, and asked them to sign an informed consent note. All 
informants who were interviewed were ensured of full confidentiality.  
 
When interviews were recorded, consent from the informant was sought before the 
interview commenced. The person who transcribed the interviews signed a 




For the survey research, all participants who completed a questionnaire did so 
voluntarily, after they were informed in their own language (Zulu) about the purpose 
of the questionnaire and survey. Confidentiality was once again guaranteed and 
respondents were not required to mention their names on the questionnaire, so that not 
even the person who captured the data knew who had completed the questionnaire. 
All informants were asked to sign the questionnaire at the top, to indicate that they 
had participated voluntarily. 
 
Overall, the research did not cause any harm to the research participants. The outcome 
of the research will not have any negative influence over the continuation of the 
existing CIP project at the South Coast. The shortcomings of CIP indicated in this 
research will rather be addressed by the facilitating organisation and the management 
of the project to obtain even greater success in future. 
 
In addition, the research has a socio-economic value as it articulates an alternative for 
socio-economic development in South Africa.  The research will be accessible to the 
public and relevant people may use it to convince the South African government to 
implement CIP nationwide and follow some of its principles when implementing the 
National Development Plan. The research findings and final dissertation will also be 
available to all research participants on request. 
 
1.5.5 Quality of the research 
 
Due to the interpretative nature of the research, and the fact that I was involved in the 
implementation of the CIP pilot project in Tsakane and my husband was the main 
facilitator of the South Coast CIP project, the research will have a high degree of 
subjectivity. However, I tried to stay as objective as possible, but I had to interpret 
Reynolds’s documents and the information gathered from interviewees and 
observation; hence there will be some degree of subjectivity. This should be kept in 
mind when reading the conclusions of the research. 
 
Most of the research will be qualitative. In this case, internal and external validity are 
important. Internal validity means that the findings of the research should follow from 
the methods and the research design, and should not be derived from other 
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considerations or hypotheses (Terre Blanche et al. 2006:163-164). This will be 
ensured by designing the interview questions in such a way that they directly address 
the research questions. With regard to the quantitative part of the research, sampling 
will ensure that the number of people interviewed ensures validity and reliability. 
Reliability relates to how a measurement is made. If reliability is good, there is an 
appropriate confidence and confidence interval during the sample design. The 
accepted international benchmark in social science research for confidence is 95% 
and for the confidence interval it should be ideally less than 5. In this research, I 
achieved a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 6.5, which means the 
gathered data are valid. Validity relates to the extent to which the intended construct 
of measurement – in this research the viability of CIP – is indeed measured. As this is 
not easy, the accepted standard in social scientific research is 60%.  
 
1.6 Chapter outline 
 
The first chapter of this research gives the historical background of this research, the 
problem statement and research questions and a brief description of the methodology 
that will be used for this research, including the ethical considerations.  
 
The second chapter gives a detailed theoretical basis for the model being discussed in 
this research, namely the Community Investment Programme. This literature review 
briefly describes the evolution of the academic discipline of Development Studies 
from its emergence until today. Afterwards, it is indicated in which sub-discipline of 
Development Studies CIP fits and why. 
 
The third chapter will describe CIP as conceptualised by Reynolds and will outline 
the characteristics of the CIP programme and what should be done, according to 
Reynolds, to implement CIP. The description of CIP in this chapter might be utopian 
and does not yet take into account potential problems when CIP is implemented. The 
aim is to describe the CIP programme as theoretically conceptualised by Reynolds.  
The information in this chapter was used as a basis for collecting the data in the CIP 




The fourth chapter will consist of the methodological procedures which I used for the 
research, for both the empirical and non-empirical research. For the non-empirical 
research, I have chosen to review mostly unpublished texts from Reynolds and other 
published literature related to the topic of this research, and to interview relevant key 
informants. For the empirical research, I chose to use a questionnaire, to gather 
quantitative data, and in addition to interview relevant key informants. The chapter 
also describes the method of analysis and says something about the validity and 
reliability of this research. 
 
The fifth chapter is describing and analysing two CIP pilot projects, namely the one in 
Huntington and Tsakane, informed by available documents and information from 
interviews with key informants. Both of these CIP pilot projects have collapsed a few 
years ago, but their analysis is of high importance for answering the research 
questions.  
 
Chapter 5 serves then also as a historical background to chapter 6, where the data and 
findings are presented related to the third CIP pilot project, at the South Coast in 
Kwa-Zulu Natal. The aim of this research is precisely to assess, by studying the CIP 
pilot projects, what potential problems with the implementation of CIP could occur, 
and how then CIP can be revised accordingly. Chapter 6 will present the findings 
from the questionnaire survey. 
 
Finally, chapter 7 will answer the research questions. These can be answered by 
reflecting on the characteristics of CIP as how they turned out in the three CIP pilot 
projects. Hence, this chapter will compare the analysis and findings made in chapter 5 
and 6 with CIP as conceptualised by Reynolds in chapter 3. The purpose of this is to 
see, firstly, if CIP as envisaged by Reynolds was fully implemented or tested in the 
pilot projects. Secondly, to determine which characteristics of CIP caused problems 
when they were implemented and why. Lastly, to indicate recommendations with 
regard the implementation of CIP to ease its implementation in future and hence 
conceptualise ‘a possible new model’ for community development, namely CIP (7.5). 
 




2: LITERATURE REVIEW 





An overview of the evolution of theories on development is important for this 
research, to show where CIP fits into this evolution, how CIP was influenced by 
existing development theories and how CIP enriches the development debate. CIP is 
an example of a more recent approach to development that finds its roots in 
Alternative Development Theory and Community Development practice. 
 
Development theory aims to explain how countries developed in the past and how 
they should, ideally, develop in the future. Over the years, adaptations were made to 
development theory because of changes in practice, as the ‘predicted’ development 
paths mostly did not turn out as it was thought they would. As a result, development 
theory underwent constant changes, but each new theory or practice would build on 
its predecessors (Potter 2013:67-68). 
 
The academic discipline of development studies developed after World War II under 
the influence of two important sets of circumstances. Firstly, large parts of Europe 
needed development assistance to rebuild countries that were destroyed during the 
war. Secondly, the process of decolonisation started and former colonisers wished to 
assist the newly independent nations to develop. This does not mean that there was no 
development in the colonies before World War II as, for example, colonisers often 
had a philanthropic drive to develop the people living in the colonies, in addition to 
the economic drive. Also, we can already speak of ‘development’ in the context of 
nation building, as in the US after the civil war when large community development 
projects were rolled out (Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:34-35). Others like Reynolds 
and Eric Toussaient (Diaz 2008) argue that development already started in the 15th 
and 16th centuries in the European countries, but also in other parts of the world that 




From 1945 mainstream development theory tried to answer the question, how to bring 
‘development’ to all the people of the world, more specifically, to the so-called 
‘developing world’ or ‘third world’ countries. Development was then defined as a 
middle-class lifestyle as it was lived in the so-called Western and modern countries of 
Europe and North America. These countries had gone through a ‘development 
process’ that resulted in an industrialised society where people had to work to live a 
decent life. Development was therefore an invention of the developed countries or the 
so-called West (Diaz 2008; Payne and Phillips 2010:56-57; Rist 2008:50-55; Sachs 
2010:viii; Stewart 2007:4-5). Other countries, that had not yet gone through the 
‘evolution’ of the US and Europe, should follow a similar path and ‘develop’.  Early 
development theory was then also called ‘modernisation’.  
 
Other development theories emerged afterwards, when it became clear that 
‘modernisation’ would not necessarily bring development as envisioned. Dependency 
theory and world system analysis criticised modernisation and said that not all 
countries could develop to become ‘modern, rich nations’ as in Europe and the US, 
because these countries became rich on the back of poorer countries and needed them 
for their development. Alternative development was then formulated on the basis that 
development should be much more people-centred, focusing on what people want 
themselves, rather than prescribing the same development path as that followed by the  
US and Europe. At the same time, the modernists formulated a neoliberal 
development theory (STWR 2012, Stiglitz 1998:20, Payne and Phillips 2010:88-97) 
acknowledging some of the problems and mistakes made in modernisation theory, but 
maintaining that the focus of development should stay on sustaining economic growth 
that would trickle down to ‘develop’ the poor.  
 
Reynolds was influenced by these developments and worked for the Ford Foundation 
and the World Bank in India in the 1970s, where he was implementing community 
development projects in rural areas. These projects were influenced by the ideas of 
Alternative Development (described more in detail in 2.2.5 and 2.2.7 below), namely 
to let people take part in their own development, let them take decisions and let them 
use their own knowledge when implementing development projects. Hence, CIP has 




An interesting aspect of CIP is that it does not reject ‘mainstream development’ and 
neoliberalism as such, but prefers to rather work with it and ensure that the benefits 
are spread more equally, and that the disadvantages of the poor and marginalised are 
addressed. CIP is a programme to develop the marginalised part of the economy of 
South Africa (and could also be used in other countries), so that all people may 
become part of the economy. Besides economic development, CIP also pays attention 
to social, cultural and psychological aspects of community development, and sees 
development as a ‘learning process’.  
 
This chapter gives an overview of the evolution of development theory and how 
Reynolds and CIP were influenced by it. 
 
2.2 A brief history of development theory  
 
2.2.1 The early days of development and its underlying theories  
 
In the early days, development theory was dominated by the ideas of economist John 
Keynes and modernisation. Keynes argued that economic growth, once achieved, was 
self-sustaining, but on condition that the state played a major role in the economy. He 
meant with this that economic development should not be left to the markets as the 
result could be economic depression, and that therefore the state should play a central 
role in intervening in the economy when necessary to ensure that economic growth is 
always sustained (Payne and Phillips 2010:57-60).  
 
Modernisation theory argued that societies went through an evolutionary process from 
traditional or pre-modern to modern. Modernisation began in Europe and the US with 
the industrial revolution in the 18th century, followed by political revolutions, like the 
French and American revolutions, and resulting in the modern states of Europe and 
North America. Modernisation is characterised by free economic development 
(capitalism), democracy and the idea of progress. Therefore, the focus of development 
should be on the creation of a modern nation state with an efficient bureaucracy 
pursuing the achievement of economic growth, which would then automatically result 
in better life conditions for all. The best way to achieve economic growth was through 
industrialisation, urbanisation and capital investment. Progress was measured in terms 
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of ‘economic growth’, meaning the more growth a country experienced, the more 
development would take place.  Rostow, an economist who advised the US 
Presidency in the late 1960s, argued that all states have to go through a staged process 
to become a modern state (Rostow 1960:4-16).  Development is therefore a staged 
process of economic growth through which all societies should pass to become 
‘modern’. These stages are called ‘the traditional society’, ‘presence of preconditions 
for take-off’, ‘take-off of the modern society’, ‘the road to maturity’ and ‘the age of 
mass consumption’ (Escobar 1997:86; Payne and Phillips 2010:59,178; Rist 2008:45; 
Shanin 1997:67-69; Zapf 2004:1-3). 
 
So the majority of academics and policymakers in the early days of development 
believed that it was possible to follow this economic theory worldwide, that it was 
applicable to developing and developed nations alike, and that all nations had to 
achieve the same state of ‘development’ in the end, namely ‘the age of mass 
consumption’. Therefore, development was the achievement of modernisation, where 
developing countries would reach the same level as developed nations – politically, 
economically, socially and culturally. As a result, the newly independent states were 
expected to play ‘a developmental role’ and make progress along the same lines as the 
developed ‘modern’ nations, with the US and the West-European nations as example. 
Karl Marx said (Roxborough 1979:43) that the country that is more developed 
industrially only shows to the less developed the image of its own future. It is not 
surprising then that modernisation was seen by many as westernisation (as the nations 
in the west were already modern) and due to the existing power relations between 
nations, the developing countries in many ways accepted this. Zapf (2004:5) argues 
that early modernisation theory was especially designed with the non-western 
countries in mind, with the aim to develop them along western ideas of progress, 
including institutions and values, and to spread capitalist ideas worldwide. In this 
way, the newly independent states could be influenced and controlled after 
colonisation had ended. Rahnema says (1997: ix): 
 
… the former colonial masters were seeking a new system of domination, that 
would allow them to maintain their presence in the ex-colonies, to continue to 
exploit their natural resources, use them as markets for their expanding 
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economies or as bases for their geopolitical ambitions. 
 
In summary, the concept of development was dominated by the ideas of the western 
or developed nations and capitalism from the start of the development age in 1945. 
 
2.2.2 The political context of the first decades of development 
 
The main drivers of this early development after World War II were the US, the  
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), namely the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations (UN). The IFIs were 
formed at the end of World War II by the US and other Western countries and are still 
controlled by them.  
 
In 1949, President Harry Truman launched the Point Four Programme, the first 
official development programme of the US, which focused on four points: the UN, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Marshall Plan and the development 
of underdeveloped nations. The programme rang in the development era. Truman said 
(Sachs 2010:1-2):  
 
we must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas…. our main aim should be to help the free 
peoples of the world, through their own efforts … by helping the least 
fortunate of its members to help themselves.  
 
The use of the word ‘underdeveloped’ and the accompanying development discourse 
implied that suddenly, many people were labelled ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘poor’. This 
meant that people were now labelled poor if they did not earn enough money, or were 
not wearing the right clothes, or were not eating the right food, or were not living in a 
proper house, all judged according to the ‘standards’ and ‘norms’ in the developed 
countries. Therefore, Truman’s speech implied that underdeveloped nations should be 
given a blueprint on how to develop, based on how the US developed, and with a 
focus on economic growth. He launched a world view where the US was seen as the 
nation to follow, economically, politically and culturally, instead of the communist 
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world view or any other ‘pre-modern’ world view. In this way, the Marshall Plan and 
development aid was part of a political strategy used by the US, and later the 
European nations, to, on the one hand, continue dominating the former colonies, and, 
on the other hand, to guard against communism. Robert Calderisi, who worked for the 
World Bank for many years, says that the World Bank was only created for reasons of 
self-interest: to promote the expansion of world trade after World War II and improve 
safety and security for the US (Calderisi 2007:156). The issue of security was 
obviously about the threat of communism. Development was used to influence 
countries to remain in the sphere of influence of the US and Europe, and not turn to 
communism (Ekins 1992:8-9; Payne and Phillips 2010:68-71; Rist 2008:77-79; Sachs 
2010:1-2).  
 
Against the background of the Cold War the notion of ‘helping underdeveloped 
nations to develop’, as mentioned in the Four Point Programme, was never 
implemented – the political reasons were always more important. Huge bureaucracies 
were established in the US and Europe, on national and multinational levels and in 
conjunction with the IFIs, which set out development policies, strategies, procedures 
and activities, all to be implemented by ‘experts’ in the developing countries and 
without asking the opinion of the people and countries who had to undergo these 
policies and programmes (Ellerman 2005a:1-10). 
 
2.2.3 The first critique on mainstream development theory: dependency theory 
and world systems analysis 
 
From the end of the 1960s onwards, development theory and the development 
programmes used until then came under pressure as the expected results did not 
materialise. In addition, development caused some undesired side effects, such as 
increasing inequality between countries and within countries. That is inherent to 
capitalism: it is very innovative in finding solutions to problems, but these solutions 
often lead to new problems elsewhere. Therefore, academics and policymakers started 
to reconsider. Dudley Seers said in the early 1960s that the application of one 
economic model to the whole world may not be possible, because countries differ 
fundamentally from each other. He therefore argued that different economic models 
were necessary in different parts of the world. Another academic, Hans Singer, said 
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there were built-in, long-term inequalities between the developed and developing 
nations and, therefore, they should not follow the same development paths. He 
stressed that there was no blueprint for development, as development started with 
people and their capacity to create wealth – and that could not be steered by resources 
and economic growth (Shaw 2006:243-245). Also, Escobar said that economic 
growth, or economic growth alone, should not be the only standard for measuring 
development (Escobar 2006:224, 225). Chambers and Freire added that development 
was in most cases ‘top-down’ from a Western point of view, without recognising or 
taking into account the views of the people who are to be ‘developed’. Hence, they 
called for ‘participatory’ development and research (Chambers 1992; Mohan 
2013:45-46). 
 
Further critique came from a group of Latin American academics called 
‘dependistas’, hence the alternative they proposed was called ‘dependency theory’. 
These academics tried to make sense of the reasons for the continuing 
‘underdeveloped’ state of Latin-American countries after the colonisation period 
(Conway and Heynen 2013:92). They said the only reason Europe and North-America 
were more developed than other countries, was their exploitation of the developing 
world for their own benefit, due to their dominant position in world politics and 
economics since the 15th century. The world economy should be seen and studied as a 
whole, using the term ‘centre’ to describe the developed world and the term 
‘periphery’ to describe the developing world. The centre keeps the periphery 
dependent on them so that, in fact, they are kept underdeveloped intentionally. The 
loan system to developing nations, which started immediately after decolonisation, 
kept developing nations dependent on the developed countries as all these loans had 
to be paid back to governments and banks in the developed nations. And, in many 
cases, the funds from the loans were used to pay firms and consultants in developed 
nations, with no local benefit or wealth accumulation. They also questioned whether 
the large infrastructure projects were for the benefit of local people in developing 
nations, or for the benefit of developed nations – so that cheap commodities could be 
exported efficiently to them (Diaz 2008; Payne and Phillips 2010:71-79; Salih 
2006:20-24; Shaw 2006:242-245). Paul Baran (Conway and Heynen 2013:93) 
indicated in his work ‘Political Economy of Growth’ that underdeveloped countries 
stay underdeveloped deliberately as the rich nations form partnerships with the elite in 
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the underdeveloped countries to their mutual benefit, while excluding the masses 
living in the underdeveloped countries. So all benefits go directly to the elite and not 
to the underdeveloped country in general. In this way, the elite become part of ‘the 
core’ and the masses become part of the ‘periphery’. Also, Frank said that the core – 
periphery concept not only played out between countries, but also inside countries 
(Conway and Heynen 2013:93). This is exactly what happened in South Africa during 
apartheid, but also from 1994 onwards. Addressing it is one of the building blocks of 
CIP (see chapter 3). 
 
The alternatives suggested by the dependistas varied from quite radical ideas, like 
Paul Baran’s suggestion that underdeveloped nations should break from the world 
system and pursue their own socialist economic planning, to more moderate ideas, 
such as protection against foreign competition, domestic production and 
industrialisation, local capital accumulation and greater state intervention to improve 
the domestic benefits of economic development (Baran 1957:10,11, 249, 250; Payne 
and Phillips 2010:71-79). However, dependency theory was in the first place a 
critique of modernisation theory. That is the perspective of its call on the periphery to 
‘claim’ their space in the world system and to fight imperialism and neo-colonisation 
more rigorously (Conway and Heynen 2013:93; Hettne 2013:81). 
 
World systems theory (WST) grew out of dependency theory and so there is 
conceptual overlap. It described the world as a system with different types of states 
which were all marked by a certain position of power, determining its economic 
development. WST’s main contributor, Immanuel Wallerstein, divided the world into 
centre (developed countries), semi-periphery (semi-developed countries) and 
periphery (underdeveloped countries), where the semi-periphery acted as a buffer 
between the centre and the periphery. The power and economic development of a 
country depended on where the state was located in the centre, the semi-periphery or 
the periphery. Wallenstein’s proposed solution was simple: developing countries 
should strive to become part of the centre (Rist 2008:106, 111). Another contributor 
to WST was Samir Amin, who said underdevelopment was the cumulative result of 
unequal exchanges between centre and periphery. Underdeveloped nations were kept 
underdeveloped for the sake of export to the centre. Underdevelopment was hence a 
product of how the neoliberal economic system was run. Amin’s proposed solution 
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differed from Wallenstein’s, namely that underdeveloped countries should ‘delink’ 
themselves from the economic system. Nations should have the option of following a 
different economic system, not necessarily capitalism, and they should not necessarily 
have to catch up and ‘grow’, but should instead find sustainable economic alternatives 
for themselves (Salih 2006:20-24). André Gunder Frank, also one of the dependistas, 
criticised Wallenstein’s world system analysis as he argued that the world system 
went back much further then 1492, which marks the beginning of the world system 
for Wallerstein. Frank says the world system started more than 5000 years ago with 
shifts in the economic centre from East to West. In the past, other parts of the world 
than the west were in the centre, and so were pushed out by the west. This cyclical 
world system may once again be repeated in future and hence the centre might 
develop where we now have periphery (Frank 1993:29). 
 
2.2.4 Mainstream development under revision: the rise of neoliberalism as the 
underlying economic paradigm  
 
Influenced by the above critiques, and exacerbated by the crisis in Vietnam and the 
end of the Bretton Woods monetary system with the termination of the dollar-gold 
correlation in 1971, the IFIs and the developed countries acknowledged that the 
existing development policies were not working. In 1973, the then president of the 
World Bank, Robert McNamara, called for ‘pro-poor’ economic growth. A United 
Nations meeting in 1974 resulted in the Declaration of Cocoyoc, which called for ‘a 
new world order’ where the purpose of development should not be to develop things, 
but to develop people (Esteva 2010:11). The report inspired others and a year later, 
two more reports followed, namely a report from the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and a report from the Club of Rome, written by Jan Tinbergen. 
The ILO report launched the basic-needs approach to development (ILO 1999:3; ILO 
1976:6-7; Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:36-37). The ILO said that the central 
objective of development should be the improvement of the well-being of people and 
hence development policy and programmes should in the first place focus on fulfilling 
the basic needs of people. So development should not focus only on economic 
growth, but also on the fulfillment of the basic needs of people, with the aim of 
reducing poverty. With basic needs was meant access to food, shelter, clothing, clean 
water, healthcare, sanitation, education and the need for people to be able to take their 
34 
 
own decisions. However, the basic-needs approach never really came up with a 
methodology for achieving its objectives and it quickly moved to the background. The 
‘Reshaping International Order’ Report from Jan Tinbergen called for reshaping the 
international order so that the gap between rich and poor would be reduced (ILO 
1976:7).  
 
In the 1980s two reports by the Brandt Commission, ‘North-South: A programme for 
survival’, and ‘Common Crisis’ (STWR 2012), called for a review of the international 
development debate. They stressed the huge inequality between North and South and 
stated that it had to be addressed to reduce poverty and ensure growth for all in future, 
with a more equal division of benefits. Development was described as more than just 
economic growth and a rethink was advocated. This was in fact the first call for 
‘sustainable development’, although it was not yet called that in the reports. Neither 
report was implemented (Desai 2013:5; Ekins 1992:23-29; Rist 2008:158-162). The 
intentions of all these reports were noble, but economic growth was still part of all the 
proposed solutions, and it was even indicated that economic growth in the South 
would be beneficial for the North (Chambers 1995:196). 
 
Due to the economic crisis of the 1970s and the critique on development, Keynesian 
economics came under pressure. A new economic paradigm saw the light, called 
neoliberalism. It was in fact not a new paradigm as it was based on the classical 
liberal economic theory of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. Smith was the founder 
of liberal economic theory, which described the market as ‘an invisible hand’ that 
would correct all problems if any would occur. However, the state also had a role to 
play where the market could not reach or play a beneficial role. Liberal theory was the 
basis of neoliberalism but neoliberalism went further, saying that states should not 
play a role at all in the economy. In fact, it ‘detached’ ethics from economy. The 
regulation of the economy should be left to the market, without any state interference. 
The state should therefore not be the main actor in development, but rather the 
market. In addition, the focus should be on policies enhancing the ‘free market’, such 
as deregulation of the economy, privatisation of state assets, world-wide economic 
integration and trade liberalisation, free capital movement, reduction of public 
expenditure and independent central banks. Neoliberal thinking was dominated by the 
Department of Economics of the University of Chicago and its most influential 
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scholar in those days, Milton Friedman. Friedman became advisor to President 
Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s, and so neoliberal economic thinking became part 
of the policies of the US and the IFIs. It influenced world leaders such as Margaret 
Thatcher in the UK and Augusto Pinochet in Chili. Neoliberalism became known as 
‘the Washington Consensus’, referring to the global elite who favored neoliberal 
economic development, driven by the US. They used their power to spread and force 
neoliberal ideas across the world. And again, US hegemony over the world prevailed, 
now in the form of neoliberalism (Payne and Phillips 2010:88-97).  
 
Due to the critique of development and disillusionment with the slow pace of 
progress, the Washington Consensus had strong influence on development policies. 
Neoliberals in the north saw the slow progress of development as the result of internal 
problems in the developing countries, like too much state intervention, weak 
government institutions and corruption, and not as a result of the world system 
(Hettne 2013:9). Therefore, the solution would be to implement neoliberal 
programmes in developing countries and reduce state intervention. These programmes 
were called ‘structural adjustment programmes’, which developing countries were 
forced to adopt as part of aid programmes and loan conditions from the IFIs or 
developed countries. As in the beginning of the development era in 1945, once again 
the opinions of developing nations and their citizens were not required. 
 
These structural adjustment programmes caused many problems in developing 
countries. For example, the reduction of state income due to the privatisation of state 
assets, which resulted in reduced state spending on education and health and 
increasing levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality, high inflation, economic 
crises and increasing debts. Additionally, it did not bring the promised economic 
growth and, in fact, some countries became more underdeveloped and poor. 
Neoliberal policies also caused inequality within nations. The gap between poor and 
rich grew larger and larger – South Africa is a good example19. So, the side effects of 
                                                          
19
 South Africa has one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world. The Gini coefficient measures the 
extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within an economy 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. Perfect equality is a coefficient of 0, which means all 
people have the same income, and perfect inequality is a coefficient of 100. South Africa’s current 
coefficient is 63.1, which means there is high inequality between the incomes of people (World Bank 
2013). Despite the introduction of neoliberal policies (GEAR and ASGISA) since 1994, the Gini 
coefficient or inequality gap has not been reduced. 
36 
 
neoliberalism were not taken adequately into account by the IFIs and the global elite 
when developing nations had to adopt neoliberal policies. However, in a number of 
nations, mostly in Africa, the slow pace of development also had local reasons, 
namely the looting of state resources by the local elite and corruption on a large scale 
(Onis and Senses 2007:266-267; Taylor 2007:454-455).  
 
Due to the above-mentioned problems and the growing influence of alternative 
approaches (see 2.2.5), the developed countries, the UN and IFIs reflected further on 
development. In 1987, the UN General Assembly appointed the Brundtland 
Commission, ten years after the Brandt Commission, to look into development 
problems, including environmental problems. Its report described development as 
human development with attention for human rights, democracy and the environment 
and introduced the term ‘sustainable development’ (Ekins 1992:30-33). The 
sustainable development agenda and the term ‘sustainability’, and the fact that 
community participation in planning for development would be critical to reach the 
objectives, was formally endorsed at the Rio Summit, or Earth Summit, in 1992 
(Reynolds 2005a:26). The World Bank launched Community-Driven Development 
(CDD) from the end of the eighties onwards. It refers to projects where the 
community is directly involved in the planning and implementation, including the 
management of funds, but with World Bank experts running the projects (Korten 
1980:482-483; Mansuri and Rao 2004:1-3). Maybe the most interesting result was the 
launch of the annual Human Development Report with a Human Development Index 
(HDI) in 1990. Influenced by Amartyra Sen (see below 2.2.5), the HDI combines 
three dimensions to measure development instead of one, namely living standards 
(economic growth), health and education (UNDP 2011b).  
 
However, once again the possibility that neoliberal economic principles and the focus 
on economic growth could perhaps be the problem, was never questioned by the 
global elite. The reason for this, according to Chambers, is because economists 
dominate the development discourse and the Northern countries are the ones that 
define concepts like ‘poverty’, what it is and how to address it (Chambers 1995:180). 
Esteva (Esteva 2010:13) also said that the attempts of the developed world to bring 




change were just ‘window dressing’ and that it was business as usual in the interests 
of the developed world. He used the HDI as an example, saying that developed 
countries would obviously be ranked higher and developing countries lower, with the 
message that developing countries should try to ‘achieve’ the same high rankings as 
the developed countries (Payne and Phillips 2010:136 and Rist 2008:178-183, 205-
210). This might be true, but what is wrong with calling for higher life expectancy 
and adult literacy rates? This should be encouraged and by measuring these rates, 
countries could keep track of their progress. 
 
In 1992 Francis Fukuyama, an American political scientist, published a book, ‘The 
End of History’, claiming that the ideological battles in the world had now come to an 
end, with political and economic liberalism (capitalism) as the winner. Due to the fall 
of the communist world since 1989, the ideas of neoliberalism had spread to the 
former Soviet Union as well and became accepted as the best and maybe last model of 
economic development in the world. Communism, as an alternative to Keynesian and 
neoliberal economic development, had obviously failed. (Desai 2013:5; Payne and 
Phillips 2010:86-98; The Economist 2006; Willett 2007:1154-1158).  
 
In 1998 however, a critical voice came from within the World Bank itself, namely 
from Joseph Stiglitz, then chief economist at the World Bank. He said that the side-
effects of the Washington Consensus were never taken into account. Stiglitz therefore 
called for an end to the Washington Consensus and the need for a new development 
paradigm with a larger role for the state. He called this new paradigm ‘the Post-
Washington Consensus’.  The IFIs then dropped the structural adjustment 
programmes. They recognised that the state and its institutions do have a role to play 
in the economy. Therefore, the state and its institutions should be strengthened, with a 
better legal framework, capacity building and good governance, as they are 
accountable to their citizens. The term ‘ownership’ came to the fore, which meant that 
developing countries and their citizens should have a larger say in development aid 
programmes, instead of the IFIs or developed nations dictating the terms (Payne and 
Phillips 2010:146-150; Stiglitz 1998:20). 
 
The global elite launched two new policies to spread their new agenda over the world: 
the Poverty Reduction and Strategy Papers (PRSP) and the Millennium Development 
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Goals (MDGs). The PRSPs had to be prepared when developing countries wanted a 
loan from the IFIs. Also, when developed countries gave development aid to 
developing countries, they did so in line with the strategies of the PRSP of the 
respective country. The PRSP should be compiled by developing countries 
themselves, in consultation with their citizens.  
 
The World Bank, however, had to approve the PRSP before any loans would be 
approved. More discretion was applied but, again, developing countries had to adjust 
their strategies to fit the World Bank’s neoliberal paradigm, which was not 
abandoned. Also, while the MDGs were noble in matters such as fighting back 
diseases like HIV/Aids and malaria, making sure all children go to school and 
reducing absolute poverty, other vital issues such as the inequality between and within 
countries were not addressed (Payne and Phillips 2010: 149, 162-164). So, the new 
ideas were welcomed, but they were in fact more of the same. The Post-Washington 
Consensus was rather a ‘new packaging’ of the neoliberal paradigm, and some ideas 
of the alternative approaches and the reports from UN bodies were included. The 
belief in neoliberalism and economic growth remained untouched, and the structure of 
the global economy, favouring the developed nations in many ways, did not change.  
 
John Perkins (Diaz 2008) says that poverty persists because of the system that has 
been created over centuries, and therefore, the system has to change for poverty to be 
reduced or eradicated. However, the developed nations and the IFIs never openly 
questioned the system and still believed that the failures of neoliberalism in 
developing countries were not caused by neoliberalism itself, being the incorrect 
developing paradigm. Rather, they saw the causes as social and political problems in 
the countries themselves, or the incorrect or insufficient implementation of neoliberal 
measures. This may be partly true since the leadership in a number of developing 
countries did abuse their power and looted state funds, but even this was in many 
cases supported by the global elite in order to retain certain political or economic 
benefits (Payne and Phillips 2010:97, 146-151; Pieterse 2000b:28; Rist 2008:211-
214). 
 




After the dependency theory and WST, more alternative voices emerged, 
simultaneously with the neoliberal thinking on economy and development as 
described in 2.2.4. Alternative Development Theory, which consists of different 
approaches going from sometimes very radical to more moderate views, further 
criticized mainstream development and influenced, to a certain extent, the changes in 
the policies of the developed nations and the IFIs. CIP is influenced by Alternative 
Development Thinking and its approaches, most clearly Community Development, 
which I elaborate on in 2.2.7 below. 
 
In 1975, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, based in Sweden, launched the concept 
and name ‘Another Development’ in a report, called ‘What now’ (Dag Hammarskjöld 
Foundation 1975:12-14): 
 
Another Development is people-centred, geared to the satisfaction of basic 
human needs – both material and, in its broadest sense, political; it is self-
reliant, endogenous, ecologically sound and based on democratic, political, 
social and economic transformations, which alone will make possible the 
attainment of the other goals. 
 
One year later, and also with the support of the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 
Manfred Max-Neef launched the Human Scale Development Approach in 1991. This 
approach holds that development is much more than economic development. The 
economy should be at the service of people and life and not people and life at the 
service of the economy (Max-Neef et al. 2009:3). Max-Neef said: 
 
the approach is focused and based on the satisfaction of fundamental human 
needs, on the generation of growing levels of self-reliance, and on the 
construction of organic articulations of people with nature and technology, of 
global processes with local activity, of the personal with the social, of 
planning with autonomy and of civil society with the state (Max-Neef 1991:8). 
 
Other academics, like David Korten (1980) and Robert Chambers (1983) also started 
advocating for ‘putting the poor’ first in designing development policy and 
implementing projects. The characteristics of Another Development Theory were 
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summarised in 1992 by Paul Ekins in his book ‘A New World Order’. Another 
Development does not reject development as such, but calls for other ways to enable 
development – where people conceptualise and control their own development 
process, using their own knowledge and resources and with a focus on self-reliance 
and the satisfaction of their own material and non-material needs, in an 
environmentally sustainable way and based on political, economic and social 
transformations (Ekins 1992: 19, 99-100). 
 
Immediately, some tried to give expression to the ideas of Another Development. The 
Zapatista movement in Mexico were one of the first when its members took 
development literally into their own hands in 1994. On 1 January 1994, when the 
North American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, Mexico and the US came 
into effect, the Zapatista movement started a revolution against the Mexican 
government. The Zapatistas called for Another Development as they did not want free 
trade, globalisation, bureaucracy and development aid to further destroy the lives of 
the indigenous people of Chiapas, a province in the South of Mexico where many 
indigenous people live. They wanted to live together in a way that protects them from 
‘development’, relying on their own forms of governance, their own life-support 
systems, information and management tools. They established an autonomous area, 
governed by the people themselves, rather than by the central-led government of 
Mexico. Villages started running their own affairs, taking decisions by unanimity or 
consensus in group discussions. Also, the villages established their own local 
economies where the Chiapas people could trade with each other. The Chiapas 
population knew exactly how they wanted to live, what to do and how to survive, but 
lacked the means to do so as they did not have land and benefits like other Mexicans. 
They wanted to run their own affairs, without being told how to live by the Mexican 
government, transnational corporations or other aid organisations (Esteva 1997:302-
304; Tormey 2004:131-135).  
 
The Indian philosopher Amartya Sen (Payne and Phillips 2010:121-122; Robeyns 
2005:94-96) further contributed to the debate and launched the concepts of ‘human 
development’ and ‘capability approach’ and contributed to the development of the 
Human Development Index (see 2.2.4). He argued that development cannot be 
measured in terms of economic growth alone as people cannot be labelled poor by 
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only evaluating their economic and monetary positions. Rather, the well-being of 
people could be measured by evaluating their capabilities to achieve human 
development. He meant with this that people should have the freedom to be able to be 
and to do what they want. People themselves should be the primary agents of their 
development.  
 
Also the practice of Community Development, which implemented projects from the 
early days of development, changed their method from the seventies onwards under 
the influence of ‘Another Development’. Community Development practice as such 
dates back to before the 1900s, but was influenced by the different development 
theories that came along and was hence used to implement development projects that 
followed modernization and neoliberalist ideas (Korten 1980:481; Swanepoel and De 
Beer 2011:34-38). Hence, when the critique on mainstream development emerged as 
described earlier in this chapter (see 2.2.3), Community Development also embraced 
the ideas of Alternative Development since the 1970s and became a practical 
expression of it. Community Development practice stressed that people should 
‘participate’ in development projects, have decision-making power and should 
manage the resources of the project. The role of institutions, or facilitators, should 
change to ‘empower’ people to develop rather than to dictate what should happen 
(Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:36-39). Contemporary community development is still 
embracing these principles of participation and ownership, stressing that any 
development project should be people-centred and empowering for the community 
involved. Community development practitioners play an important role in making this 
happen, by acting as collaborators (not experts) and refraining from organising the 
community into formal organisational structures (Yachkaschi 2010:194, 198-204; 
Chile et al. 2006:400). Yachkaschi (2010:202-203) and Westoby and van Blerk 
(2012:1085) further indicate that ensuring ownership is not easy, due to the current 
power imbalances caused by donors who insist on timeframes, deliverables and 
professionalisation. Ownership will result only if the community is allowed to ‘form’ 
itself, along its own timelines and using its own language. As the involvement of 
community development practitioners can make or break a project, the issue of 
whether ‘the community development practitioner’ should be recognised as a 
professional, is currently being considered (Chile 2006:420; De Beer 2011:402-414). 
Westoby and van Blerk (2012:1084) also maintain that a failure to educate the 
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community development practitioner will ensure the failure of the community 
development project. All community development practitioners should be trained – in 
terms of community development as well as in the contextual setting of the project. 
And, practitioners should get refresher courses and on-site training during the process, 
as they will learn more by ‘doing’. However, this should be guided and contextualised 
(Westoby and van Blerk 2012:1084-1086). 
 
Some scholars however, like Arturo Escobar and Majid Rahnema (Ekins 1992:9-10; 
Payne and Phillips 2010:138-139; Pieterse 2000a:285-293; Pieterse 2000b:22; Rist 
2008:259; Stewart 2007:4-5) wanted to go further than Another Development. They 
believed development as we know it should be ended in favour of a movement to 
‘post-development’. Post-development argued that development had not at all 
contributed to the improvement of the quality of life of the majority of the people of 
the world, but had only brought marginalisation and dependency for the so-called 
poor. It also argued that, for the whole world population to attain a middle-class 
lifestyle is socially, ecologically and economically impossible. Development was a 
project by the powerful countries to control the less powerful ones, exploiting them 
and westernising them. Post-development suggests an end to development as we 
know it, and hence, a focus on people’s development on a local level, where people 
use their own indigenous knowledge, traditions and cultural beliefs. A strong 
emphasis and responsibility is placed on local grassroots organisations, which should 
take the lead by organising themselves, identifying their own needs and problems, 
addressing them, and taking accountability themselves. However, the ideas of post-
development never came off the ground. 
 
2.2.6 The influence of neoliberalism and alternative development in South Africa 
 
The post-apartheid South African government had to address the injustices of the past 
and reduce poverty, but at the same time become a globally competitive nation within 
a neoliberal paradigm. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme, the first economic programme of the new government, 
was still loyal to Keynesian economics, stressing that the government had to play an 
active role in the economy and that people should participate in decision-making and 
implementation (ANC 1994: principle 1.3.3; Pieterse 2003:124-125; Schenck and 
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Louw 1995:82). In 1996 however, the RDP was side-lined as GEAR was launched. 
This new economic development policy was loyal to neoliberalism and the 
Washington Consensus. The RDP office was cut down to size and incorporated in the 
Department of Land Affairs, as GEAR promised development for all with the market 
maximising growth, which would trickle down to the poor and make resources 
available for the government to redistribute. In this way, South Africa was one of the 
few countries that voluntarily moved to neoliberal policies, without having a 
structural adjustment programme imposed on it. 
 
With GEAR, South Africa moved away from being a developmental state, assuming 
that the trickle-down effect caused by economic growth would emerge and thus lift all 
South Africans out of poverty. However, GEAR was in many respects a failure and 
did not bring development to all South Africans. The South African government 
implemented the wrong policy with GEAR (see 1.1 for detail). A country with 
structural inequalities and mass poverty should not leave the economy to the market, 
but control the market to ensure that the poor do not get poorer and that structural 
injustices are reduced. The ANC knew this, and also that neoliberalism could bring a 
number of negative consequences. The RDP literally mentioned some of the negative 
impacts of neoliberalism. The RDP was therefore formulated as an alternative, as a 
growth and development strategy with a clear developmental role for the state and 
stressing the importance of people’s participation in policymaking (ANC 1994: 
principle 1.3.6 and 1.4.17). When GEAR was launched and the government was 
asked why they adopted a structural adjustment programme inspired by neoliberalism, 
they mentioned the changed international economic environment, the absence of a 
clear macroeconomic policy for South Africa in the RDP and the depreciation of the 
rand. A clear macroeconomic strategy for South Africa was needed to attract 
investors, but also to make it financially possible to implement the RDP (Manuel 
1997: part 1 economic overview; Mhone 2003:21-24).  
 
The question is, would it have been possible to avoid following a neoliberal policy in 
South Africa, with the Washington Consensus dominating the world? Reynolds and 
Van Zyl (2002:13) say that, in a world dominated by the Washington Consensus, the 
freedom of a government, certainly of a developing country, to address domestic 
economic issues is obviously limited, but it is not impossible. They suggest a 
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combination of localisation and globalisation policies, as CIP also does. This is 
explained further in chapter 3. The East-Asian countries20 actually did this, by 
following some neoliberal economic policies but with much stronger state 
interference than the IFIs were advising. The East-Asian countries instead played the 
role of developmental states, interfering in the economy where appropriate to 
stimulate certain industries, protect certain markets, stimulate other markets as well as 
the economy to attract greater investment (Payne and Phillips 2010:102-105). When, 
in 1997, Asia was hit by an economic crisis and they then allowed the IMF and World 
Bank to assist them to solve it, the neoliberal advice they received worsened the crisis 
(Geerts 2009:5; Stiglitz 2002). This happened only one year after the implementation 
of GEAR, thus South African politicians could have known that neoliberalism would 
not necessarily bring the necessary economic change for all.  
 
In the early days of GEAR’s implementation, Reynolds was a member of the Rural 
Development Task Team in the Department of Land Affairs, writing a rural 
development framework. When GEAR was launched, the former RDP office was 
disbanded and what remained, like the Rural Development Task Team, was placed in 
the department of Land Affairs. The rural development framework, which was 
launched in May 1997, was inspired by the RDP and alternative development 
thinking. This can be seen in the framework’s main aspects, namely to ‘restore basic 
economic rights’ to marginalised rural areas so that these areas may become 
economically active, with reduced dependency on urban areas, and secondly, to create 
an economy of participation where citizens may become part of an active economy in 
rural areas and regain access to land. A very clear inspiration from Alternative 
Development is the framework’s desire to involve rural people in decisions affecting 
their lives through participation (Department of Land Affairs 1997:1, 9, 21). The main 
aspects of the framework are also to be found in CIP, but in more detail (see 2.2.7). 
Today, the Rural Development Framework has been replaced with the 
Comprehensive Rural Development Framework. This has the vision to create vibrant, 
equitable and sustainable rural communities through participatory approaches. The 
framework is clearly inspired by the earlier Rural Development Framework and RDP, 
                                                          
20
 Ten East Asian countries experienced sustained economic growth since the 1960s, namely the 
Philippines, Thailand, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Japan. The latter four experienced exceptional growth of more than six per cent annually over a 30-
year period and are called the ‘East-Asian Tigers’ (Sarel 1996:1-2) 
45 
 
but it has not (yet) lifted the rural areas out of poverty as it has not been duly 
implemented. 
 
In South Africa, the critique on neoliberalism and GEAR led towards the Accelerated 
and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) in 2006, a new 
macroeconomic government policy years after the first critique on neoliberal policies 
emerged. From 2003 onwards, then president Thabo Mbeki started using the concepts 
‘dual’ and ‘second’ economy more frequently (Neves and du Toit 2007:1). Mbeki 
presented the dual economy as a double-storey house where the rich live on the upper 
floor and the poor on the lower floor, with no ladders to get upstairs (Reynolds and 
van Zyl 2006:1). The first floor, or first economy, is the global, international, 
competitive economy which creates growth for South Africa and where no state 
intervention is needed. The lower floor, on the other hand, is marginalised, with little 
economic activity, where people with low skills levels live. These people are 
dependent on the first economy and the government for jobs, goods and services.  
 
With this reasoning, Mbeki argued that GEAR actually worked very well for the 
South African first economy, but not for the second one. So GEAR did work, 
according to him, but some changes were needed for the second economy (Neves and 
du Toit 2007:3). These changes were reflected in ASGISA and ASGISA recognised 
that the free market should be ‘adjusted’ by the government as the market would not 
solve all problems but, in fact, could even contribute to more problems. The state 
should play a developmental role in the second economy, focusing on delivery and 
investment in education and skills so as to create the ladders for the poor to advance 
to the upper floor. The development state moved to the front again. However, 
ASGISA stayed loyal to GEAR in many respects, and so also to the Post-Washington 
Consensus (Gevisser 2009:310; Gumede 2007:113 140). Once again Mbeki was 
wrong. While he did recognise that there was a second economy in South Africa, he 
wanted to solve its problems by hoping to absorb all South Africans into the first 
economy, rather than by developing the second economy – which is what CIP 
proposes. 
 
When the Zuma government came to power in 2009, it became clear that his 
government wanted to bring some changes to economic development policy in the 
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country, with first the launch of the New Growth Path and later the launch of the 
National Development Plan (NDP). The New Growth Path is a framework for 
directing the economic policy of South Africa by ‘restructuring the South African 
economy to reduce poverty and inequality’. The focus of the New Growth Path is on 
the creation of more and better jobs to achieve this (Economic Development 
Department 2010). It is the first time that a South African government document 
mentions that the economy has to be ‘restructured’. The NDP was informed by a 
‘National Diagnostic Review’, which set out the shortcomings of the government 
since 1994, mainly in terms of fighting poverty and reducing inequality (National 
Planning Commission 2011a:1). To address these shortcomings, the NDP proposes ‘a 
new approach’, one that moves away from a passive citizenry receiving services from 
the state to one that systematically includes the socially and economically excluded – 
where people are active champions of their own development, and where government 
works effectively to develop people’s capabilities to lead the lives they desire 
(National Planning Commission 2011b:2). It is obvious that the Planning 
Commission, which compiled the NDP, found inspiration in the Alternative 
Development approaches described above, as Alternative Development also calls for 
‘people-centred’ development, where people lead the lives they want and take 
decisions themselves. The facilitating organisation, in this case the South African 
government, should play a supporting role. There is, however, no reference as such in 
the NDP to Alternative Development Theory. The NDP was launched in August 2012 
and endorsed by the ANC at its 53rd national conference in Mangaung in December 
2012. However, it remains to be seen if the NDP will be fully implemented and, if so, 
if it will bring change. The objectives of the NDP are long-term with some results 
expected by 2020 and others by 2030. In any case, CIP fits perfectly into this new 
approach from the NDP and would be a useful model to roll out community 
development in South Africa and fight rural poverty. 
 
2.2.7 How Alternative Development Theory and Community Development 
practice are the roots of CIP 
 
As stated above, CIP has its roots in Alternative Development Theory. But also, CIP 
resembles to a certain extent Community Development practice as it was used to 
implement community development projects from the 1970s. Reynolds, who 
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conceptualized CIP in the early 2000s, was influenced by the ideas of Alternative 
Development and Community Development. In the late 1960s already, he had 
experimented with concepts of participation, ownership and the creation of vibrant 
local economies when he completed a doctoral degree in economics, investigating the 
resettlement on farms of previously disadvantaged farmers in Zimbabwe and taking 
these principles into account (Reynolds 1968).  Afterwards, in the 1970s, he worked 
in India – in rural community development projects that used Community 
Development methods, initiated by the World Bank and the Ford Foundation. He 
therefore had direct experience of Community Development and its practical 
implementation. Reynolds was clearly inspired by these projects as in the 2000s, 
when he told stories or argued the feasibility of CIP, he often referred to the projects 
he had encountered in India in the 1970s (personal interviews with Reynolds). 
  
To show that CIP indeed has its roots in Alternative Development Theory and 
Community Development practice, some of the main principles of each are discussed 
and considered below. The main principles shared by CIP, Alternative Development 
and Community Development are that development should be ‘a learning process’; 
development should be ‘people-centered’ with ‘participation and ownership’ of the 
involved beneficiaries; and development should include ‘all aspects of development’, 
not focus only on the economic aspect but also on the social, psychological, cultural 
and political aspects so that development leads to the increased self-esteem of the 
involved beneficiaries (hence holistic development).  If all of these are sufficiently 
taken into account, the chances of success for development projects are better, and 
hence the sustainability21 of the project is enhanced. 
 
Reynolds’s definition of development is similar to that of Hans Singer, one of the 
early Alternative Development thinkers (see 2.2.5), namely that people are the 
starting point of development and that development cannot be ‘engineered’ (Shaw 
2006:243-245). Development starts with people, happens in the minds of people, over 
unpredictable periods of time. Hence there is no blueprint for development as it takes 
different shapes in different contexts. Chambers (1992) said all development should 
be ‘participatory’, with input from the people participating in development projects 
                                                          
21
 Here ‘sustainability’ means ‘project sustainability’, meaning the project will continue when the 
facilitator withdraws.  
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(Mohan 2013:45-46). David Korten, one of the first leading Community Development 
thinkers, says a community development project cannot succeed if it follows a 
blueprint approach (Korten 1980:480). He stresses that the implementation of a 
community development project or programme should be ‘a learning process’ 
allowing for error, learning from mistakes and renewed action based on the new 
knowledge gained (Korten 1980:498). He further stresses that projects are therefore 
not necessarily suitable, as they are bound in time, have to adhere to project 
deliverables and have ‘an end point, or goal’. This aspect is still emphasised by 
contemporary community development academics such as Chile (2004), Yachkaschi 
(2010) and Westoby (2012). Westoby and Ingamells (2012:384) say community 
development is a concept that cannot be objectivised. It has no ‘best’ or ‘right’ way 
and each time community development takes place, it is different. Community 
development should rather implement programmes, which are not necessarily bound 
in time and which are more flexible, both in terms of deliverables and budget 
(Westoby and van Blerk 2012:1085). Yachkaschi (2010:200-204) believes donors 
should not impose timelines on communities as these will undermine sustainability 
and ownership. Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:46; 56-57) say only community 
development projects where learning takes place can lead to real change. Schenck and 
Louw (1995:84) stress that the implementer of a community development project 
should facilitate a process that should lead to learning, growth and development of 
people, not of things. So, when a clinic is constructed in a community and the people 
were not involved in the management and the building of the clinic, there was no 
development and, consequently, no learning. Chambers adds that not only the 
community should experience learning, but also the facilitating organisation 
(1995:197-198). Yachkaschi (2010:195-204) further stresses that facilitators of 
community development projects should not develop, but should rather capacitate 
individuals ánd organisations to develop, by being collaborative instead of imposing. 
Facilitators (or community development practitioners) should hence be trained to 
understand this (Westoby and van Blerk 2012:1084-1086). Reynolds believed that 
CIP could not be a blueprint for the development of all the communities in South 
Africa as communities differ and have their own dynamics. CIP is offered as a 
method for development, which should be guided by a facilitator and take shape over 
time. Which shape it takes, will depend on the involved community. He further 
stresses that therefore, the implementation of CIP should be ‘a learning process’ and 
49 
 
that the community implementing CIP is ‘a learning society’. There should be space 
for learning and, consequently, making mistakes. Reynolds advises in some of his 
many papers on the ways of building  a learning society and I elaborate on this in 
chapter 3 (Reynolds 2005a:29). From the outset, Reynolds called his idea for 
community development a ‘programme’ (community investment programme). 
Chapter 7 will look at the ‘learning’ that CIP itself, as an alternative approach to 
development, has undergone when it was implemented in the three different pilot 
projects that were studied. For example, the mistakes that were made in the first CIP 
pilot project (Huntington), were avoided in the second (Tsakane) and third (South 
Coast). Also, the CIP programme as such was adapted in the process, to suit the needs 
of the beneficiaries better and to become more responsive. This indicates the learning 
that CIP itself underwent, and the flexibility that CIP inherently possesses to adapt to 
the context where it is implemented.  
 
As mentioned, Reynolds worked in India in the 1970s. So did David Korten and for a 
period both worked for the Ford Foundation. It is not clear whether or not they ever 
met, but the similarities of their ideas are obvious. The rural development projects 
they both encountered were examples of community development projects allowing 
space for learning and where the project facilitators were critical of themselves, were 
open to learning from their mistakes and accepted input from the project beneficiaries. 
The projects implemented by the Bangladesh Rural Action Committee (BRAC) 
provide a good example, as these projects went through different stages of learning, 
influenced by what was happening on the ground and guided by people themselves. 
Hence, BRAC itself kept on renewing its approaches and thinking, which led to huge 
successes over time (Korten 1980:488-490). Another example is the small farmer 
dairy projects in India, which were promoted by the Indian Government and consisted 
of establishing village cooperatives where all farmers could bring their milk to a 
collection point daily. There they could sell any quantity of milk, even the milk from 
only one cow. The farmers got immediate cash for their milk to empower them on the 
spot with opportunities to spend the cash on other products and services (Korten 
1980:485). Reynolds used the example of small farmer dairy projects often and saw it 
as a useful project to drive the local economy. Both Korten and Reynolds were hence 
influenced in terms of what a successful community development project should be. 
Korten’s thinking culminated in the 1990s in what he calls the ‘Earth Community’. In 
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such a community, people live in healthy relationships with one another and the earth, 
the market serves the interests of the people and it is based on equality (Korten 2011). 
Reynolds’s thinking culminated in CIP, a new approach for implementing community 
development projects, but inspired by Community Development practice. 
 
Alternative Development Theory and Community Development stress that all 
developmental efforts should focus on the satisfaction of basic human needs, both 
material and non-material (Ekins 1992:99-100, Chambers 1995:191-194). An 
integrated approach should be followed when implementing community development 
projects, where economic, social, political and cultural aspects should be addressed 
together, in a coordinated way (Chile 2006:420; Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:41). 
That is exactly what CIP aims to achieve, namely focus on the satisfaction of all 
human needs, like experiencing happiness, improving self-esteem, achieving potential 
– not only the physical needs such as food and shelter. If people are happy, reach their 
potential and become more self-reliant, amongst others, their self-esteem and dignity 
will be improved in any case (Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:47-50). Also, CIP wants 
to focus on the collective level, for example by strengthening social cohesion, and not 
only on the individual level (Reynolds 2005a). Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:41-42) 
say that community development occurs when action is taken by a number of 
individuals who share a mutual problem and want to solve it together. However, 
participation should be voluntarily and not all people living in the community will 
participate in the project, only those who are committed. Cooke and Kothari (2001:9) 
say that, rather than a community participating, it will always be individuals in the 
community who decide voluntarily to participate in a project or not. They have to see 
the benefit for themselves and for the group, before they will participate. Yachkaschi 
(2010:195) mentions the importance of investing in the organisational development of 
the community to ensure sustainability. CIP is a development approach that aims to 
put people at the centre, involve them in planning and decision-making and focus on 
self-reliance. This is how people develop self-esteem and reach their potential. 
Community development projects that focus on improving only the income of 
beneficiaries do not do enough. Such projects might also improve the self-esteem of 
the beneficiaries, but the bigger picture should be taken into account. That does not 
mean that community development projects should specifically focus on ‘improving 
self-esteem’, for example, but the improvement or enhancement of non-physical 
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human needs should flow from the project and each project should therefore pay 
attention to those aspects (Chile 2006:420; Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:48-49).  
 
As does Alternative Development Theory (Ekins 1992:99-100) and Community 
Development (Chambers 1995:200; Chile et al. 2004:321-322; Swanepoel and De 
Beer 2011:50-52; Yachkaschi 2010:200-204), CIP stresses that people themselves 
should take the lead in decisions affecting their lives, focusing on fulfilling the needs 
they find important. To achieve this, local communities should organise themselves, 
identify their problems and solve them, with or without the help of non-community 
members, but with the community always deciding and if possible, using their own 
knowledge, whether traditional and/or indigenous or not. Development should be a 
bottom-up process where people themselves make the decisions – not the 
government, the foreign development organisation or the NGO (Chambers 1995:200; 
Schenck and Louw 1995:85; Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:44; Yachkashi 2010:200-
204). This focus on participation flows naturally from the fact that both Alternative 
Development and Community Development want to be ‘people-centred’. Without 
people participating in their development, there can be no mention of being ‘people-
centred’. Desai (2013:115) even says that people have the right to participate in all 
decision-making that affects their lives, so all types of development should always be 
people-centred. Reynolds stressed the importance of democratic decision-making 
when CIP is implemented, with a government or NGO playing merely a facilitating or 
supporting role. This condition for people-centred development was already stressed 
by Korten, Ekins and Chambers in the 1980s (Korten 1987:146; Ekins 1992:99-100, 
Chambers 1995:202-203). 
 
Participation means that the people (involved in a project or programme) are fully 
involved by taking part in the planning of the project, by making decisions related to 
the project and by taking part in the implementation of the project. They take 
responsibility for the project which goes further than just being involved (Chile et al. 
2004:321-322; Schenck and Louw 1995:85; Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:50-52; 
Yachkaschi 2010:202). The participation of beneficiaries is important as it increases 
the chances of success. This is because, firstly, there is a better ‘fit’ between the needs 
of the beneficiaries and the outputs of the project when the beneficiaries are involved 
in the planning. They know best what they need and what they want. Secondly, 
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because of the potential for learning and the space for local initiative. And thirdly, 
because of local accountability through the governance structures set up for the 
management of the project. All of these contribute to the relevance of the project for 
the involved beneficiaries. So participation reduces the chances of collapse when 
facilitating organisations withdraw ánd enhances ownership and sustainability 
(Chambers 1995:200-204; Cooke and Kothari 2001:1, 5-6; Desai 2013:115; Korten 
1980:496; Korten 1987:146; Westoby and van Blerk:1092-1083; Yachkaschi 
2010:202). Mohan (2013:46) states that the key question that should be asked in terms 
of participation in development is what the people, who are expected to participate, 
will gain from participating. If people do not see, or do not understand, why they 
should participate – what they or their community will gain – they will not participate, 
or at least not meaningfully. Facilitators should take this question into account when 
they start implementing a community development project. For example, the 
facilitators of the CIP project at the South Coast were indeed aware of this question 
and deliberately worked on showing the people how they would benefit if they 
participated (see chapters 6 and 7).  
 
However, Cooke and Kothari, Korten and Chambers advise caution as participation is 
sometimes abused (consciously or not). For example, sometimes community 
development projects collapse and ‘lack of participation’ is indicated as the reason for 
this collapse. However, this lack of participation is caused by the facilitating 
organisation following too much of a ‘blueprint’ approach, or keeping too much 
control and refusing beneficiaries the opportunity to participate. They sometimes give 
‘token’ participation to beneficiaries by, for example, asking their opinions when the 
decisions have already been taken, or by just informing them, or by creating a 
governance structure which, in reality, has nothing to say. The facilitators could do 
this, for example, to achieve the project goals more quickly, or to stick to timelines 
prescribed by the donor, or just to keep a certain bureaucracy in place and protect 
their own jobs (Cooke and Kothari 2001:9, Korten 1980:483, Chambers 1995:197-
198). Therefore, to always ensure real participation by the beneficiaries of a 
community development project, the facilitators should be flexible, pro-active and 
self-reflexive to ensure they never control the project. The facilitating organisation, 
even if it is a government institution, should give control to the people and it is not 
really important whether participation is initiated from the top or comes from the 
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bottom, as long as the people have the power to influence the development process 
and make their own analysis (Cooke and Kothari 2001:4-6; Desai 2013:116; Mohan 
2013:46-47; Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:50-52; Chambers 1995:1997-204). The 
facilitator should understand the local context and adapt the project accordingly, 
which means the facilitator should be close to the community and be capable of 
constantly learning and so improve the approach (Korten 1980:484; Chambers 
1995:198). The CIP pilot project in Huntington is a good example of why this is 
indeed important and what went wrong when the facilitator was not close to the 
community (see chapters 5 and 7). Another warning by Cooke, Kothari and Korten to 
ensure real participation deals with the existing power relations in the applicable 
community. These should be thoroughly studied by the facilitating organisation when 
a project or programme is started up. Power relations are often not visible or formal as 
such, but if ignored, they may sink the project (Cooke and Kothari 2001:14). Once 
again, the CIP pilot project in Huntington is a good example. The existing power 
relations in the community were not sufficiently understood by the facilitators and 
this was one of the main reasons for the collapse of the project (see chapters 5 and 7). 
Korten mentions that a community mapping exercise before implementation can be 
useful to avoid this problem. Mapping should be done by the community members 
themselves and can guide the facilitator to ensure a responsive action plan for 
implementation (Korten 1980:490). Also Chambers mentions that local people should 
make their own analysis of the situation before a development project can start to 
ensure sustainability (Chambers 1995:201). But again, mapping and identifying needs 
with the community could still lead to traps as this type of exercise raises expectations 
with the community. These expectations should be managed well to avoid 
disappointments, which many communities experienced when well-intended 
development projects collapsed (Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:43). 
 
The question of participation is, in theory, addressed in CIP by the arrangement that a 
representative and inclusive community trust (or other representative vehicle) should 
take all decisions related to the project. A facilitating organisation is merely there to 
provide support if and when required. Reynolds argues that ideally the state should 
play the facilitating role and put budgets on offer to communities. However, that is 
the ideal, and it does not mean that the facilitating organisation would not fall into the 
traps described above. The pilot projects that will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6 
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will indicate that these traps were also experienced by CIP facilitators, including 
Reynolds himself.  
 
Participation gives people the opportunity to bring in their own knowledge, which is 
not possible when the facilitation organisation comes with ‘a blueprint’ that is 
designed by some ‘professionals’ in an office far away from the community where the 
project has to be implemented (Cooke and Kothari 2001:5). Ekins refers to the 
importance of the contribution of ‘own knowledge’ when he sums up the 
characteristics of Another Development (Ekins 1992:99-100). Also Chambers 
(1992:6) says that rural people are themselves knowledgeable about things that are 
important for their lives. Korten (1980:499) says that projects should build on what 
people already know as they will then participate more readily and the risks will be 
lower. It is important to mention here that the existing assets in a community should 
be used as much as possible. These may be natural resources like water, rivers and 
soil, but also the roads that exist in the community, the town hall perhaps and the 
electricity lines. The people living in the community are also an asset as they bring in 
their own knowledge (Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:44). Chile et al. (2006:400-401) 
also say that respect for local habits and knowledge has a huge impact on the success 
of a community development project and should therefore always be taken into 
account. In Reynolds’s view, if you are poor, illiterate and uneducated, it does not 
mean that you do not know things and that you do not know how you want to run 
your life. Hence, it is important to let poor people have their say when projects are 
designed and implemented. That does not mean that other knowledge is not 
important. Specific education of the community may be required for the project. 
There should be a balance and no naïve assumptions should be made about any 
knowledge, as all knowledge should be relevant for the project.  Facilitators should 
always be realistic (Cooke and Kothari 2001:12; Reynolds 2005a:28, Schenck and 
Louw 1995:88). 
 
Another Alternative Development approach grew out of an emphasis on the 
importance of local assets, namely Asset-Based Community Development. In this 
approach, an analysis is made of what the community or involved beneficiaries 
already have, and how this can be used to build the community, or what opportunities 
for local economic development this brings. So it is a more positive approach to 
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community development. Rather than focusing on needs that still need to be 
addressed, it focuses on what is already there and how it can be used more effectively. 
An appreciative enquiry may determine what present assets already exist in the 
community, including existing social relationships, networks and associations (Mathie 
and Cunningham 2002:1-2; Chambers 1995:195). As described in chapter 3, one of 
the ways Reynolds would enter a community when introducing CIP is to ask them 
three questions, namely ‘who are you?’, ‘what resources do you have?’ and ‘what do 
you want to do?’ Reynolds stressed that existing resources in the community should 
be used when starting a CIP project. One of the important assets he said a community 
had was the huge amount of ‘unused’ labour that existed in communities. Many 
unemployed adults live in these communities, but they do have the capacity to work. 
If this ‘unused labour’ could be used by the community for the benefit of the 
community, what an opportunity it provides for community development (Reynolds 
2005a:34-36).  
 
The way participation is described above is the same as what would be meant with 
‘ownership’. In most literature on participation, this meaning applies (like in Cooke 
and Kothari 2001:1; Korten 1980:480-499; Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:50-52). In 
this research, the word ‘ownership’ is also used, which then means the same as 
‘participation’ as described above. Participation could also mean just being ‘involved’ 
in the project because of some benefit, but there is no real interest in taking part in the 
project planning, decision-making and in sustaining the project. Just being ‘aware’ of 
the project, and knowing that it exists in your community, is not yet participation. In 
chapter 6 where the CIP pilot project at the South Coast is discussed, this distinction 
between participation and ownership applies, as some of the beneficiaries are merely 
‘involved’ in the project without taking part in the planning and decision-making, 
while others are truly participating and do take part in the planning and decision-
making of the project. To promote ownership, it is important to build independent 
member-controlled local organisations capable of managing the community 
development project, whether CIP or not, while working closely with the facilitating 
organisation (Korten 1980:482; Yachkaschi 2010:195-204). Once again, in CIP it is 





Alternative Development Theory stresses the importance of the development of 
people leading towards self-reliance without being dependent on, for example, 
governments or donors (Ekins 1992:19, 99-100). Community development also shares 
this belief that development creates dependency from which it is difficult to escape 
(Chambers 1995:202-203; Korten 1987:146, Yachkaschi 2010:202-204). And CIP 
warns about dependency and the ‘wait and see’ attitude it creates with citizens. 
Reynolds argues that current social grants in South Africa foster dependency and 
passivity as they do not tackle the underlying causes of poverty and so keep people 
poor (Reynolds 2006:Annex 2). The long-term vision of CIP, therefore, is to 
transform the situation where poor citizens depend on social grants for their survival 
into a situation where social expenditure is redirected into activating budgets (as part 
of the rights programme as explained below and in detail in chapter 3) that citizens 
may access directly. This will transform them from passive grant receivers, depending 
on the state, into active citizens at the local level, providing for their own needs and 
so becoming more self-reliant. This would not only put development into the hands of 
people, but it would also liberate people economically and improve their self-esteem, 
which is once again an important aspect of real human development. CIP proposes to 
enhance this self-reliance of communities by starting with local production to ensure 
local capital and wealth accumulation. A vibrant local economy will be able to 
complete, or rather complement the global economy, so that both economies 
strengthen each other rather than undermine and destroy each other, which is 
happening still today. Also, on a macro scale, Alternative Development and CIP warn 
about dependency: dependency on the first economy or globalisation, or dependency 
on the so-called ‘centre’. The dual economy described in CIP, namely the first, 
globalised economy and the second, marginalised economy, may be compared with 
the centre-periphery concept of World Systems Analysis, where the marginalised, 
second economy is dependent on the developed, first economy. The first economy is 
using the cheap labour of the second economy to further develop and become richer, 
just like the centre was and is using the periphery to become richer. Reynolds, 
however, does not suggest breaking with the first economy, unlike Escobar, or 
becoming part of the first economy (or centre), unlike Wallerstein. Reynolds says you 
cannot simply ‘stop’ globalisation and neoliberalism and/or break with it. He 
proposes rather trying to work with globalisation and neoliberalism and ensure that 
the benefits are spread more equally and that the disadvantages are addressed. He 
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pointed out that the majority of South Africans live in marginalised areas like 
townships and rural areas (the second economy), characterised by non-working local 
economies, high dependency on the ‘global’ South Africa for jobs, goods and 
services, and an inability to participate in the economy. To bring these marginalised 
areas into the economy, CIP suggests a balance between globalisation and 
localisation, calling for a set of ‘localisation policies’ for the South African economy 
(Reynolds and van Zyl 2006:2). ‘Localisation policies’ means policies that help 
communities to create a working local economy and hence, become more self-reliant 
as described above. Communities should own their productive assets and production 
and trading should take place as much as possible within the community. This will 
improve the local money circulation and, therefore, wealth can be created within the 
community. The more the local economy is capable of providing local needs, the less 
dependence there will be on the global economy. Reynolds often used the example of 
the Indian dairy cooperatives, which contributed to the self-reliance of many Indian 
villages (Korten 1980:485). Max-Neef also argued that self-reliance of communities 
was the only way to promote real development. Local self-reliance will stimulate 
regional and national self-reliance, so the process is bottom-up and not top-down 
(Max-Neef 1991:57-58). Chambers said (1995:194-495) that, to create a sustainable 
livelihood for the poor, they should be paid immediately for the products they 
produce. On the other hand, not everything can be produced and traded locally, so the 
global market remains necessary.  
 
To enhance the creation of a local economy, CIP proposes the allocation of 
‘activating budgets’ to communities in the form of ‘rights programmes’. Rights are 
accompanied by budgets, which a community may use to address its needs. These 
rights budgets should be allocated by the government (national, provincial or local) in 
the form of child rights, investment rights, health rights and other rights (see chapter 3 
for a detailed explanation of rights programmes). This rights-based approach of CIP 
resembles the basic-needs approach and the capability approach of Sen (Robeyns 
2005:94-96). The rights budgets within CIP focus on the fulfilment of basic needs, 
like food, education, work and health. These rights budgets should be offered by the 
government to the people (organised in for example a community trust) and people 
themselves should implement them, if they like, as they want them. The basic-needs 
approach said exactly the same, namely that there should be a focus on the fulfilment 
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of the basic needs of people to eradicate poverty, in the short term (Swanepoel and De 
Beer 2011:36-37). Sen says that people should have ‘the capabilities’, or 
opportunities, to deal with their needs as they see fit. The government should create 
the environment to make this possible (Robeyns 2005:94-96). For example, Sen says 
that if a person wishes to be healthy, that person should have the capability to access 
clean water, a doctor and nutritious food, as all of these contribute to health. A person 
should hence have ‘the capabilities’ to access these. CIP says the same, as people 
should have the means to live a healthy life. CIP offers a concrete method to achieve 
this, which the basic-needs approach and Sen’s ideas do not. Governments should put 
‘health budgets’ on offer to communities. The community may then decide how to 
spend this budget, based on programme rules but also based on the needs of the 
community. In the Busiesvlei example (described in chapter 3), the community 
decides that there is a need for a local clinic, and that is what they achieve with the 
budget that is put on offer to them. Chile (2004:318) also mentions the importance of 
community access to community resources to ensure well-being. 
 
To summarise, CIP is clearly inspired by Alternative Development Theory, and by its 
practical expression in Community Development. Just as Community Development, 
CIP stresses the importance of participation and ownership; that development should 
be a learning process where the focus is on self-reliance and human development 
leading towards improved self-esteem. If these aspects are taken into account, this 
will automatically lead, in most cases, to an improved likelihood of sustainability. 
Hence, CIP builds upon Community Development and adds some important factors 
which will be studied in the CIP pilot projects in chapter 5 and 6, and reflected upon 
in chapter 7. 
 
2.2.8 The future of development  
 
Poverty and inequality remain part of the world, also in South Africa. The rich keep 
on exploiting the poor, the poor keep on supplying cheap labour to the rich and the 
developing countries remain largely dependent on the developed countries for aid, 
food imports and manufactured products. The meaning of the concept ‘development’ 
is also still largely dominated by the ideas of the Western countries, the IFIs and UN 
institutions. The meaning of development for them was, and still is, economic growth 
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as a way to reduce poverty and inequality and, eventually, the same way of 
development for all (Berthoud 2010:74-76; Payne and Phillips 2010:178; Sachs 
2010:x). The political will to focus on development and alleviate poverty in the world 
is also absent. The focus of the rich countries is currently on ‘the war on terror’ and 
ensuring safety and stability for their countries (Dodds 2013:4). 
 
However, just like before, there are also now dissident voices proposing alternatives – 
mainly ‘development’ that is less focused on economic growth and more on 
promoting fair and equal relations between developed and developing countries. 
These alternatives are influenced by the ideas of Alternative Development. One of the 
most radical suggestions in this regard is the call, by some European scholars, for a 
period of ‘degrowth’ in the developed world (Viellard 2002). Reducing poverty 
worldwide cannot be achieved without reducing growth in the developed world. This 
would also result in less pressure on the environment and the poor. Developing 
nations should aspire to economic growth, but in ways that are not compromising the 
environment and with respect for people (Viellard 2002). The current pace of 
economic growth in the world is incompatible with sustaining the environment. If, for 
example, the EU economy should grow consistently by 3% per year, which the EU 
officially aims to achieve, the EU economy would double in 25 years (Kenis and 
Lievens 2012:103). Imagine how much energy such an economy would need. And 
that is only the EU – economic growth in regions such as China, India and Africa is 
higher than 3%. Also, the conditions that were present when Europe and the US 
started on their growth paths in the 1800s are not present today. Therefore, a new 
development paradigm based on equity, community and respect for the environment 
becomes inevitable. A solution in this regard could be a ‘steady-state-economy’, 
which would use energy only according to what the environment and society can 
carry (Kenis and Lievens 2012:103-105). We produce what we need, not more. 
Economies should localise to reduce transportation costs and reduce work hours per 
individual to provide more time for doing other things and so that more jobs are 
available for the many unemployed. People should work the number of hours 
necessary to provide for their needs, not work to make as much money as possible. 
Local economies, factories and individuals should share resources rather than all 
buying what they need for themselves (Kenis and Lievens 2012:104-114). However, 
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such an economy would be rather utopian and many people, also in the developing 
countries, would prefer growth as in the developed countries.  
 
A less radical suggestion is to address the unequal power relations between nations, 
with a view to implement a new development paradigm. For example, the power held 
by the US and Europe in the IFI’s and the UN has been a point of discussion for a 
long time, but reforms that would give equal power to all nations have still not been 
achieved. They are put forward by developing nations, but vetoed by developed 
nations. Neves and du Toit (2007:28-29) argue that any new development paradigm 
should first focus on addressing the unequal power relations – between nations and 
between people – as change will not happen otherwise. World trade rules and 
procedures should be fair and equal to all nations, without benefitting the developed 
countries. But, once again, this might also not happen soon as developed nations will 
not easily give up their power. The alternative suggested by Thomas Friedman, 
namely ‘the green economy’, might perhaps fit here as it does not require developed 
countries to give up their power. Green economy is a form of ‘green capitalism’ 
which will use the flexibility and innovation of the market to move towards a 
‘greener’ and ‘more equal’ economy, however still based on private property, the 
accumulation of capital, productivity and cheap labour  (Kenis and Lievens 2012:115-
122). The market has always been innovative to solve the problems of humanity, so 
why would the market not be the solution this time? It is basically more of the same 
but packaged nicely as neoliberalism did before (see 2.2.4). 
 
More concrete and realistic alternatives are fortunately also suggested by, amongst 
others, David Korten, the New Economics Foundation, the Open Development 
movement and, of course, Reynolds with CIP. These alternatives are briefly described 
below.  
 
Korten’s alternative for a new world is called ‘the Earth Community’. In this 
community, people live in healthy relationships with one another and the earth, while 
the market serves the interests of the people and is based on equality. He stresses the 
importance of choosing our own future, not dictated by the market, states and 
corporations, as well as strong, organised communities (Korten 2011). The New 
Economics Foundation and its local branch, South African New Economics, is a 
61 
 
think-tank challenging mainstream economic and development thinking and 
suggesting a new way of thinking, where economic wellbeing is pursued, and people 
and the planet are considered first (NEF 2011). It is important that these alternatives 
all call for a ‘natural move’ towards another, more sustainable society, which grows 
over time and which cannot be ‘managed’ – communities are not companies. It will 
take some time to move to this more healthy way of living, but it will be worthwhile.  
 
‘Open Development’ is a new, still emerging concept, overlapping substantially with 
Alternative Development. According to Matthew Smith (Smith et al. 2008:1) of the 
International Development Research Centre, Open Development is about making data 
and information available between developed and developing nations, between 
governments and citizens and between the citizens of developed nations and those of 
developing nations. This would improve fairness, but also, citizens would know 
which resources are available to them. They would therefore be in a better position to 
keep their governments and also the donors (mostly from developed countries) 
accountable. Secondly, Open Development calls for more participatory development 
processes and, thirdly, more inclusive, collaborative and bottom-up development, 
which are two ideas taken over from Alternative Development. Lastly, Open 
Development calls for horizontal knowledge sharing between developing nations 
rather than with developed nations, to share experiences and overcome problems 
(Gigler 2012). 
 
As the alternatives mentioned above, CIP is also a concrete alternative for 
development and it obviously overlaps with these. CIP shares Korten’s ideas that 
strong, organised communities should be in charge of development, and not markets. 
It shares with the NEF the idea that people should be considered first instead of profit, 
and CIP also challenges mainstream development and acknowledges that we cannot 
carry on like we do today. A new economy is needed, with a focus on allowing people 
to lead their own lives and take decisions on public funds. Real change can only 
happen when it comes from the bottom. The concept of Open Development overlaps 
with CIP in that ‘knowing the resources available’ is one of the main characteristics 
of CIP. If people are to choose their own development, they should know the 
resources that are available to them. Planning is done bottom-up and public 
institutions should assist and facilitate the execution of community planning. So 
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development planning becomes totally decentralised as people themselves decide, 
instead of government officials in the capital, or worse, officials from developed 
countries or IFI’s. Reynolds says that if the objective of an economy is to create 
maximum profits and value for money, then the viewpoint of economic growth as 
efficient as possible should underpin the economy. But if the objective of an economy 
is to reach non-materialistic goals for citizens, such as stable living conditions, 
fairness, sustainability and dignity for all, then the economy should be underpinned 
according to these objectives, which are the key targets of communities and citizens 
(Reynolds 2005a:vi). 
 
Will the above alternative development approaches and CIP have a chance in this 
unequal world? I believe so, as the poor demand changes. The rulers will have to 
address their demands to keep their votes, at least in democracies, and the 
multinationals will have to pay higher wages as delocalising their businesses to 
‘cheaper’ places will become unviable in the long run. CIP, however, also calls for the 
development of the local economy, where people produce and buy local products as 
far as possible. If law and policy makers would start to draft legislation to promote a 
local economy, people would have to follow and it would become more viable than 
now as cheap imports would be kept to a minimum. However, until that happens, 




The Community Investment Programme is an alternative for mainstream development 
thinking. It is a programme that may be classified as an approach of Alternative 
Development, calling for community-driven development where people themselves 
take the lead in their own development, using their own knowledge and resources, and 
assisted by government. CIP has synergies with the basic-needs approach, the 
capabilities approach of Sen, the ideas of Ekins, Chambers, Manfred Max-Neef, 
David Korten, community development practice and others.   
 
In South Africa, the neoliberal development paradigm is still dominant. However, 
some positive changes are mentioned in the new NDP. It is not yet clear whether 
these will bring the needed transformation. However, it is encouraging to see that CIP 
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would fit nicely into the NDP: 
 
Communities, in partnership with government, will develop the capabilities to 
improve their own lives… we have to forge an active citizenry that takes 
ownership of the solutions… we therefore launch a paradigm shift from a 
delivery model to a capabilities approach where communities are active in 
their own development (National Planning Commission 2011b) 
 
The fact that CIP could be used as a model for local economic development in the 
NDP increases the relevance of this research, because if this research could prove that 
CIP is indeed an alternative approach to local economic development in South Africa, 










3: THE COMMUNITY INVESTMENT PROGRAMME 
(CIP) 
The Community Investment Programme as conceptualised by Dr N. 
Reynolds 
 
This chapter will describe CIP as conceptualised by Reynolds and will outline the 
characteristics of the CIP and what should be done, according to Reynolds, to 
implement it. The description of CIP in this chapter might be utopian and does not yet 
take into account potential problems with implementation. The aim is to describe CIP 
as theoretically conceptualised by Reynolds. The information in this chapter was used 
as a basis for collecting the data in the CIP pilot projects. The aim of this research is 
then precisely to assess, by studying the CIP pilot projects, what potential problems 
with implementation could occur and how CIP may be revised accordingly. The main 
questions are: Does CIP, as conceptualised by Reynolds, work? And: How can CIP be 
adapted to contribute meaningfully to local economic development in South Africa? 
In chapter 7 I reflect on the characteristics of CIP as revealed in the pilot projects. 
Recommendations will be put forward, for use as a basis when CIP is implemented.  
 
This chapter is based on documents written by Reynolds, discussions with him and 
interviews with his colleagues. As indicated in chapter 2, CIP is based on Alternative 
Development Theory and related practices, hence many of the ideas of CIP may be 
attributed to one of those. 
 
3.1 Understanding CIP: the Busiesvlei case study 
 
As a starting point to conceptualise CIP, I describe below an example of a community 
development programme, executed from 1992 to 1994 as part of the Independent 
Development Trust’s (IDT) drought programme. This programme was conceptualised 
by Reynolds and is the predecessor of CIP, containing a number of CIP characteristics 
(Jagoe 2012:1).  
 
The example of Busiesvlei was related to me by Reynolds. He was asked by the IDT 
to conceptualise a drought relief and development programme that would provide a 
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quick response to the problems caused by the drought and, at the same time, provide a 
model to serve as a platform for sound socio-economic development (Jagoe 2012:11).  
The IDT was asked by the government to assist communities hit by the drought – 
mostly communities living on farms, where many had lost their jobs. According to 
Respondent 5, then a board member of the IDT and later its CEO, the approach of 
assisting drought-hit communities had to be inclusive and people-centred. The IDT 
wanted to ensure that communities had full ownership of the development projects 
they were implementing. Also, as the drought project was happening in the political 
transition period in South Africa, trust levels towards outsiders were low. The IDT 
wanted to achieve legitimacy for its projects and believed it could only be done by 
ensuring full ownership. Therefore, communities affected by drought were given 
access to ‘budgets’, to invest in whatever they deemed important, under certain rules. 
For the first time in South African history, communities had direct access to such 
funds through signatories elected by the community.  
 
One of the communities that received such a budget was Busiesvlei, a labour 
township located between farms in the North West Province. It received a grant of 
R40 000 as part of the drought relief programme. Before the grant was allocated, 
Reynolds visited the community and had a brief meeting with some community 
leaders. After the visit, a letter was sent to the community to explain the grant 
opportunity and what they had to do as a community to receive the grant. The 
community then had to come together and democratically decide if they wanted the 
grant and, if yes, what to do with it. It was presumed, and later confirmed in practice, 
that a public letter placing funds on the community table would unite and mobilise the 
members of a community. Reynolds visited Busiesvlei several times after that to 
explain the use of the grant. According to Respondent 5, the facilitators had to 
identify the leaders of the community and let them bring together the community to 
identify spending priorities and appoint signatories for the account. The Busiesvlei 
community was initially upset that they received only such a small grant – they 
wanted a clinic and how could they build a clinic with R40 000? But Reynolds 
explained during his sessions with them that much could be done. After five months 
of interaction with Reynolds and internal debate, things started happening. 
Community representatives visited the Provincial Health Department, who could not 
help with a clinic, but they referred them to a nearby clinic for assistance. They then 
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visited this clinic and explained their wish for a clinic in Busiesvlei. One of the 
doctors at the clinic was impressed by the pro-activeness of the community and he 
arranged an ambulance service between Busiesvlei and his clinic. However, the town 
clerk where the clinic was located objected to the ambulance service. In his opinion 
the clinic was already overstretched. The doctor and one of the sisters of the clinic 
then offered to come to Busiesvlei twice a week if the community could cover their 
transport costs and arrange for a place that could be used as a clinic. The community 
got frustrated as they did not have a place that could be used as a clinic in Busiesvlei. 
Again, Reynolds said they had to be creative. The community members then went to 
the Ditsobotla Local Municipality, which had Busiesvlei under its jurisdiction, and 
were offered an old house for R1 040. The community renovated the building, paying 
for the labour from the grant, and they had a clinic! The doctor and sister visited the 
new clinic twice a week. After the clinic was ready, R27 000 from the R40 000 was 
left. The community then identified further uses for the money and in the end a youth 
centre was established and a partnership was arranged with two commercial farmers 
nearby. Community members could use some of the farmland to grow vegetables and, 
in return, they offered their labour to the farmer concerned. Also, part of their 
production was bought by the farmer and in this manner they established a connection 
with the South African economy and benefited from it (Discussions with Reynolds; 
Interview with Respondent 5; Jagoe 2012:1-2; Massingham 2009:1-2). 
 
This case study illustrates the main characteristics of CIP, which overlap with the 
characteristics of Alternative Development Theory and Community Development 
Practice, as described in chapter 2: 
 
• People-centred development where intended beneficiaries take the decisions, 
are involved in planning and participate in the project implementation. The 
Busiesvlei community decided themselves what to do with the grant after 
identifying the most urgent issue for them, namely a clinic. They planned the 
entire establishment of the clinic themselves, including renovating the 
building and conducting all communication with relevant stakeholders 
(municipal authorities, doctors, etc.). 
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• The community went through a learning process with Reynolds as a 
facilitator, but they were left to take their own decisions. If mistakes were 
made, the grant was not taken away from the community, so the flexibility 
existed for them to learn from mistakes and to ‘develop’. 
• The focus of the programme was on all aspects of human development, 
including self-esteem. Self-esteem, Reynolds argues, was lost through years of 
colonisation and apartheid. Black communities had lost their freedom in so 
many ways, and by giving them access again to budgets and decision-making 
about their own development, they regain the freedom to decide about their 
own lives (Jagoe 2012:3).  The community’s involvement in the renovation of 
the clinic building and the negotiations with relevant stakeholders, contributed 
to the improvement of their self-esteem. 
• The project also focused on communities becoming self-reliant. The 
Busiesvlei community started developing a local economy by hiring their own 
labour whenever possible, or sourcing services locally. They also negotiated to 
use the land of the commercial farmer, in this way growing their own food and 
selling their surplus, thereby creating better food security and a small income. 
• The Busiesvlei Community knew which resources they had available before 
they commenced to identify their needs. In most community development 
projects led by a government or a donor, the funds available are not known to 
the community (or project beneficiaries) and the community cannot take 
decisions about funds. Projects are based on the expertise of the NGO or 
government body, and sometimes do not even address a community need. By 
having direct access to the budget, the prospects of the community taking 
ownership of the project are much higher. Respondent 5 and Jagoe both 
confirmed that the IDT hardly ever lost money by giving communities direct 
access to the account, even when working in very difficult environments. 
Checks and balances were in place and 7% of every budget allocated was set 
aside for financial mentoring and regular checks by an audit firm (Interview 
with Respondent 5; Jagoe 2012:2). 
 




3.2 What is CIP? 
 
CIP takes the approach that the South African economy consists of a first (developed) 
economy and a second (marginalised) economy. Hence, CIP is aimed at developing 
the second economy in such a way that the South African economy will benefit all 
South Africans, instead of mostly those working in and benefitting from the first 
economy. As the first economy is unlikely to achieve the sustained high levels of 
growth to create jobs for all and ensure stable development, the second economy has 
to become developed. The first economy cannot realise its full potential, nor 
guarantee the social stability needed, unless the state helps to ensure that the majority 
of South Africans – now living in the second economy – become economically and 
socially active within working local economies. The better the second economy 
functions, the better will be the overall performance of the national economy 
(Reynolds 2005a:ix-x, 25).  
 
CIP wants to transform the second economy by focusing on localisation policies 
which will create local economies where decentralisation and the self-reliance of 
citizens are of key importance. Hence, CIP may be viewed as a programme for local 
economic development. Proven globalisation and localisation policies should become 
interdependent rather than compete against or undermine each other. Reynolds 
therefore does not want the current first economy to change drastically – it is a 
dynamic, existing system and cannot simply be ‘stopped’. He does, however, want the 
second economy to be developed as well, so that the two economies will strengthen 
each other, in the process creating economic opportunities for all SA citizens. Strong 
local economies should emerge, capable of competing in certain areas with the 
national economy and providing economic and social security. 
 
Implementation of CIP in South Africa would mean a refocus of government 
economic policy from a centralised, supply-side approach towards a decentralised, 
demand-side approach, led by people themselves. Reynolds states that the supply-side 
approach of the government (and development agencies) has led to frustration and 
tension; it leaves people inactive as it is presumed that they will pay for what is 
provided, but they are not asked to provide themselves. The only role that government 
or a development agency should play, is support for local planning, a budget and 
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facilitation (Reynolds 2002:3-9). Once again, it is clear that CIP has synergies with 
Alternative Development Theory and Community Development Practice (see 2.2.7). 
 
CIP is not yet a proven programme for development. At this stage, it has been used as 
the intellectual basis for implementing development projects (in the three pilot 
projects studied in this research and in the Khulumani22 support group villages and to 
a certain extent in the IDT drought projects as described under 3.1) but the 
programme as such has never been studied and proven viable. Hence, this research 
aims to do that. Before the CIP pilot projects are studied, this chapter will explain in 
detail what CIP is all about, according to Reynolds. Once again, this description of 
CIP might seem utopian and unrealistic, however, this chapter describes CIP 
theoretically and it is exactly the aim of this research to reflect on CIP after the CIP 
pilot projects have been studied, and, in doing so, indicate if it is indeed utopian or if 
it can work. 
 
3.3 Characteristics of CIP 
 
3.3.1 People-centred development: participation and ownership 
 
The implementation of a CIP programme should be people-centred. Firstly, CIP 
should be implemented by ‘a group of people’ with a common purpose so as to ensure 
participation and ownership by the involved community. The extent to which the 
beneficiaries of the project own the project is called ‘ownership’. This means that the 
beneficiaries should know about the goal(s) of the project, be involved in the planning 
of the project, make vital project decisions and act on their own behalf (Reynolds 
2004c: 3-6; Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:53). It is important to ensure a governance 
structure of the project is in place, to ensure the total involvement of the beneficiaries. 
As most community development projects, whether CIP or not, are implemented by a 
facilitating organisation (government, NGO, foreign development agency), a lot 
depends on the way the facilitation is done, and if the community members are in fact 
allowed to participate in the project and take ownership.   
                                                          
22
 Khulumani is a social movement in South Africa that was established to assist survivors of apartheid-era gross 
human rights violations. The movement has branches countrywide and is still trying to get justice for human rights 




In CIP, such ‘a group of people’ is called a community. The understanding of the 
concept ‘community’ is manifold, from a ‘locality’ or ‘neighbourhood’ to ‘a group of 
people sharing a common interest’. A conceptual discussion of ‘community’ is not the 
purpose of the research. The focus here is on what Reynolds meant with the concept. 
In Reynolds’s view, a community can be any group of people, but structured in a legal 
entity and with the objective of developing ‘their community’ (Interview Respondent 
3; Reynolds and Drew 2005c:4-30). These communities could be existing urban or 
rural communities, or parts of them, or certain groups such as ‘farmers’ – as long as 
there is a common purpose and the willingness to work together to achieve this 
purpose. This ‘community’ can be created just for the implementation of the project, 
as long as there is a common goal and some individual reward (Chile et al.  2006:400; 
Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:62; Yachkaschi 2010:196). If an existing community is 
involved, the existing power relations and purpose should be taken into account. 
Existing power relations are often not visible to facilitators and can therefore create 
problems (Cooke and Kothari 2001:14).  
 
Reynolds argues that the community should be run according to democratic 
principles. To organise the ‘community with the common purpose’, Reynolds 
proposed a vehicle called ‘the community trust’. In such a trust, each member of the 
community has equal democratic, social and economic rights. The formation of the 
trust should not be just a legal exercise; the members have to apply their minds by 
asking themselves three vital questions: ‘who are we?’, ‘what resources do we have?’ 
and ‘what do we want to do?’ (Reynolds and Drew 2005c:4-30; Reynolds 2005f:2-3). 
Community trusts are governed by elected trustees and a management committee, 
who are trained to play this role and are accountable to the other community trust 
members. Annual community meetings will elect or re-elect trustees and managers. 
The community trust places the responsibility for development in the community. 
Decision-making, planning and management of resources is put in the hands of the 
people. Each member of the trust (adult men and women) enjoys an equal share in the 
resources and assets of the community trust and all have a vote. All land, water, trees, 
roads, public schools, gardens, fencing, etc. become communal resources, owned by 
the community trust. They are assessed to determine the total value of the 
community’s resources and assets and also to determine the value of ownership for 
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individual community members. A community trust is not a political body, but a body 
to ensure community development (Reynolds and Drew 2005c:4-30). 
 
The trust has to decide on new members (people who move into the community or 
marry a community member) as well as members who leave the community or are 
away for long periods of time, such as migrant workers. If outsiders wish to use 
community resources, like mineral-rich land, the outsiders have to negotiate the terms 
and conditions for such ‘use’ or ‘extraction’ with the community trust. The ownership 
of the land always remains with the community trust. Ideally a partnership is put in 
place with the outsiders, with the community benefitting from the use of its land and 
resources. The community trust may also attract investors from outside the 
community if there is a need for extra funds to develop certain needs (Reynolds and 
Drew 2005c:4-30; Reynolds and van Zyl 2002:29). Community management of 
resources is the basis for economic freedom, as people can only be economically free 
if they own the basic assets on which their lives depend. If the land that people live 
on, and the house they live in, is not theirs, there is no economic freedom. It also 
moves from a supply-side delivery model to a demand-side model, where the 
community trust can decide which programme rights with budgets to access and what 
to do with it (see 3.3.2 below). There will be certain rules, and facilitation workers 
will be available for the community to call upon (not to compulsory receive), but the 
final decision about what will happen, and how it will happen, remains with the 
community trust (Reynolds and Drew 2005c:4-30; Reynolds and van Zyl 2002:29; 
Reynolds 2005b:6).  
 
The community trust partners with the government to ensure local development in the 
community. According to set rules, the community trust will receive annual budgets 
from the government in the form of imaginative programme rights (see 3.3.2 below 
for a detailed explanation of programme rights) which can then be used to satisfy the 
needs of the community. It is the responsibility of the trust to manage the resources 
and assets of the community and the annual budgets they receive from the 
government.  
 
In practice, to run the different responsibilities of the community trust, management 
committees should be formed, as well as community companies and cooperatives. For 
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example, another characteristic of CIP is for a community to become as self-reliant as 
possible and establish a working local economy by producing food locally (see 3.3.2), 
so a community cooperative may be formed to produce the food, using land from the 
community. Small businesses may be formed under the trust, and the trust can provide 
the start-up budget for these businesses. In this way, the trust gets shares in the 
community businesses and receives an annual return on investment and, later, new 
cash to assist other businesses. Such a relationship between trust and business in the 
community promotes sustainability and accountability (Reynolds and Drew 2005c:4-
30; Reynolds and van Zyl 2002:29; Reynolds 2005b:6).  
 
However, the use of community trusts in development projects is not without 
problems. The ownership and management of common resources implies collective 
decision-making by the ‘trustees’ and the involved community and this often presents 
challenges in terms of accountability, abuse of common resources, conflicts about 
what to do with the common resources and so on (Tshikululu 2013:10,11). As will be 
described in chapter 5, the community trust in Huntington, one of the three CIP pilot 
project, was hijacked and abused by the ‘elite’ of the community trust. Some of these 
elites even believe that they are ‘entitled’ to certain benefits, even if these are 
communal, just because they are part of the ‘elite’. A good example here is the 
principal of the crèche in Tsakane (see chapter 5), the second CIP pilot, who assumed 
that communal resources could be spent for her own personal benefit. Respondent 4, 
who was involved in setting up community trusts, indicates that forming a community 
trust is the most difficult aspect of implementing a CIP project, even in a homogenous 
rural community where people know each other. Jealousy and distrust are very 
difficult to overcome, and then there are the ‘hidden’ power relations unknown to a 
community development worker that could affect the good working of a community 
trust. Respondent 7 also indicated that when setting up a trust in a rural community, 
facilitators are often confronted with elderly people, women and young, unemployed 
adults who are uneducated. Those with education have left the rural area. So, from the 
group of people who ‘stayed behind’ in the rural area, trustees should be appointed to 
manage communal resources. However, they mostly have no relevant experience and 
they are uneducated about financial management, for example. Here, open and 
transparent communication is the key to success, as indicated by Reynolds, 
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Respondent 4 and Ostrom (2008:3), who did a lot of research on common resource 
management in communities. 
 
To summarise, CIP suggests a well-organised governance structure to implement CIP, 
preferably a community trust. This trust should be governed according to democratic 
principles and partner with the government to ensure development of the community. 
Only then will there be real prospects of participation and ownership by the involved 
people. 
 
3.3.2 Becoming self-reliant: knowing the resources available and a working local 
economy 
 
3.3.2.1 Knowing the resources available  
 
Another important characteristic of CIP is that known budgets should be made 
available to community trusts. Giving decision-making power to communities should 
be accompanied by resources. Communities should know what budgets are available 
to invest in their communities, and they should have the power to, firstly, decide what 
is to be done with the money, and secondly, play a part in the spending of the money. 
In principle, the budget should be known to the communities before they start 
organising themselves as the availability of potential resources will give them 
opportunities and trigger processes that otherwise might not happen. This would 
require a mind shift from the government regarding the management of community 
development – from ‘beneficiary management’ to active community participation. 
Citizens will become active and decide for themselves. Many, including the current 
South African government, who hear about ‘putting budgets directly on offer to 
communities’ comment that people will not take responsibility for their own 
development, that they cannot be trusted with budgets (the government does not trust 
its own citizens) and ask: “How would they do it?” But such assumptions are wrong. 
Rather, many South Africans have lost their self-esteem and became rather passive 
citizens due to the history of South Africa. The post-1994 government believed they 
could ‘solve’ everything now that they were in power. People should wait and receive 
– an attitude which has become a barrier to participatory governance and planning. 
However, this can be rectified as people know what is needed to improve their lives 
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and now they also know that you cannot wait forever for the government. Not that the 
government does not want to help, but it requires huge resources and skills to do so 
and the government has now realised they cannot manage it on their own (National 
Planning Commission 2011b:2-3). To tackle huge problems like poverty and 
unemployment, different stakeholders have to work together. So, why not partner 
with the people themselves? The example of Busiesvlei, and the many other projects 
that were run under the Independent Development Trust in the period just before 
1994, prove that communities can manage budgets, if the government needs 
examples. Internationally there are other examples, such as northern Uganda, where 
young people organise themselves in groups to get access to budgets (direct cash with 
no conditions), which can be spent individually or collectively. Research conducted in 
this project has shown that these direct cash grants have a positive effect on 
employment, the creation of new businesses and the reduction of poverty. The 
research also shows that grants (like the child support grant and old age grant in South 
Africa) do usually not lead to investments as the cash is directly spent on consumable 
goods (Blattman et al.  2013:2, 19, 20). Hence, this research, and others that Blattman 
et al. mention, argues for making direct cash accessible to the poor, as the availability 
of direct cash, with no conditions attached, gives the freedom that makes success 
possible. Reynolds said exactly the same and added that if you give people access and 
control over budgets, it will lead to poverty reduction and improved self-esteem 
(Everatt and Gwagwa 2005:ex summary; Interview Respondent 3; Interview 
Respondent 5, Reynolds and van Zyl, 2002:15-16). 
 
CIP proposes that budgets should be put on offer to community trusts in the form of 
‘rights programmes’, a term used by Reynolds for such budgets. These are made 
available to communities to pursue public goals under programme rules. CIP suggests 
four different rights programmes, namely investment rights, child rights, health rights 
and use rights. More rights programmes could be conceptualised if needed. As an 
example, all community members have the right to ensure a proper education for their 
children. And budgets are available under child rights for that. The community 
decides what to do with the child-rights budget – for instance, build a pre-school, send 
the pre-school teacher on training or buy lunch for every child at school – as long as 
the decision fits the child-rights concept. The community trusts, who know the rules 
and sizes of available budgets under each rights programme, may in this way become 
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major players in local economic development and service delivery, as partners of the 
government. For Reynolds, budgets should be given to communities and they should 
decide how to spend the money. The rights programmes are available on an annual 
basis and, subject to proper accountability to the community and the government; 
each trust may claim more funds. 
 
The rights programmes should be ideally funded by the government. See below under 
‘implementing rights programmes’ for more detail. 
 
Investment rights 
Investment rights are funds the community trust receives from the government, on an 
annual basis, per adult who is part of the community. These funds are equally owned 
by all the adults and used to develop and manage the community. On the annual 
general meeting of the community trust, the community decides what will happen 
annually with the investment funds, in consultation with the municipality, the ward 
councillor, the traditional leadership and other relevant stakeholders. The integrated 
development plans of every municipality should be revised to suit the community and 
discussed at these annual meetings to decide the focus in the community. As there 
will be funds that have to be spent in the community, it will create a labour market for 
the many unemployed community members.  
 
As a priority, the investment rights should be used to increase the local circulation of 
money. For example, some of the funds may be invested in local food production and 
processing. The local food production will be stimulated by the child rights 
programme (see below) as funds will be available to buy food for the children in the 
school. Food production should focus on what the community needs and what can be 
produced locally, which in most cases is fruit, vegetables, bread, milk, meat, biltong, 
jams, cheese, yoghurt, butter, dried fruits, etc. As much local production as possible 
should be done, without inputs from the first economy. It is of course not possible to 
produce everything locally so, firstly, shops selling goods from the first economy, like 
tuck shops, should at least be owned by locals. Secondly, when certain resources are 
not available in the community, like fabric, but the labour is available to make 
clothes, the fabric should be bought in the first economy but the clothes should be 
made in cooperatives or businesses supported by the community trust. Obviously, it is 
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very difficult to compete with retailers, but school uniforms, nurses’ uniforms, church 
uniforms etc. are exclusively needed in a particular community. Also, when 
infrastructure projects take place in the community, local people should take part as 
far as possible. The community may even decide to support the start-up of a business 
to do the task. Or the community may decide to buy expertise outside the community, 
for example if it is a once-off project, but on the condition that the outside company 
uses local labour where possible (Reynolds 2007a:8-12).  
 
Local businesses should run, if possible, according to the principles of democratic 
employee ownership. Reynolds saw this as a vital component of CIP, namely that 
employees working for a company owned by a community trust, should own part of 
or the whole company. Workers should own at least 20% of the shares, preferably 
more. This gives the workers a bigger voice, but also makes them less vulnerable and 
makes them owners, rather than just workers selling their labour. This will improve 
company performance (Reynolds and Drew 2005c:4-30; Reynolds and van Zyl 
2002:29; Reynolds 2005b:6). 
 
To stimulate local production and make it viable, the prices for local products should 
not necessarily equal commercial prices. In many cases, products and services cannot 
be produced cheaper locally and competition will be difficult, as in the end, poor 
people buy where it is cheapest. But, this is the conventional market approach which 
says that the price of a product is equal to its value in economic terms. Now, if we 
look at the value of a product from another perspective, for example having more job 
opportunities and living a more sustainable life, people might argue that the price of a 
product should be decided according to these factors and not according to the market. 
So, CIP argues that the local market has to be protected from outside products, where 
possible. Also, a locally produced product may even be able to compete in price as 
there are no high distribution costs. Wages may also be lower for local production 
than in the first economy, giving a competitive advantage to small local producers. It 
is conventional wisdom that people value their jobs more if these give them 
satisfaction and if they are being acknowledged for what they are doing. If the worker 
knows that, because he accepts a lower wage, he can get a job, sustain his family 
better, give back to his community (as he will produce for his immediate community 
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members) and buy products in the community rather than having to go to ‘town’, he 
might prefer a lower wage to no job at all (Reynolds 2007a:8-12).   
 
Putting the decision-making power and the funds for community development in the 
hands of the community is a big change from the current delivery model of the South 
African government. The resources for providing each community trust with annual 
funds are already available in the funds that municipalities receive every year for 
service delivery. For example, if a municipality receives funds for building sewerage 
in a particular community, these funds will go directly to the community trust and 
they will decide what to do with the funds, in consultation with the municipality.  
  
Child rights 
The second rights programme under CIP is called ‘child rights’. Children are the 
future of our society and many children live in dire poverty. Focusing one of the 
programmes directly on children, Reynolds argued, would force the attention of the 
community and the government on its children. These child rights also come in the 
form of funds to the community trust as per the amount of children living in the 
community. With these funds – the annual community child budgets – the community 
will look after the welfare of all its children.  
 
Firstly, the trust has to feed its children by making use of the schools in the 
community (pre-school, primary and high school). So, if people know the trust will 
buy locally produced food from them, they will be encouraged to do produce. 
Demand will create the supply. As the community trust is the major buyer of this 
food, it can set the prices and reward local food production so that this expenditure 
stimulates the local economy. Due to the availability of investment rights budgets, 
funds are available to start food production and processing businesses. The 
community trust buys as much as possible locally and distributes the food to local 
schools where community members are employed to cook the food (Reynolds 
2007a:1-7). 
 
In addition, payments for locally produced food are taxed and this tax money is used 
to pay part of the school fees of the children, as in many cases poor parents cannot 




A certain percentage of the child rights budget, to be decided upon by the community 
trust, should be used to improve the school infrastructure, buy educational tools and 
send unschooled teachers for training. Pre-schools are not part of the government’s 
education policy and therefore many pre-school ‘teachers’ are untrained. By giving 
them the opportunity to go for Early Childhood Development Training, their teaching 
skills will be greatly enhanced – to the benefit of the physical and mental 
development of the children. Also, pre-school teachers do not receive a salary from 
the government. By improving the school fees and having better payment rates, the 
salaries of pre-school teachers can be improved, which encourages them to become 
better teachers (Reynolds 2007a:1-7). 
 
The advantages of child rights are there for the parents, the children and the 
community. Unemployed parents get a job, or at least some income, by producing 
food for the schools in the community, they save on food expenses as their child gets 
a healthy breakfast and lunch at school, their child gets a better education and they 
pay less on school fees. In one of the CIP projects, in Huntington, the community 
trust agreed that the payment parents receive for produce they sell to the schools, 
should be divided as follows: 25% to pay for the school fees of their child, 65% to the 
parent and 15% to the community trust for agreed common purposes. As parents may 
sell their produce daily to the community trust, and can get paid daily, they earn cash 
locally, which they may spend locally on the products that are available. This will 
increase the local income multiplier, which will increase wealth in the community. 
Parents will also buy produce from other parents (Reynolds and Swi ta Lunga Trust 
2005e:6-7). It should be noted that all the above are suggestions that Reynolds made 
in terms of what could be done with the child rights budget. In essence, it remains the 
decision of the community what indeed will happen with the available child rights 
budget. 
 
In 2007 Reynolds suggested an annual child grant of R1 500 per child living in a 
community. The resources should come from the government’s existing School 
Feeding Scheme budget and, more controversially, the child support grants. As he 
was aware that this was controversial, he suggested that, as a start, only the School 
Feeding Scheme Budget could be used. If the community is successful in using these 
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funds to feed their children, they could ask for a larger amount (which could then 
come from either the child support grant or other budgets). In this way, the 
government becomes ‘a financier’ rather than ‘a spender’. It is investing in its 
citizens, rather than keeping them dependent on government grants. Another 
suggestion by Reynolds is that parents receiving a child support grant should agree to 
give a certain percentage to the community trust (for example 25%) so as to increase 
the available child rights budget. In the end, this money will go to the improvement of 
the schools, which will benefit all children in the community. However, asking part of 
a cash grant from parents is problematic and they might only agree when they have 
clearly seen the advantages of giving a percentage of their grant to a community body 
so that their children may have better schools (Reynolds 2007a:1-8, Reynolds 
2005g:11-13). 
 
The child rights model would look as in the illustration below: 
 
 Figure 1: Child rights model (Geerts 2008) 
 
Reynolds made the following calculations to prove the relevance of child rights 




Model School 1 (present – no child rights) 
The typical community-based pre-school operation today is 30 pupils, one or two 
‘teachers’ and a cleaner and/or cook. The pre-school uses one of the teachers’ home 
and outdoor shack. 
School Fee Income    
Fee is R30 per month x 30 children = R900. It should be noted that families who 
cannot afford the fee, about half, do not send their children to pre-school or do not 
pay the fee.  
School expenditure 
Expenses: Principal’s salary = R900 
 
Model School 2 (with child rights)  
The community ensures that all children attend well-supported schools where children 
are also fed. Community ensures that all teachers are fully trained and supervised.  
School Fee Income 
1. School fee is R30 per month, 50 children attend. Monthly fee is paid by parents, the 
ones who cannot pay get community bursary support (so more children will attend the 
pre-school due to the bursary) = R1 500  
2. From the child rights grant, levy for administrative costs and cook’s salary = R1 
500 
Total monthly school income = R3 000 
Monthly school expenditure 
Salaries of teacher, assistant teacher and cook = R1 200 + R900 + R700 = R2 800 
Electricity and materials = R200 
Monthly Expenditure Total   =   R3 000 
 
In summary, child rights are very powerful and feasible. Which parent does not want 
to improve the chances of their children to become better educated and live a better 
life?  
 
Health rights  
Thirdly, CIP suggest the introduction of health rights. Health security is too expensive 
for most South Africans and the available government facilities are often under-
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resourced. Reynolds states that government is responsible not only for the ‘delivery’ 
of health, meaning the infrastructure and certain services, but also for the ‘means’, 
meaning people becoming responsible for their own health. The legacy of the past, 
poverty and the HIV/AIDS crisis have intensified the health crisis so that the majority 
of South Africans do not have access to good and easily available healthcare. 
Healthcare does not mean medical care, as this is reactive – the person is already sick. 
Healthcare is making sure that people do not fall sick, meaning prevention by 
ensuring clean water, hygienic sanitation services, good nutrition and an income to 
buy medical services and a doctor’s visit when needed. So, people who have the right 
to live a healthy life do not have the means to actually do that. If preventive health 
issues are not addressed, the pressure on the state can only increase. Access to clean 
water, good nutrition etc. prevents illness and so investing in these services will be 
more rewarding in the long term than investing in medical infrastructure and services 
(Reynolds, 2004a:3-8). 
 
To achieve this, Reynolds suggests the introduction of health committees on 
community level to manage an annual health budget for the community. They focus 
on healthcare, namely ensuring there is free clean water, good sanitation and 
sewerage, access to nutritious food, safe roads to prevent road accidents, training for 
citizens about their own responsibility towards health, etc. So, the local health service 
is placed in the hands of the community, with the funds, called health rights. The local 
health committee appoints its own medical staff and runs its own clinics (or 
communities may partner when there is only one clinic to serve a number of 
communities), first sourcing available trained health professionals in their own 
community before sourcing from elsewhere (Reynolds, 2004a:3-8).  
 
Each committee registers the people from its community and the annual health budget 
is based on these numbers. Of the available budget, 80% should go to the provision of 
healthcare for the community and 20% to overhead costs and support services like 
research, training, regulation, etc. The budget is adapted for ‘vulnerable members’ 
(like children, HIV/AIDS patients, etc.) and poor conditions of sanitation and 
drinking water facilities. Budgets are increased if a community has to deal with many 
vulnerable members and poor conditions. The health budget comes from the normal 
health budget of the government earmarked for that area, increased with money from 
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public works and water affairs to upgrade poor facilities. The local health committees 
offer basic medical aid schemes, which can be run by private medical aid schemes 
with the local health committee as a go-between and manager. (Reynolds and van Zyl 
2002:49; Reynolds 2004a:3-8). 
 
The introduction of health rights to communities in this way is very idealistic and the 
three CIP pilot projects saw no experiments in this regard. Hence, it remains to be 
seen if the implementation of health rights is realistic. 
 
Use Rights 
Lastly, Reynolds argues that, in more traditional communities with communal land 
under traditional leadership, use rights may be introduced. These are different from 
the programmes mentioned above, as no funds are directly attached to use rights. In 
pre-capitalist societies, all land was communal, or at least not ‘owned’ by private 
persons, and everybody had free access to what nature provided. The concept of 
private land ownership and private ownership of common resources, like nature, was 
introduced in South Africa by the colonialists (Kenis and Lievens 2012:93). However, 
things like nature, the air, the sea, rivers, water and mineral resources are ‘commons’ 
that should not belong to anybody.  
 
Reynolds argues that people living in areas with grazing land, or mineral resources, or 
large rivers, should decide what happens with these and how, and not market. 
However, this is not easy as most natural resources are already privatised and mineral 
resources ‘licensed’ to companies. Therefore, in CIP the remaining communal land 
under custodianship of chiefdoms and all other natural resources not yet ‘privatised’ 
should be seen as a free good accessible to all people living in the community. 
Therefore, it should become an asset for the community trust (not property). In this 
way, all adult community members have an equal right to use it, and not only, for 
example, the few cattle farmers that actually use it. Also, the farmers who use it, use it 
for free, while the whole community is owner. Therefore, Reynolds suggests 
introducing use rights, which makes each community member and owner of the land. 
Each community member receives use rights once a year, which they can buy and sell 
amongst themselves so that a price arises. Each community member has the right to 
use the land, but if not needed, the member can sell that right to other community 
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members who need it, for instance for gardening or cattle farming.  As ownership 
brings a dividend, the use right can stimulate local production (as now you have to 
pay for land if you want to use it) (Reynolds and Van Zyl 2002:46-47; Reynolds 
2007a:9-12; Reynolds 2005a:14).   
 
The value of a use right can be determined by the value of the land. For example: 
Suppose a village has 100 adult members and one grazing area. The technical 
carrying capacity of the grazing land (how many animals can graze on the area) is set 
by the members at the annual general meeting of the trust. Assume that there is 
grazing for 1 000 animals. So each member will receive ten units for that year, so ten 
use rights (100*10 = 1000). During the next month, the members can exchange, buy 
and sell use rights as per their need. For instance, the cattle farmers may want to buy 
all grazing rights from the other members, who get paid for selling their use rights and 
then have cash available. This process only happens once a year, but it does stimulate 
the local economy (Reynolds and Van Zyl 2002:46-47; Reynolds 2007a:9-12; 
Reynolds 2005a:14).   
 
Implementing rights programmes  
Firstly, rights programmes are on-going, meaning a community trust may apply every 
year for a new portfolio of rights programmes (in the form of budgets), after the 
evaluation and audit of the previous rights-programmes budgets. Secondly, 
‘experiential learning’ is possible, meaning that failure is allowed as part of the 
learning process (see also 3.3.4). If, for example, an investment is made in a 
community business and it fails, this does not mean that the community trust loses its 
investment rights the next year. Of course, mitigation measures have to be put in 
place and the community facilitator should organise workshops with the community 
trust to learn from the mistake(s) and avoid more failures.  
 
The most important question is, how should these rights programmes be financed? 
Reynolds argues for redirection of current social grants, especially the child support 
grant. As this is highly controversial, CIP suggests three other means of financing, 
namely increasing VAT on luxury goods, introducing a corporate tax of 1% and 
introducing a Tobin tax (tax in capital movement) within South Africa. They are all 
controversial, but not impossible. Introducing a 1% corporate tax would be possible if 
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the income would exclusively go to the financing of rights programmes, and 
companies could claim it against their Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
scorecard (Reynolds 2007b:1-5). 
 
Reynolds was aware that the re-allocation of child support grants would be very 
difficult. How can you take away the little income that poor people receive? However, 
Reynolds claimed rightly that the child support grant is paid out to adults who, in 
some cases, use the money without benefitting the child. If the child support grants 
could be paid out to a community trust, all this money would be spent solely for the 
purpose of improving children’s lives. It would also enable the many unemployed in 
marginalised areas. In addition, it would improve local money circulation in the 
marginalised areas, improving wealth, as currently the largest part of the child support 
grant is spent outside the marginalised areas, in the shopping malls and towns nearby. 
As mentioned above under child rights, Reynolds suggests that parents who receive a 
child support grant should agree to give a certain percentage to the community trust 
(for example 25%) to increase the available child rights budget. But this can only 
happen once the parents have experienced the benefits of the child rights programme, 
so it cannot be introduced immediately. If parents are not willing to share their child 
support grants, the government could consider paying out the child support grant 
partly in the local currencies of communities, so that at least local money circulation 
will be stimulated (see below about local currencies) (Reynolds 2007b:1-5, 
discussions with Reynolds). 
 
Besides the controversial financing methods above, the government could also look at 
its existing spending patterns and redirect funds directly to community trusts, for 
instance parts of the education budget, health budget, agriculture budget, economic 
development budget, social budget, etc. Also, in 2007 and 2008 a working group 
under the then dplg was discussing the implementation of a national CIP programme. 
It suggested the establishment of a National Community Investment Trust (NCIT), 
which would be initially funded by international donors, corporations and the 
government, and which would be the central body making funds available to 
community trusts. Under the NCIT, a National Community Investment Trust Fund 
would be established, where some of the funds from NCIT would be invested to 
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finance the programme in the coming years. This would become the funding 
mechanism for community investment initiatives (dplg 2008:8-9). 
 
To conclude, there are possible ways of funding CIP, which are not all controversial. 
If initially rights programmes could be funded by donor money, the benefits could be 
shown to all involved, making it easier afterwards to re-allocate existing funds within 
the government for financing rights programmes. 
 
3.3.2.2 The right to live in a working local economy  
 
A next important characteristic of CIP is that every South African has the right to live 
in a working local economy. CIP therefore calls for the establishment of a working 
local economy where it is absent, which is mainly in rural areas and townships. A 
working local economy is an active economy at the local level, where production and 
selling takes place on a daily basis. It would stimulate the ‘local income multiplier’, 
which would create more local exchange leading to increasing wealth on the local 
level. Local income multiplier basically means ‘the cash that circulates in a locality 
and how it multiplies its value’ (Reynolds 2005a:1-14).  
 
In the early 2000s Reynolds conducted a survey, measuring the local income 
multiplier in Sandton23 and in a township nearby. He found that when you drop a 
R100 note in Sandton, it will circulate seven to eight times there, from one business to 
another, before it leaves Sandton. This means that the R100 note created seven to 
eight times extra value in Sandton, which benefits business owners in Sandton. In a 
township, the same R100 note would circulate 1.3 or 1.4 times, meaning that it does 
not even create double the value. People living in townships and rural areas do not 
buy in the area where they live as there is very little to buy. They take a taxi and go to 
the nearby town or shopping mall to buy their necessities. There might be tuck shops 
in their area, but the tuck shop is also stocked with items bought in town, which the 
tuck shop sells at a higher price (Reynolds 2005a:14). The fact that buying locally 
contributes to local money circulation and local wealth creation is confirmed by 
                                                          
23
 Sandton is an upmarket suburb north of Johannesburg where many large companies (local and 
multinational) have located their SA headquarters. 
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research by others, such as the New Economics Foundation (2013), Richard 
Douthwaite (1996) and Browne et al. (2007). 
 
Reynolds’s point is that, when you create demand locally, it will pool the supply 
locally, so that local production can start and stimulate local money circulation and so 
create local wealth. Browne et al. (2007:567) did research at the South Coast of 
Kwazulu-Natal in an area bordering the area where a CIP pilot project was 
implemented (see chapter 6) and is similar in climate, population and culture. Browne 
et al. found that when you stimulate local production, you get more local demand as 
people get more income that they also spend partly locally (Browne et al. 2007:567). 
Through investment rights, community members will have the cash to start local 
production. However, people will only start with local production if they have some 
guarantee that their produce will be bought. This can in turn be stimulated by 
targeting produce which can supply the local school feeding schemes, or the local 
fresh produce market, or the school uniform market, etc. If the sale of local produce 
can be guaranteed, it stimulates production and demand.  
 
Reynolds illustrated this point with the case study of the AMUL Dairy Co-op in India 
and the other Indian dairy projects (see 2.2.7). The AMUL Dairy Cooperative started 
in 1946, when local farmers got frustrated with the ‘middlemen’ who took the profits 
of the milk trade. AMUL introduced a system whereby farmers could bring milk to 
the cooperative collection point twice a day and get paid cash immediately. Every 
village had a collection point. Any amount of milk could be sold, so people with only 
one cow could also become part of the co-op. Around the milk collection points, 
small businesses emerged where the farmers could spend their cash. So the farmers 
created demand for local products, which they could buy in the village. This ensured 
constant money circulation in the community and the creation of local wealth. AMUL 
is now one of the largest cooperatives in the world, offering many other products. In 
South Africa, milk production is usually in the hands of large commercial farmers, 
who keep the milk in big tanks which are collected by trucks and the farmer is paid 
once a month for his milk (AMUL 2013; Reynolds 2007a:15). The fact that the 
creation of local demand will pull local supply is also confirmed by Respondent 4, 





To further stimulate a working local economy, CIP suggests the implementation of 
three additional measures: a periodic, rotating market system, community banking 
and the introduction of a local currency.  
 
Periodic market system 
Before the National Party came to power in 1948, there were more than 500 markets 
in South Africa, usually in or around white towns, forming trading hubs countrywide. 
After 1948, the government stopped supporting all these markets and identified 13 
wholesale markets countrywide. This move led to the collapse of the other markets 
and destroyed the livelihood of many small farmers and producers who depended on 
selling their products at these local markets (Respondent 5). According to Reynolds, 
markets are the heart of a working local economy and they can hardly be found in 
South Africa, certainly not in marginalised areas, hence they should be re-introduced 
(Reynolds 2007a:12-17).  
 
With a ‘periodic market system’ is meant a system of small, local, periodic markets in 
each community, operating at least two or three times per week. The introduction of a 
marketplace in all townships and rural areas would increase the local income 
multiplier. The market should be open every day (or at least two to three times per 
week) for every person who wants to sell something. Community members may sell 
their produce to their fellow community members or to the community trust for the 
school’s feeding scheme or for export. For example, a community cooperative may 
buy all excess local produce and sell it elsewhere, maybe at another regional market. 
In this way, community members are guaranteed that, every two or three days, they 
are able to present their produce (even if it is only one bunch of carrots) to buyers and 
use the cash immediately to buy something else they need at the market. Thus money 
circulates IN the community. This has been introduced by the CIP project at the South 
Coast (see chapter 6) and has proven to be very successful. 
 
In addition, once a week, there should be a ‘market day’ where outsiders come to 
offer other services like municipal services (pension payouts, registration for 
elections, home affairs, etc.), community trust services (selling of bulk items like 
seeds, gardening tools, etc.) post office services, library services and banking 
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services.  Also, at these weekly market days, traders from nearby villages with other 
products than those available locally may come and sell them. In larger markets, 
artists may be invited to perform over lunchtime or in the late afternoon to close off 
the market day. In this way the market becomes, besides a trading place, also a place 
of entertainment and social exchange. Spread over an area, there could be a market 
day on every day of the week in a different village. Traders with a lot of produce will 
be able to move from market to market to earn a living. A transport network between 
markets in neighbouring communities, where other products might be produced, 
could be established. The result will be regional trade. So, by introducing a market, 
people do not have to take taxis any more to go to town for food and services – once a 
week, most goods and services they need are available at the local market (Reynolds 
2004b:4-10). 
 
The periodic market system could be organised on the community level, the regional 
level and the national level. On the community level, where the markets are run, 
market committees are formed under the Community Trust. On regional and national 
levels, market societies are formed to support the market committees. The market 
societies advise the market committees on setting up the market, assist with building 
the market, facilitate external services like the post office and pension payouts, 
organise the market days in the region, etc. The market committee runs the 
marketplace as a cooperative under the community trust. Market stalls at the market 
are free for locals but will be rented out for a small amount to external traders and 
service providers (government, post office, banks) so that the trust can afford to 
maintain the marketplace and ensure that water and electricity is available. A number 
of jobs can be created to run the marketplace. All regional market societies are 
represented on the national market society, which is an overseeing body dealing with 
policy issues, national planning and assistance with creating economies of scale 
(Reynolds 2004b:19).  
 
Reynolds has written a manual on setting up such a periodic market system in an area. 
 
Local currency and community banking  
When the rights programmes and local markets are introduced, there will be a 
significant increase in local money circulation. Therefore, CIP proposes a community 
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banking system and a local currency. This would again stimulate local money 
circulation. Often, money entering communities (through salaries or trading) quickly 
disappears again into the formal economy. Hence, to create local wealth, it could be 
beneficial to introduce a local currency and local banking system to keep money 
circulating locally.  
 
Alternative currencies or systems or community banking to stimulate local or 
community development have been used for thousands of years. One example is the 
highly popular Local Exchange Trading System (LETS), which was created in 
Canada in 1983. LETS is a mutual credit system where members list goods and 
services they offer in LETS currency. The system expanded over the world and 
remains in use (Quintiliani 2002). Another example is the use of Ithaca hours in 
Ithaca, a poor neighbourhood of New York, where products and services may be 
bought with Ithaca hours (Quintiliani 2002). A South African example is the Ora, a 
local currency introduced in 2004 in the small village of Orania in the Northern Cape. 
The village was established in 1991, mainly to preserve Afrikaner culture. They 
experimented with local economic development and found that the introduction of a 
local currency contributed strongly. The Ora is on par with the rand and villagers can 
buy Ora at the local bank for rands, which are then saved. Interest on the savings is 
used to cover the costs of running the local bank (Lembethe and Mears 2006:1-2, 8-9; 
Steyn 2004:10-15; Respondent 8). Also the use of micro-credits and voluntary 
savings-and-loan systems is a form of local currency (CARE 2013; Grameen Bank 
2013). Much more can be said about local currencies and there are thousands of other 
examples. However, this is not the purpose of this research. The point Reynolds wants 
to make is that local currencies and community banking may be used to enhance 
community development. 
 
Reynolds envisaged community banking as follows. Community members may open 
an account at the community bank to save money and where the community trust can 
pay them (the principle of immediate payouts remains as the community bank is in 
the community). The community bank should negotiate a relationship with one of the 
large commercial banks, which would be in their interest as they could access a larger 
market and, through the increased money circulation in communities, people will 
have more cash to save. These savings will be a guarantee for the commercial bank. 
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The community bank can also become an agent for small loans to the villagers, either 
from the savings of other community banks or from the commercial bank (a credit 
union system where the savings of people are used for loans). The community banks, 
assisted by the government, may also stimulate local business by providing loans at 
lower interest rates to businesses producing and selling locally. This is another 
advantage for local producers, to make them more competitive with the national 
economy (Reynolds 2005a:14; Reynolds 2005b:2-11). 
 
The community bank may introduce a local currency, or a voucher system, to further 
stimulate local money circulation. The local currency may only be used to pay for 
goods and services within the community. The value of the currency is on par with 
the South African rand. Economic activity is measured by the amount of money 
circulating in the area. A local currency will increase local circulation, as it can never 
leave the local community. It cannot escape to the malls; it stays to circulate between 
local people and create local wealth. It could be exchanged at the community bank for 
rands, but why would you do that if you can use it buy most goods and services in the 
community? Reynolds suggests that the local currency will be strengthened if the 
government pays out a certain percentage of pensions and grants in the local currency, 
or even part of salaries of government employees. However, this would be highly 
controversial as the government would impact on the freedom of choice of its 
citizens. Also, the community trust, when buying produce from community members, 
could pay partly in the local currency (Reynolds and van Zyl 2002:24-26; Reynolds 
2005b:2-11). 
 
3.3.3 A learning process with attention for all aspects of human development 
 
Reynolds mentioned that CIP could not be a blueprint for the development of all 
communities in South Africa as they all differ and have their own traditions and 
dynamics. CIP is offered as a programme for development, which should be guided 
by a facilitator and take shape over time. Which shape it takes is up to the involved 
community. Hence, implementing CIP is ‘a learning process’ and the community 
which implements CIP is ‘a learning society’. This is an important characteristic of 
CIP. There should be leeway for learning and, consequently, making mistakes. As 
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mentioned in chapter 2, Alternative Development and Community Development 
Practice also advocate development as a learning process. 
 
Reynolds expressed ideas on the building of a learning society in some of his many 
papers (Reynolds 2005a:29). He stressed that development should be a bottom-up 
process, where the community is assisted by a facilitator and not told what to do. The 
development of the programme is a learning process – mistakes should not be covered 
up, as often happens, but should be discussed and addressed before moving on. Also, 
mistakes should not result in giving up on existing projects for new projects. Rather, 
the mistakes should be addressed and reflected upon by the community and the donor 
or the government agent.  
 
In addition, social aspects should be included in the learning, for example how the 
trust is governed, how feedback is given to the members, what to do if community 
members are not happy with the management of the trust. These are processes the 
community has to follow and from which it should learn. It is also important that the 
facilitating organisation undergoes ‘a learning experience’. Facilitators should be 
trained, in terms of community development as well as in terms of understanding the 
local context.  Chapters 6 and 7 will indicate the ‘learning’ that CIP and SDC have 
experienced during implementation in the three pilot projects that were studied – 
indicating the flexibility of CIP. 
 
Respondent 6, a former board member of the People’s Agenda and colleague of 
Reynolds, mentions that Reynolds was one of the few academics who really 
understood the bottom-up approach and how communities operate. In South Africa, 
policymakers are often remote from the grass roots. Reynolds understood 
communities and how to develop them, making CIP such a powerful programme for 
development. Choices and decision-making power make people participative citizens 
who can grow, learn and reach their potential. This is often not understood by the 
government and other development agents, who seem to doubt the capability of their 
own citizens and who seem not to trust them (interview Respondent 6).  
 
Trust is the key to community development because people who are not trusted will 
not reach their potential or the full goals of a development process. Reynolds stressed 
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that CIP was not just an economic development programme, but a programme also 
dealing with the social, cultural and psychological aspects – all the aspects of human 
development. This is one of the features of Community Development as explained by 
De Beer and Swanepoel (2011:41): 
 
... the most fundamental characteristic of community development is that it 
follows an integrated approach to the problems of poverty and development ... 
problems of development are multifaceted and that they should be tackled 
together ... It emphasises the fact that social, political and cultural aspects 
should be treated together with the economic aspects, because they are all 
interrelated. 
 
CIP wants to focus on all aspects of human development, like experiencing happiness, 
improving self-esteem, achieving potential; not only the physical needs like food and 
shelter. If people are happy, reach their potential and become more self-reliant, 
amongst others, this will improve their self-esteem and their dignity (Swanepoel and 
De Beer 2011:47-50). 
 
Reaching potential, on an individual or collective level, contributes to the 
development of self-esteem, which is what CIP advocates. Trusting each other and the 
facilitator is therefore very important. If the government, or an NGO, enters a 
community to start a development project but they do not trust the community from 
the start, the success of the project is compromised. Firstly, development agents 
(government, NGO or others) should trust the community members with whom they 
are going to work. The government should trust its own citizens, who vote for them. 
This is a precondition for any development effort to succeed. Secondly, community 
members should also learn again to trust each other. To work with each other without 
being jealous of what the other has, or has achieved, and even help to develop other 
community members. This trust between people is to a large extent lost in South 
Africa, and Reynolds argues that CIP could build trust again over time – between 
community members, but also between the community and the development 
facilitators. To start a community trust, for example, means trusting each other to 




If people are able to take decisions about their own lives and become more self-
reliant, they will reach their potential and their dignity will be enhanced (Swanepoel 
and De Beer 2011:50). If people cannot participate meaningfully in the development 
of their own lives, as is often the case in marginalised areas of South Africa, they will 
not be able to reach their potential or, in this way, regain or develop more self-esteem. 
For example, a CIP project could expose community members to a new way of 
farming, as in the CIP South Coast project, which gives them new confidence to farm 
and, over time, increases their self-esteem. Some community members get the 
opportunity to become involved in the management of the trust, or a community 
income-generating project, for the first time. They learn how to negotiate and manage 
and might even discover talents they did not know they possessed. Over time, they 
could reach their potential. Reynolds says that if you allow people to become 
dependent on the government, which the South African government is continually 
encouraging by handing out grants, it will be very difficult for them to reach their full 
potential. Such funds should rather be used to enable people to reach their potential.  
 
3.4 Implementation of CIP 
 
CIP was never implemented as envisaged by Reynolds. In principle, CIP should be 
rolled out by the government, but this has not happened. Reynolds argued in a paper 
delivered to the then dplg in 2005 how CIP could be implemented nationwide. He 
suggested that the unit of Local Economic Development (LED), located in dplg and 
now CoGTA, should take the lead. LED should become the coordinating CIP body. 
The dplg adopted CIP as a developmental strategy in its 2006 – 2011 white paper on 
local economic development. A working group was established, under the leadership 
of the dplg, to roll out CIP nationwide. This working group met often in 2007 and 
2008. A working paper was developed which outlined CIP, its implementation and 
governance, and how it should be resourced. The figure below illustrates the outputs 
of the government. Most importantly, no extra resources from the government would 
be needed, as a national CIP fund would be established from international donor 
funds, to be invested for renewing resources (Working Group SDCIP 2008:5-8).  
 
As indicated in chapter 1, the process came to a halt in September 2008 when the then 
minister responsible for the dplg was dismissed. The next minister did not believe that 
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CIP could succeed and stopped implementation. Also, the director in the dplg section 
of the working group resigned shortly afterwards, resulting in a complete breakdown 
of the process. It is possible that CIP might be seen as a threat to power due to its 
decentralising nature. Under CIP, community trusts are expected to have direct access 
to government-funded budgets, with decision-making and implementing power. This 






















Figure 2: Outputs of the implementation of CIP by the South African government (Working 
Group SDCIP 2008:7). 
 
Due to the failure to implement CIP, it has to date been rolled out only in small 
donor-funded projects.  CIP was rolled out in Huntington, Hazy View in 2006 - 2008; 
in Tsakane, Ladysmith in 2007 – 2009 and at the South Coast, Port Shepstone since 
2008. Due to the limited available funds, not all characteristics of CIP as mentioned 
above could be implemented. However, most could to a certain extent, hence I have 
studied all three projects and collected data to analyse if CIP could be viable as a 
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development programme. The CIP pilot projects in Huntington and Tsakane are 




This chapter attempted a concise description of CIP as Reynolds conceptualised it. By 
exercising objectivity and verifying information with his former colleagues, I believe 
I stayed close to what Reynolds had in mind and did honour to his great thinking. 
 
The Busiesvlei case study provides a fair idea of what CIP is all about. Firstly, CIP is 
a programme to develop the second economy of South Africa, or marginalised areas 
with little or no economic activity. Secondly, CIP is a programme that should be 
implemented by the people themselves, with assistance from the government or other 
stakeholders, but driven by the people. They should be organised to a certain extent, 
for Reynolds preferably in a trust, with an efficient governance structure. Companies 
and cooperatives could be started under this trust, to the benefit of the trust and its 
members. Thirdly, communities should become as self-reliant as possible. To achieve 
this, all resources available to the trust should be made known up-front. If people 
know what funds are available to them, it could serve as a powerful incentive to get 
them active and organised around a common purpose. Funds should be allocated in 
so-called rights programmes. These come in different forms, namely: investment 
rights, which are funds to invest in income-generating projects for the community; 
child rights to ensure schooling and to buy the products of income-generating projects 
in the community to a certain extent (for the school feeding scheme and school 
uniforms); health rights, which are funds to localise health facilities and let the 
community ensure these; and use rights, which are not funds on offer to communities, 
but a form of management of joint community assets, like grazing land, to ensure fair 
use. It is important that rights programmes are ‘on offer’ to community trusts. 
Reynolds suggested that the rights programmes could be funded by increasing 
corporate taxes, increasing VAT on luxury goods, establishing a Tobin tax or re-
allocating current social grant spending or other spending by the government. 
 
Another way of achieving self-reliance would be to develop ‘working local 
economies’. These are economies at the local level where production and buying 
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happens locally to a degree. Local trading will increase the local income multiplier 
and so increase local wealth creation. The local economy may be further enhanced by 
introducing periodic markets and a local currency. 
 
Lastly, CIP wants to be a development programme that is implemented in a 
community as ‘a learning process’ for all involved, including the facilitators, with 
attention to all aspects of human development, like experiencing happiness, 
improving self-esteem and achieving potential; therefore not only the physical needs, 
like food and shelter. If people are happy, reach their potential and become more self-























Figure 3: Schematic view of CIP as envisaged by Reynolds (own design). 
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This chapter deals with the methodology I used for my research, both empirical and 
non-empirical. For the non-empirical research, I engaged with mostly unpublished 
texts by Reynolds and other published literature related to the topic of this research. 
For the empirical research, I firstly engaged with former colleagues and friends of 
Reynolds, so as to better understand CIP.  Secondly, I engaged with beneficiaries and 
key informants of past and current CIP pilot projects. 
 
Firstly, I discuss the rationale for choosing the data collection methods that I have 
chosen. Secondly, I elaborate on the review of documents and literature that I had 
available. Thirdly, I discuss how I conducted interviews, both with colleagues of 
Reynolds to understand CIP better and with key informants of the CIP pilot projects. 
Fourthly, I elaborate on the survey I conducted in one of the still existing CIP 
projects, at the South Coast in KwaZulu-Natal. Lastly, I say something about the 
validity and reliability of this research and the ethical considerations I took into 
account. 
 
4.2 Rationale for the data collection methods 
 
As I wanted to know, in the first place, what Reynolds meant with CIP and how he 
envisaged the programme, I started with collecting all available documents related to 
CIP in his personal library and on his computer. I had full access to these. In addition, 
I interviewed some of his colleagues and friends who were well informed about CIP. 
The interviews indeed did give me a better understanding of CIP, but also triggered 
new thoughts and interpretations I did not have before. 
 
To gather information about the CIP pilot projects, I used mixed data collection 
methods. This allowed me to gather more diverse data, to get a better understanding 
and to have more reliable and valid data. Besides the interviews, I developed a 
questionnaire informed by the interviews. Interviews were conducted with key 
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informants to assist me in designing the questionnaire and after completion of the data 
collection and data analysis. This was very valuable as new insights were gathered, 
the questionnaire could be revised after the pilot interview round and information was 
either gathered anew or better understood.  
 
The use of a questionnaire allowed me to systematically ask the same questions from 
a larger number of respondents. The type of questions asked where both quantitative 
and qualitative. For the quantitative questions, I used matrix questions with uniform 
answering options (Babbie 2011:252-253). The first set of questions has a yes and no 
answering option and the second set has index scale questions. The reason for using 
matrix questions was to make the questionnaire as easy as possible to complete. Many 
of the respondents are illiterate or partly literate and having the same answering 
options assisted them to complete the questionnaire. Once again, the purpose of the 
mix of different questions is to increase the validity of the data. The yes/no as well as 
the index questions enquire about similar concepts. 
 
As I wanted to know whether or not CIP is implementable, I did an analysis of the 
project implementation of CIP pilot projects in three different localities, in light of 
CIP as described in chapter 3. This was done to find out which aspects of CIP were 
implemented and which not, and also to determine if implemented characteristics of 
CIP worked and made an impact (and why or why not). I used both deductive and 
inductive analysis. Deductive, because a practical theory (CIP) is surveyed and I 
investigated whether or not the application of the theory indeed confirmed the 
practical theory. CIP can in principle not yet be called ‘a theory’. CIP is not yet a 
proven theory that is used widely. Because I am testing ‘CIP’ by looking at its 
applications and doing research, I am executing deductive research (Babbie 2011:58). 
Inductive, because from analysing the data, I suggested changes to CIP (see chapter 
7), recommended aspects to be taken into account which were not included by 
Reynolds and advised the exclusion of other aspects as they were unworkable (Babbie 
2011:58). 
 
I should also mention that I was involved in the implementation of the CIP project in 
Tsakane, the second CIP pilot project, as a facilitator. I was not involved directly in 
the CIP project at the South Coast, but my husband was the main facilitator. I also 
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spent about nine months with Reynolds, when he shared much information with me 
and took me to projects, meetings with dplg and others. Hence, my involvement will 
also colour the research analysis.  
 
4.3 Review of documents 
 
I did not follow a specific design when I considered data collection from documents 
in relation to CIP and the pilot projects. I decided to go through all Reynolds’s 
documents and books, both electronically and on paper, and select information 
relevant to my research. I kept the different categories in mind when selecting and 
coding documents, as used in the survey research, namely people-centred 
development (ownership, participation), becoming self-reliant (knowing the resources 
available, creating a working local economy) and the project as a learning process 
with attention for all aspects of human development (learning society, self-esteem). In 
terms of the collapsed CIP pilot projects, some information was available on 
Reynolds’s personal computer and I requested other documents from the managers of 
the CIP projects, Respondent 7 and 4. From the still existing project at the South 
Coast, I gathered strategy documents, minutes of board meetings and impact reports 
to make myself familiar with the context of the project. It was a lot of work to go 
through all the information, but it was easy to select the relevant documents as I was 
familiar with the CIP concept and could assess the relevance of particular documents. 
 
The review of documents helped me to conceptualise CIP and answer crucial research 





4.4.1 Sampling and population 
 
For the description of CIP as well as for studying the CIP projects, I interviewed a 
number of people, targeting key informants who would have relevant information and 




For the description of CIP, I interviewed: 
• Respondent one:  Reynolds’s wife, who also worked with him on CIP projects 
and applied some of the CIP characteristics in her own work; 
• Respondent two: a friend of Reynolds who had a keen interest in CIP and 
hosted CIP workshops;  
• Respondent three: a colleague and former dplg employee who worked with 
Reynolds to include CIP in the LED framework of the dplg; 
• Respondent four: co-facilitator at the Tsakane CIP project and lead facilitator 
of the South Coast CIP project; respondent four is also my husband; 
• Respondent five: a colleague of Reynolds at the Independent Development 
Trust in the early 90’s; 
• Respondent six: a colleague and friend of Reynolds and board member of the 
People’s Agenda in South Africa;  
• Respondent seven: the former manager of the CIP project in Huntington; and 
• Respondent eight: Frans de Klerk, chairman of the Orania-beweging. Mr de 
Klerk agreed to be named in the research. 
 
In addition, for the study of the CIP projects I interviewed the following people before 
and after developing the questionnaire and once again after collecting data, in order to 
gather data from the existing CIP project: 
 
• Respondent four: co-facilitator at the Tsakane CIP project and lead facilitator 
of the South Coast CIP project; respondent four is also my husband; 
• Respondent seven: the former manager of the CIP project in Huntington; 
• Respondent nine: the manager of the Kumnandi Cooperative at the South 
Coast project; 
• Respondent ten: a colleague of Respondent four at Siyavuna Development 
Centre and co-facilitator at the South Coast CIP project; and 
• Respondents 11, 12 and 13: leaders of the farmers’ association in sub-
communities at the South Coast CIP project (chairperson and secretary in 




4.4.2 Structure and content of the interviews 
 
I used semi-structured interviews to gather more information about CIP from 
Reynolds’s colleagues and about the CIP projects from relevant key informants. 
Hence, the interview questionnaire is open to give the interviewees the opportunity to 
influence the interview event. The sequencing of questions is not fully structured to 
allow space for probing and discussion and to have interaction with the interviewed 
people. I prepared some questions around key topics. However, I did not necessarily 
stick to the questions and did not ask all the questions identically from person to 
person (Terre Blanche et al. 2006:297-298). The semi-structured interview is so 
named because it lies between a very structured and an open interview. This option 
allowed me to have some questions prepared going into the interview, while also 
leaving leeway for the research participant to be spontaneous and bring up other 
thoughts that might not be related to a question. It was also the preferred option 
because key informants interviewed to assist in conceptualising CIP might have 
forgotten certain aspects of CIP, and sometimes they added a new dimension 
unknown to me.  This also applies to the key informants of the collapsed projects as 
these projects collapsed at least four years ago.  
 
All interview questionnaires consist of three parts. The first part consists of an 
introduction of me and the research participant, an explanation of the research and the 
terms and conditions that applied to the interview – like giving informed consent, 
transcription of the interview and confidentiality issues. All participants received an 
explanation note and an informed consent note before the interview took place, which 
they had to sign. A copy of the consent note may be found in annexure three. 
 
The second part consists of a number of research questions. These questions differ, 
depending on whether I interviewed the research participant for the description of CIP 
or in relation with a CIP pilot project. The different questions may be found in 
annexure one. 
 
The third part is the conclusion of the interview, when I asked the research 
participants if they had any questions or final comments to make. I thanked the 
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research participants and explained to them that they could access the research data by 
contacting me if they wished.   
 
The interviews with Reynolds’s friends and colleagues took place after I had 
reviewed the documents between August 2011 and September 2012. 
 
Most of the interviews were recorded. If the situation did not allow this, for example 
when we were at a busy café, I did not record the interview but took notes. With 
respondents one, four and ten I had numerous discussions about CIP and not all of 
them are documented. The transcription of the recorded interviews was done partly by 
me and partly by a professional in that field. 
 
4.4.3 Analysis of the interviews: interpretative framework 
 
The underlying research paradigm for the analysis of the data, both for analysing the 
interviews and the data from the survey research, is interpretative. Information was 
gathered and interpreted with the aim of conceptualising and understanding CIP. 
Terre Blanche et al. (2006:6-9 and 274-277) describe interpretative analysis as 
‘studying the reality through the subjective experiences of respondents’. Interpretative 
research relies on information gathered by the researcher, which informs the 
researcher to describe something, interpret it and then present the findings.  
 
Two factors are important in interpretative analysis – firstly, my role as the researcher 
and, secondly, understanding the context in which the research is taking place. Terre 
Blanche et al. (2006:274-277) say that the researcher has to exclude any subjective 
biasing in describing and interpreting the results. In addition, the research should be 
conducted while understanding the social, political, cultural and economic context of 
the area where the data are gathered. The broad context for this research is described 
in chapter 1, and the specific context of the areas where the CIP pilot projects were 
implemented (and where the data were collected) is described in chapters 5 and 6. To 
learn more about the context, I visited the areas and the project. For the South Coast 




For the analysis of all data (interviews as well as findings of survey research), I 
created an interpretative framework corresponding with the characteristics of CIP as 
described in chapter 3.  
 
The interpretative framework is as follows: 
Category  Level of 
implementation of each 
category 
Level of success of 
implementation of each 
category 
A. People-centred development 1. No implementation 
2. Partly implemented 
with description of 
what is implemented 
3. Almost full 
implementation 
4. Full implementation  
5. Very successful 
6. Successful  
7. Neither successful 
nor unsuccessful 
8. Unsuccessful 




B. Becoming self-reliant 
B1. Knowing resources available  
B1.1  Investment rights 
B1.2 Child rights 
B1.3 Health rights 
B1.4 Use rights 
B2. Creating a working local 
economy 
B2.1 Local production and selling 
B2.2 Market 
B2.3 Local bank and currency 
C. A learning process with 
attention for all aspects of human 
development 
C1. Learning process and society 
C2. Self-esteem and dignity   
Figure 4: Interpretative framework 
 
The categories in the interpretative framework are as per the CIP characteristics 
described in chapter 3: 
• Category A: People-centred development. This category has two sub-
categories, namely participation (A1) and ownership (A2). 
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• Category B: Becoming self-reliant. This category has two sub-categories, 
namely ‘knowing the resources available’ (B1) and ‘creating a working local 
economy’ (B2). Each sub-category also has ‘sub-characteristics’.  
• Category C: A learning process with attention for all aspects of human 
development. This category has two sub-categories, namely ‘learning process 
and society’ (C1) and ‘self-esteem and dignity’ (C2). 
 
The concept of ‘sustainability’ is not a separate characteristic of CIP and is hence not 
included in the interpretative framework. The idea of CIP is that, if the other 
characteristics are met, sustainability will follow. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, where the 
pilot projects are discussed, the ‘sustainability’ of these projects will be discussed by 
analysing the different CIP characteristics as mentioned in the interpretative 
framework. 
 
For every CIP pilot project – in Tsakane, in Huntington and on the South Coast – I 
looked at each of the categories and firstly described whether or not it was 
implemented, how it was implemented and what the problems were with 
implementation (column two). Secondly, I looked at the level of success of the 
implementation (column three), based on the interviews and survey research findings. 
The evidence was either provided by the survey findings or the interviews. So, for 
example, A1 (participation) was fully implemented (4) and it was successful (6). 
 
In chapter 7, I am using then the interpretative framework to compare CIP as 
conceptualised by Reynolds and how CIP turned out when implemented in the pilot 
projects. This then made it possible to make recommendations. One of the objectives 
of my research is to look at the practicability of CIP once implemented and to suggest 
changes if needed for successful implementation so as to come towards a new model 
for implementing CIP. 
 
For analysing the interviews, I immersed myself in the interview data (transcriptions 
or notes) focusing on the categories as described in the interpretative framework and 
putting the corresponding letter (A, B, etc.) in the margin of the text. This 
identification of the categories corresponds with the practice of ‘identifying themes’ 
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in qualitative research. Terre Blanche et al. (2006:322-327) mention that once themes 
are identified, they should be ‘coded’. Marking the relevant information with the 
letters (A, B, etc.) is exactly this. I also coded information relating to the level of 
engagement and level of success by putting the corresponding number in the margin 
of the text (1, 2, etc. until 8). When this was done, I started interpreting the data as per 
the interpretative framework, considering the different levels of engagement and 
success.  
 
4.5 Quantitative research: survey 
 
I used questionnaires to gather information from the participants (or beneficiaries) of 
the CIP project at the South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
4.5.1 Sampling and sample validity, data collection and processing 
 
The people participating in the CIP pilot at the South Coast are all farmers and, 
therefore, I took a random sample amongst all the farmers who are part of the project, 
spread over the different villages where the project is active.  So the population for 
the questionnaires are farmers who are members of the CIP pilot project, from 
Nositha, Gcilima or Kwanzimakwe. All the farmers participating in the project have 
membership cards, thus simplifying the determination of their numbers and locations. 
Before the data collection in August 2012, the total farmer population with 
membership cards was 230. I planned a sample with a confidence interval of 5 and a 
confidence level of 95%, which would require 144 farmers to fill out the 
questionnaire. Due to time constraints only 116 questionnaires were completed, which 
reduced the confidence interval to 6.5. The confidence level remained on 95%, which 
means that the data are 95% valid.  
 
All farmers had an equal chance of being selected, depending however on whether 
they attended farmers’ association meetings or visited vegetable collection points. 100 
questionnaires were completed during three farmers’ association meetings and 16 
during one-on-one sessions. All farmers who attended the farmers’ association 
meetings during September and October 2012 were selected to fill out the 
questionnaire, so they had a 100% chance of being asked to participate in the 
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research. The farmers did not know before the meetings that the survey would be 
done. They attended at random, meaning their selection remained random. 
Afterwards, the remaining part of the sample was completed by randomly selecting 
other farmers who visited the vegetable collection points. Some appointments were 
also made to visit farmers at home. 
 
The questionnaires were facilitated by an interviewer who asked the questions orally 
in Zulu (the mother tongue of the farmers). This method increased the quality of the 
data as the interviewer ensured correct completion of the questionnaire. If questions 
were not understood, they were explained. 
 
A pilot of the questionnaire took place on 28 September 2012 at a farmers’ 
association meeting in Nositha. A group of 12 respondents was present at the meeting. 
A staff member of SDC (Respondent 10) explained the purpose of the questionnaire 
and the answering options to all participants. Afterwards, he went through the 
questions one by one to ensure that all concepts and answering options were 
understood. The participants ticked the boxes and it was arranged that a literate 
person was seated next to a non-literate person to ensure correct completion of the 
questionnaire. I was present during this meeting to assist the staff member when 
necessary. A volunteer at SDC was also present to assist the farmers with the 
completion of the questionnaire. 
 
I chose to use staff members of SDC to assist with the data collection and the 
interviews as they are known to the farmers, who trust them. I believe this increases 
the validity of the data. The staff members involved familiarised themselves with the 
questionnaire before the meetings/interviews took place and I had a session with them 
to explain that they should be objective and not push their opinions on the respondent, 
be open and honest and create an environment where the respondent would feel 
comfortable to answer. The staff member of SDC was the interviewer during the 
larger meetings and the volunteer did the one-on-one interviews. I had weekly 





After this pilot, the questionnaire was slightly adapted (see detail in 4.5.3). Further 
data was then gathered at two other farmers’ association meetings, one in 
Kwanzimakwe and one in Gcilima. The remainder of the questionnaires were 
collected by means of one-on-one sessions with farmers. The volunteer went to 
vegetable collection points, where farmers came to sell vegetables, and visited 
farmers at their homes. She attended all farmers’ association meetings and was 
present when I had a one-on-one session with an English-speaking farmer. 
 
The volunteer and I captured the data on an Excel spreadsheet. I explained the Excel 
file and capturing method to the volunteer and verified the first batch of data she 
entered for correctness. I could not find a single mistake. Afterwards, I did sample 
tests to ensure all data were captured correctly. The volunteer is a graduate who was 
preparing herself for an honours degree and wished to expand her knowledge of 
research. She was keen to learn and read some initial chapters of my research to 
familiarise herself with the research and the methodology.  
 
The data was captured in the Excel sheet per respondent by coding each question (1, 
2, 3 etc.) and writing the answer to the question underneath (yes, no, agree, disagree, 
45 years, etc.). This Excel sheet was the basis for further data processing, namely the 
development of a ‘Pivot table’. This is a data summarisation tool in Excel to 
automatically sort data, provide tables and provide other information related to the 
data. The data were sorted in the Pivot table under demographics, yes/no questions 
and interval questions. Under these three options, the data may be sorted per 
community, per age group, per gender, per education and per employment situation. 
Also, under the yes/no and interval questions, the data may be sorted per category 
(working local economy, participation, ownership, etc.) and per question. The Pivot 
table can also generate tables, and colour codes are allocated as per the Likert scale 
mentioned below. 
 
The Pivot table was designed by a data specialist on my instructions about the kind of 
data sorting I would require. Specific knowledge is required to enter the different 




The one open question on the questionnaire was translated first by the staff member 
and the volunteer of SDC into English and afterwards captured in a word document. 
 
4.5.2 Structure of the questionnaire 
 
A number of questions are measured on a nominal scale and a number of questions on 
an interval scale. Both scales are used to increase the validity of the data. Scales are 
often used to measure abstract concepts like ‘beliefs’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘sentiments’ 
regarding an issue, in this case the CIP project (Terre Blanche et al. 2006:155-156). 
Each question refers to an indicator of a variable about which I wish to gather more 
information. See below under ‘content of questionnaires’ (4.5.3) for the variables I 
have identified which questions/indicators. 
 
Questions 1 to 5 are related to demographics, namely gender, age category, level of 
education, employment situation and grant income – to provide an understanding of 
the group of research participants. Questions 6 to 29 are yes/no questions where 
respondents could answer ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’ by ticking a box. Questions 30 
to 46 are interval-scale questions where respondents could answer ‘strongly agree’, 
‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’. This is known 
as the Likert Scale – standardised response categories ranked on a scale (Babbie 
2011:164) – and is often used to measure attitudes and opinions. Question 47 is the 
only ‘open question’ on the questionnaire.  
 
The interval scale questions lead to index scores which express an average on a 
numeric scale of 0 to 100. It is not a percentage, but numerically expresses an average 
disposition towards an indicator. So an index score is recognisable as a statement with 
agreement scales and each scale corresponds with a score and a condition. A five-
point Likert scale was used with scores as per the table below. Colours were added to 
make the tables in the Pivot table easily understandable. 
 










Not sure, doubt Disbelieve - 
Unsuccessful 
Strongly 





To give an example: if the majority of the respondents ‘strongly agree’ that the 
chairperson of the Farmers’ Association has been democratically elected, than we can 
strongly believe that this is indeed the case.  
 
When a first draft of the questionnaire was ready (after discussions with my 
supervisor), it was shared and discussed with the management of SDC on 27 July 
2012. During this meeting, a number of questions were changed so as to make them 
clearer and straightforward. The staff member of SDC who would be used as 
interviewer suggested reducing the Likert Scale answering options from five to three 
as some of the illiterate farmers might have difficulty in grasping the detail of five 
options. However, after further debate and consultation, we decided to retain the five 
answering options for the sake of more reliable data and so a better research result. 
The staff member agreed and explained the five answering options in detail before 
farmers completed the questionnaire.  The staff member also translated the 
questionnaire in Zulu (he is a native Zulu speaker). 
 
4.5.3 Content of the questionnaire 
 
The purpose of the questionnaire is to find out if CIP, or at least the characteristics of 
CIP that have been implemented in the project at the South Coast, are working. The 
following categories were identified, and questions were allocated to each category as 
described in the table below. The questionnaire can be found in annexure two. 
Category Variables (questions) Percentage 
1. Demographics  1, 2, 3, 4, 5 10.87% 
2. People-centred development: participation 
and ownership 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 30, 31, 
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 
32.61% 
3. Becoming self-reliant: working local 
economy  
15, 16, 17, 18, 26, 38, 39, 
40 
17.39% 
4. Becoming self-reliant: knowing the 
resources available  
19 2.17% 
5. Learning process: learning society, self-
esteem and dignity  
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 
41, 42, 43 
21.74% 
6. Sustainability and success of the CIP 
project  
13, 14, 27, 28, 44, 45, 46 15.22% 
Figure 5: Categories and variables 
110 
 
The first version of the questionnaire, used for the pilot (see 4.5.1), contained five 
questions in addition to the 46 mentioned in figure 4 above. Four of these questions 
concerned the board of the cooperative (were they democratically elected, are they 
known, are they trusted and do they act in the interests of farmers), but the farmers 
indicated that they could not answer these questions as they indeed did not know the 
board members of the cooperative and had no idea whether or not they were 
democratically elected or were acting in the interests of the community. So, these 
questions were taken out as they become irrelevant when the board members are not 
known to the farmers. These questions were put to the local chairperson and secretary, 
in an interview (respondents 11 to 13), as they are seated on the board of the 
cooperative and were able to provide answer. 
 
A fifth question was taken out after the pilot phase, namely ‘Do you have more 
income since you are selling to the cooperative’. Of course, all farmers selling to the 
cooperative gain income from doing so, so it would be an irrelevant question. Some 
farmers would answer ‘no’ if, for example, some household income had fallen away 
for reasons unrelated to the project. This question would dilute the data and was 
therefore removed. 
 
An explanation of the different categories and how they related to the concepts about 
which I needed more information follows below. The category ‘demographics’ 
(category 1) is not discussed here as it is self-explanatory. 
 
• Category 2. People-centred development: ownership and participation 
 
Participation in this context refers to the degree to which the beneficiaries are 
participating in the project. Participation is different from ownership as people might 
participate by selling vegetables, without taking part in the management of the project 
and having no idea of how the project works and what its goals are. Ownership in this 
context refers to the degree to which the beneficiaries of the project own the project. 
This means that the farmers should know about the goal(s) of the project, be involved 
in the planning of the project, make the vital project decisions and act on their own 




The questions aim to confirm that the community is participating and that the farmers, 
to a certain extent, own the project. One of the main characteristics of CIP is the 
active participation of the community and the ownership of the project by the 
community.  Good participation and ownership increase the chances of success.  
 
Ownership and participation are measured by questions 6 to 12 and 30 to 37. 
 
• Category 3. Becoming self-reliant: working local economy 
 
A working local economy in this context means whether or not the CIP project is 
creating or is contributing to a working local economy. With local is meant ‘in the 
community where the farmers live’. Does the fact that the farmers are paid out cash 
immediately contribute to this working local economy? And do the farmers have 
more disposable income since they are selling to the project? Does that contribute to 
them being more self-reliant? 
 
‘Working local economy’ is measured by questions 15 to 18, 26 and 38 to 40.  
 
• Category 4. Becoming self-reliant: knowing the resources available 
 
Knowing the resources available in this context means whether or not the farmers 
who participate in the CIP project know which resources are available for the project 
and whether or not they take part in deciding what is done with those resources. 
 
‘Knowing the resources available’ is measured by question 19: ‘Do they have 
something to say on how the resources are spent?’ It is irrelevant to ask whether or 
not they know how much resources are available as I know from interviews with SDC 
staff members that this is not the case. 
 
• Category 5. Learning process: learning society, self-esteem and dignity 
 
CIP aims to be a ‘learning process’ for the involved community. Did the community 
and farmers learn something from participating in the project? Was the programme 
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flexible enough to be adapted or reviewed, if this was found to be necessary? And 
how does the learning contribute to the improvement of the self-esteem and dignity of 
the farmers? Self-esteem in this context means how farmers’ perceptions about 
themselves have improved due to their participation in the project. Do they feel better 
about themselves? Dignity in this context means how the farmers, by taking part in 
the project, have fulfilled their lives and whether or not they have been given the 
opportunity to reach their potential (or approach it), besides the monetary benefits of 
being part of the project.  
 
Learning society, self-esteem and dignity are measured by questions 20 to 25, 29 and 
41 to 43. Questions to measure self-esteem and dignity are difficult to formulate. 
After discussions with my supervisor and Prof Willem Landman, an ethicist, I 
concluded that, if I wanted to know whether or not people’s feelings of dignity and 
their self-esteem have improved, I had to find out whether or not they could reach 
their potential, or were invited to do so, whether or not they were given recognition, 
whether or not they could participate in decision-making and whether or not they 
became more self-sufficient. If the answers to these questions were positive, I could 
conclude that their sense of dignity and their self-esteem have improved. However, it 
would still be a perception.  
 
• Category 6. Sustainability and success of the CIP project 
 
This is a large concept to measure, but in this context it means whether or not the 
project is sustainable in the long term. The idea of CIP is that, if there is participation, 
ownership, more self-reliance, learning taking place and increasing self-esteem, then 
sustainability will follow. The farmers will be able to live a more sustainable life. 
Whether or not the CIP project at the South Coast as such is sustainable financially 
without the assistance of SDC is another question and it will be addressed as well. 
 
Sustainability is measured by questions 13, 14, 27, 28, 44, 45 and 46.  Question 47 is 





4.5.4 Validity and reliability of the information gathered through the 
questionnaire 
 
How do I know the answers given by the respondents are valid and reliable for 
measuring the concepts I want to measure? How do I know the respondents are honest 
when they answer? How trustworthy are the answers? These questions are not easy to 
answer. The assumption is made that the respondents are answering the questions in 
good faith and truthfully. To ensure this, the interviewer (a staff member of SDC) was 
selected with this in mind. The respondents know him well and he is trusted. The 
respondents probably found it easier to answer him and ask him questions in their 
own language than if I had to conduct the questionnaires. The management of SDC 
also said that the farmers were generally truthful – that was their experience when 
they conducted other surveys, such as a baseline survey and impact surveys. The 
respondents are therefore also used to completing questionnaires as they did that 
before.  
 
In the end, the answers the respondents give are a perception of how they see and 
experience the CIP project. So, in the respondents’ view, this is the reality and the 
truth. This ‘reality’ is then verified by the follow-up interviews I did with key 
informants like the chairpersons of the farmers’ associations and SDC staff members.  
 
The findings are reliable as they can be repeated for other farmers who are part of the 
project. For example, the majority of respondents get a number of benefits out of the 
project and it can be assumed that other farmers who are part of the project, or are 
joining the project at a later stage, will also experience these benefits. In terms of CIP, 
the findings confirm that the project does contribute to the creation of a working local 
economy, so we can assume that the project, if replicated in other areas with other 
farmers, will do the same (see chapter 7). 
 
4.5.5 Analysis of the data gathered through the questionnaire 
 
The survey findings were firstly presented in a separate chapter (chapter 6) per 
category. I decided to have a separate chapter on the CIP pilot project at the South 
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Coast as I could gather much more data there than in the projects in Huntington and 
Tsakane. The data from Huntington and Tsakane were gathered merely by means of 
document review and interviews, not by means of a survey. The data from Huntington 
and Tsakane are analysed in chapter 5, and provide an additional background to 
chapter 6.  
 
Before presenting the findings from the survey in chapter 6, the categories (e.g. 
participation) were explained in detail in relation to the context of the project. In each 
category, the applicable questions were presented separately, indicating the score 
(percentage or agreement score) and an interpretation was made based on the score. 
After the presentation of all questions within a certain category, an overall analysis 
was made of the category as per the interpretative framework (see figure 4). This 
information was repeated in chapter 7, where these findings were interpreted in 
relation to the objectives and research questions. 
 
In the Pivot table, the questions were already grouped per category so there was no 
need for further coding.  
 
To discover patterns (Babbie 2011:391-392), for example whether or not the project 
had an impact on the lives of the farmers, I looked at the answers and at how many 
farmers confirmed a certain question (frequency). For example, many farmers said 
that the income they earned by selling to the Kumnandi cooperative was not much, so 
I could say that the impact of the project was not big. However, I then had to interpret 
the question in relation to others, and in relation to the interviews, as I later 
discovered that even a little bit of extra cash income may make a huge difference in 
the life of a farmer and his/her family. So the impact of the extra cash is significant 
and it does have an impact on the household. 
 
4.6 Ethical considerations 
 
During the total duration of the research, I ensured adherence to basic ethical 




5: THE BEGINNING: ANALYSIS OF THE CIP PILOT 




The information in this chapter is based on non-empirical and empirical data, namely 
available documents from the two CIP pilot projects in Huntington and Tsakane and 
interviews with a few key informants who were involved in the projects.  
 
When the dplg included CIP as one of the four strategies for LED in 2005, Reynolds 
started searching for a donor to sponsor CIP pilot projects, so as to prepare the ground 
for nationwide roll-out of CIP as part of the new LED framework. He found two 
donors, the Sabi Sabi private game reserve in Mpumalanga, and Broederlijk Delen, a 
Belgian development NGO. Each of them would fund a CIP pilot project in the areas 
where they were present. 
 
For Sabi Sabi, this was near their game reserve and the Kruger Park in the province of 
Mpumalanga. Huntington was chosen, a small rural community bordering the Sabi 
Sabi Game Reserve. It is also one of the communities from which Sabi Sabi sources 
staff. As part of its corporate social responsibility strategy, Sabi Sabi wanted to do 
something structured and sustainable to assist the bordering communities. Sabi Sabi 
saw an opportunity with CIP to contribute more than hand-outs. Huntington was the 
first place in South Africa where a CIP pilot started, in 2006. 
 
The other CIP pilot project started in Tsakane, a township of Ladysmith in northern 
KwaZulu-Natal. Broederlijk Delen had a long relationship with an organisation based 
in Ladysmith, the Uthukela Umzinyathi Christian Council (TMCC) – a regional 
council of the KwaZulu-Natal Christian Council24. TMCC had received funding from 
Broederlijk Delen for some years for an economic empowerment programme to 
address the massive poverty in the rural areas surrounding Ladysmith. However, this 
programme was not a great success and, therefore, Broederlijk Delen and TMCC 
                                                          
24
 The regional councils are sister organizations of the KwaZulu-Natal Christian Council (KZNCC), 
formed and supported through KZNCC (www.kzncc.org.za) 
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opted for CIP in the hope that this programme would be more successful. Tsakane 
was identified as the preferred community for the pilot. TMCC had already worked 
there as part of its economic empowerment programme and was well-known in the 
community. Tsakane is a township about 12 km outside Ladysmith, established in the 
early nineties during the drought, when large numbers of farm workers moved there 
in the hope of finding work. The township is characterised by high levels of poverty, 
unemployment, HIV/AIDS and violence (TMCC). The pilot project in Tsakane 
started in March 2007.   
 
Both CIP pilot projects collapsed quite quickly, that in Huntington in mid-2008 and 
the Tsakane pilot by early 2009. 
 
Each project is described separately below, using the categories of chapters 3 and 6 
and as mentioned in the interpretative framework (see chapter 4), namely: people-
centred development (with participation and ownership), establishing self-reliance 
(working local economy, knowing the resources available), a learning process 
(learning society, self-esteem) and then to conclude, sustainability. Per category, a 
description is made of the implementation of aspects and whether or not it was 
successful – based on my own knowledge, interviews and a document review. 
 
5.2 Huntington  
 
5.2.1 People-centred development: ownership and participation 
 
The CIP pilot project in Huntington was facilitated by Reynolds himself. He was the 
main facilitator, assisted from time to time by a colleague and friend of his who is 
specialised in management and bookkeeping. The project was started by forming a 
community trust, which would own the project and all its assets. Reynolds facilitated 
this process and an election was held in the community to elect trustees for the trust. 
The process of forming a trust took more than a year and a lot of effort was put in, so 
as to ensure that the governance was solid and that there would be participation in and 
ownership of the project. Reynolds and his colleague trained the elected trustees with 
regard to their responsibilities as trustees and the management of the community 




A project manager was appointed from year two, who would live in Huntington to 
assist the community with the implementation of CIP. Reynolds lived in 
Johannesburg and only occasionally visited Huntington (see 5.2.3).When the project 
manager arrived in Huntington, he noticed a number of problems that slowly but 
surely led to the collapse of the CIP pilot project.  
 
Firstly, the project manager became aware that the trustees were also the political 
leaders of the community. No assessment was made by the facilitator of the existing 
power relations in the community and how this played out when the community trust 
was formed. Existing power relations, even if not visible or formal as such, can make 
or break a project (Cooke and Kothari 2001:14). The existing power relations in 
Huntington were not sufficiently considered when the trust was formed. The project 
manager, who was from the same area, thought from the outset that a community trust 
was not necessarily the right vehicle for the CIP pilot project. The elected trustees 
were also political leaders or other existing leaders in the community. Those who 
already had power were once again elected. The project manager indicated that 
Reynolds was probably not aware of this as they were duly elected by the community 
and, even if he was, the facilitator could not interfere in the community election. 
According to the project manager, the election of these political leaders as trustees 
was a major problem as they were corrupt and would not be accountable. They had 
power and the project manager even thinks that they persuaded or ‘bought’ the 
community members to vote for them. He also mentioned that the local people were 
influenced by issues of witchcraft and family history. Once you were a leader in the 
community, you would remain a leader as nobody would challenge you. Therefore, 
ordinary members of the community were not represented in the trust, only the 
existing powerful elite. The political leaders/trustees did not see the trust as a body for 
community development, but rather as a body for personal enrichment. This implied 
that there was no real participation from the community for the CIP pilot project from 
the beginning (interview Respondent 7). 
 
Secondly, besides the training that Reynolds and his colleague provided for the 
trustees regarding their responsibilities as trustees, the project manager claims that 
they did not understand, or did not fully grasp the extent of the responsibility on their 
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shoulders as trustees. He says:  
 
They gave these people so much responsibility that they did not even 
understand what it meant. To understand the CIP concepts, you need some 
educated ones to take the decisions. These have long left rural marginalised 
communities and the ones that remain take the power, mostly for their own 
gain. However, I believe that any community member, educated or not, knows 
the value of money, and when asked to manage money on behalf of the 
community, that is very clear. The problem lied with the fact that the trustees, 
or at least the majority, had the wrong intention from the beginning. They 
became a trustee as they saw personal enrichment opportunities and not 
because they wanted to develop the community as a whole (interview 
Respondent 7).  
 
Hence, the trustees had the intention of abusing the trust funds from the start. This 
obviously jeopardised the project from the outset, while Reynolds remained unaware 
of it. This jeopardised real participation and ownership. 
 
The project manager also indicated that better results could have been obtained if 
other aspects of the CIP project were introduced before the community trust (process 
before structure). It was done to ensure participation and ownership from the 
beginning, but that might not have been the best strategy for achieving these results. 
For example, better results may have been obtained by starting income-generating 
projects first, as part of promoting a working local economy. Community members 
would have been able to see the value of the project and how they could benefit from 
it. This would have encouraged their willing participation. Once these projects were 
working, the introduction of governance and management bodies could have 
followed. Community members might then have been eager to run the projects as well 
as the management as they had seen the added value. Such an approach was followed 
when the CIP project at the South Coast was introduced. The facilitators anticipated 
that, once the benefits of community development had been clearly demonstrated, 
community members would want to become involved in the management (see chapter 
6). Also, Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:41-42) and Cooke and Kothari (2001:9) 
believe it always boils down to individuals participating voluntarily. People should be 
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able to see the benefit of participation for themselves, the community or both. Mohan 
(2013:46) indicates that if people do not see, or do not understand, what is in it for 
them, they will not participate, or at least not meaningfully. The project manager 
indicated that community members did participate in the income-generating projects 
introduced by the CIP pilot project (see 5.2.2 below), as they did see opportunities. 
But involvement remained superficial as decision-making was in the hands of the 
trustees. As indicated in chapter 3, Reynolds wanted CIP to use a community trust to 
ensure participation and ownership. However, that approach might not always be 
feasible. Hence, deviations should be possible when implementing CIP (see chapter 
7).  
 
Lastly, Reynolds envisaged the CIP project to be implemented for the whole 
geographical community of Huntington. As Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:62) 
indicate, it is very difficult to target a whole community with a community 
development project. Why would all community partners line up to participate in a 
community development project which has not yet proven anything? It is better to 
start with a smaller group, demonstrate the benefits and so grow the group from the 
inside out. This correlates with the above-mentioned point of first implementing other 
aspects of CIP to demonstrate benefits, before organising the community.  
 
From the above, it may be concluded that there was no participation or ownership by 
the Huntington community. Not because they did not want to participate or take 
ownership, but because the trustees, or the ‘powerful in the community’ prohibited 
them from doing so. The trustees took ownership of the funds of the trust, literally, 
and not of the project. The dynamics of the community, like witchcraft, traditional 
power structures and politics, prohibited the community from taking ownership of this 
project. The Induna tried to mediate between those in power and the community, but 
he also failed due to the power structures.  
 
In addition, we may conclude that participation and ownership is a very important 
aspect of a community development project, which will make or break the project. 
However, if the intentions of some community members are not honest, how is a 
facilitator to know this? It is not a simple matter to discover such influences during a 
feasibility study or when inviting the community to become part of the project. The 
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project manager only made his analysis after he became part of the project. He 
believed another governance structure would have been wiser. For example, a 
structure representing not only the community, but also outsiders with voting rights 
such as a representative of Sabi Sabi, a consultant, the facilitator etc. This could have 
prevented powerful community leaders from ‘hijacking’ the community trust. On the 
other hand, such a structure could introduce the danger of ‘the outsiders’ taking 
ownership and dictate to the community, with ‘token participation/ownership’ as the 
result. However, having community members and outsiders as part of the decision-
making body has been used for the CIP project at the South Coast (see chapter 6), and 
there it has been successful so far.  
 
It is therefore important to make a proper analysis of the area where a project is 
introduced before commencing, as well as doing a community mapping exercise to 
understand the dynamics in the community. The facilitators should take the time to 
get to know the community before starting a project there (as was the case in Tsakane, 
see 5.3 below, and at the South Coast, see chapter 6).  
 
5.2.2 Becoming self-reliant: Knowing the resources available and a working 
local economy 
 
As explained in chapter 3, CIP argues that it is very important to ensure that the 
community knows which resources are available to them when a CIP project is 
introduced. This will enable the community to think about ways of implementing the 
project, which will trigger more action and, according to Reynolds, ensure greater 
participation, ownership and sustainability of the project. Therefore the Huntington 
community was told upfront, when the project was explained to the community, that 
R150 000 was available as a starting budget for the community trust. This amount 
was provided by the Sabi Sabi Trust and had to be invested by the community trust 
for the benefit of the community.  
 
The project manager (interview Respondent 7) argues that the fact that everybody 
knew there was R150 000 was a problem from the start. Everyone wanted a piece of 
the pie. He said the trustees abused the funds from year one. As mentioned above, the 
trustees received training from Reynolds and his colleague on how to manage the 
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accounts. Three of the trustees were the signatories of the community trust account. 
According to the project manager, these three trustees were friends before the trust 
was formed and made sure they were elected as trustees so as to access the money. 
The powerful community members, who manipulated their own election, made sure 
they would be able to access the money, not for helping the community, but for 
helping themselves. The trustees were both mismanaging the funds and stealing the 
funds, said the project manager. For example, they would buy tools for the gardening 
project but not provide receipts, so the real costs of the tools was never known. Then 
some of the funds disappeared and they claimed not know where it went. However, 
they were the only signatories; nobody else could access the account. Reynolds, in the 
spirit of ‘learning’ gave the trustees more than one chance. More training was 
organised on how to manage the account, the importance of receipts, etc.  
 
The project manager in this case argued that it would be better not to inform the 
community about the available funds before the trust had been formed and the trustees 
had received training. This approach would improve the prospects of community 
members making themselves available as trustees for the right reason, and not for 
personal enrichment. Once they were trained and knew that money had to be invested 
for the benefit of the community, funds could be released and made known to the 
trustees and the community. Also, a smaller amount could be made available initially. 
More could be released when accountability had been demonstrated, for example by 
returning receipts. However, it is a core element of CIP that the community has to 
know about the resources from the start. Hence, this could be an area where CIP 
should be adjusted. This will received further discussion and reflection in chapter 7. 
 
In terms of introducing rights programmes (investment, child and health rights), this 
was not done in the Huntington CIP pilot project. Existing income-generating projects 
were identified in year one, when the trust was established. Each project was 
promised that they would benefit from the trust and that the trust would assist the 
projects where and when possible. However, some projects received funds from the 
trust to invest in their business, while others did not. The absence of proper criteria for 
receiving funds created conflict in the community from the beginning of the CIP 
project. The project manager also indicated that the assistance given to some projects 
was in the form of hand-outs, unsupported by a strategy. Preferably trust funds should 
122 
 
be ‘invested’ in the community, with a return for the community, rather than being 
disbursed as hand-outs which don’t become investments (interview Respondent 7). 
So, an attempt was not made by the trustees to create ‘a working local economy’. 
Most of the existing income-generating projects did not make money, and this was 
known. In year two, the project manager attempted to change this by mapping all 
existing projects, but by then the funds of the trust were spent.  
 
Under the community trust, only one new project was implemented, namely ‘the 
bicycle project’.  It was started in year two (2007) and was introduced by Reynolds 
and a friend of his. All children in Huntington attending high school walked long 
distances to attend school in a neighbouring community. They had to get up very 
early for the long walk, causing many of them to become tired early in the school day. 
Providing all of them with bicycles would solve this problem. Special bicycles were 
designed, suitable for the gravel roads. But, in the spirit of CIP, these would not 
simply be handed over to the children. Those who wanted a bicycle had to sign a 
contract with the trust, through the bicycle project manager, agreeing to ‘work’ for the 
bicycle in a community garden after school. This garden was especially established 
for the project, and each child had its own plot. The produce of the garden would 
firstly be sold to the schools and crèches in the area. If any produce remained, it could 
be sold to other community members. Also, a bicycle maintenance shop was started, 
where children had to go to repair their bicycles themselves. A person from the 
community was appointed to manage this project and report back to the trustees and 
the project manager of the CIP project. He also received training in bicycle 
maintenance, so that he could assist the children in the maintenance shop. 
 
The CIP project manager indicated that the bicycle project manager took this position 
with abuse in mind. He was the son of a sangoma in the community and had a highly 
respected grandfather. He could therefore abuse his position as he knew he would be 
untouchable. Nobody would dare to hold him accountable. He allegedly misused the 
resources of the bicycle project from the outset, for example by selling some of the 
bicycles intended for children. Bicycles were for children in high schools, but 
children of trustees not yet in high school also received bicycles from the bicycle 
manager. Funds that had to be used for the maintenance shop were allegedly used for 




It can be concluded that the introduction of a working local economy as part of the 
CIP project in Huntington was not a success. Informing the community of the funds 
available to them when introducing the project, might also not have been the right 
thing to do. However, it is an important characteristic of CIP to do so. Nevertheless, it 
led to the wrong expectations amongst trustees from the outset. This does not mean 
that, if this approach was repeated in other communities, the funds would also be 
abused. As described in chapter 3, informing the community of the resources 
available upfront may also lead to success. This will receive further reflection in 
chapter 7. 
 
5.2.3 Learning process: self-esteem and dignity 
 
As Huntington was the first CIP pilot project, much learning could have taken place. 
This has happened to a certain extent as the facilitation of the project was adapted 
along the way. More importantly, the facilitators of the CIP pilot project in Tsakane, 
and later the South Coast, took the mistakes made in Huntington into account when 
implementing the CIP pilot projects in their areas. 
 
Firstly, both Reynolds and his colleague lived in Johannesburg and travelled down to 
Huntington from time to time (a five-hour drive). At other times the management of 
the trust and the project was left to the community. The irregular presence of the 
facilitators was a mistake. Forming a trust is one thing, but executing all tasks related 
to the management of funds, is a different matter. It is surprising that the facilitators 
did not anticipate this problem, as it was known that the proximity of the facilitator 
was crucial to the implementation of a community development project, as also 
mentioned by Korten (1980:484). The absence of the facilitator negatively influenced 
learning opportunities for the community members (and probably the facilitator), as 
mistakes were not seen by the facilitator, or often seen late. The emerging problems – 
the misappropriation of funds, for example, or the fact that the elite was capturing the 
trust – could have been noticed earlier if a facilitator had been more involved. Only 
from the middle of year two did Reynolds realise that his occasional visits were 
insufficient to support the trustees and the community, at least at that stage of 
implementation. This realisation only came when the bookkeeping was found to be 
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incorrect, creating a suspicion that funds were being misappropriated by the trustees. 
As a result, a project manager was identified to go and live in Huntington and further 
facilitate the project. The project manager was a Master’s student in Social and 
Economic Transformation and originally from a neighbouring community in the area. 
He therefore understood the language, culture and social fabric of the region 
(interview Respondent 7).  
 
The project manager indicated that his appointment was problematic from the start 
(interview Respondent 7). The trustees had agreed with Reynolds that a project 
manager would be appointed to assist them and that he would be paid from the trust 
funds. The trust had to pay the project manager’s salary, but at the same time he had 
to check the books and confront the trustees with the mismanagement of the trust 
funds. He had the best intentions and wanted to make it work, but it was impossible to 
play a facilitation role and a policing role at the same time. To exemplify this, he told 
the following story (interview Respondent 7): When the bicycle project was 
introduced, he found out that the project’s bicycles were probably stolen by the 
trustees themselves and sold elsewhere. He then called a meeting with the Induna, 
who was highly respected in the community. The Induna tried to be objective, but he 
could not report the incident to the police as his brother was a trustee. The project 
manager could not act without the support of the Induna. Also, the grandfather and 
father of the manager of the bicycle project were known for witchcraft practices and 
the project manager got death threats when it was known he wanted to report the 
stolen bicycles.  
 
While there was learning by the facilitators resulting in the appointment of a project 
manager, the intervention came too late and the position of the project manager was 
difficult from the start. He could not address the problems that were already there. 
 
Due to the presence of private game reserves in the area, many community 
development projects have been implemented there. Consequently the local 
communities, including Huntington, were familiar with such projects. For example, 
Sabi Sabi Game Reserve had given hand-outs to the Huntington community for many 
years, such as drip irrigation systems, gardening tools, seedlings, etc. No capacity 
building, however, or assistance in using the hand-outs. So when the CIP pilot project 
125 
 
was introduced, community members might have thought, ‘hey, now they give us 
R150 000 instead of tools or whatever and we can decide what to do with it’. It was 
not seen as the beginning of a community development project, but again as a hand-
out from the same donor (interview Respondent 7). A lesson here is that a 
community’s perception of ‘donors’ is crucial in the expectations they have or 
develop of a project. In this case, the community had the expectation that they would 
‘receive’ something, as had happened in the past. Perhaps they did not understand that 
the facilitators had a different expectation, namely that the community would start 
running a community development project, including the management of its funds. 
This might also explain why the trustees, from the beginning, used the funds for their 
own gain; they did not realise the money was for community development. It is, 
however, not clear if, by the time the CIP pilot project collapsed in Huntington, the 
trustees and community members involved had learned anything. The facilitators in 
Tsakane did learn this lesson, but only later, not during the time when the project in 
Huntington collapsed. The facilitators of the CIP pilot at the South Coast, however, 
were aware of this issue and took it into account. 
 
It is not clear what attention the facilitators gave to enhancing the self-esteem and 
dignity of the involved community members. The probable assumption was that 
enhanced self-esteem would result from the project after a while. However, most of 
the attention was given to setting up the community trust and nothing was really 
achieved besides that, for instance income-generating projects with real benefits for 
the people. The trustees were already powerful in the community and it is not clear 
whether ‘being a trustee’ improved their self-esteem further. In any case, it seems this 
would have been to the detriment of the other community members in any case, as the 
trustees acted as if they were untouchable. They did not act in the interest of the 
community. The bicycle project might have contributed to the self-esteem of students 
involved, who now had a bicycle to ride to school and were given the responsibility to 
take care of it, but this is an assumption. 
 
It can be concluded that the CIP pilot project in Huntington went through a learning 
process and was flexible enough to adapt, but the facilitators started off wrongly and 
anticipated the necessary changes too late. The facilitators should have been closer to 
the community to better understand community dynamics from the start, to adapt the 
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implementation of the CIP pilot quicker and also, to make the trustees aware of the 
mistakes they were making, so that learning on their side could have taken place. 
 
5.2.4 Project sustainability and conclusion 
 
The CIP pilot project in Huntington came to an end when the project manager 
discovered that some of the bicycles of the bicycle project were stolen. On top of that, 
funds were being mismanaged, which Reynolds and the project manager could not 
resolve. The project manager felt responsible to the donor and reported all issues to 
the management of Sabi Sabi, with the consent of Reynolds. As a result, the provision 
of funds to the community trust was stopped immediately. Also, the arrival of a 
second batch of bicycles, for another group of high school learners in the community, 
was put on hold as the project manager believed they would again be 
misappropriated. He advised against the distribution of more bicycles. So 350 
children did not get a bicycle and the big loser in all of this was the community. The 
misappropriated community trust funds and bicycles were never recovered. Reynolds 
and his colleague went back to Huntington to enquire about the misappropriation, but 
nobody ever spoke out. An audit was also started to find the ‘lost funds’, without 
success (interview Respondent 7, interviews Reynolds).  
 
However, both Reynolds and the project manager believe the bicycle project was a 
real success. Besides mismanagement by the bicycle project manager, the project 
worked well and the children were really enthusiastic.  The project was well planned, 
the trust was involved and proper training was done with the management and school 
children. It could have worked, but because the foundation of the CIP project in 
Huntington was not solid, and the wrong person was appointed as bicycle project 
manager, the project collapsed.  
 
The project manager’s final conclusion is that CIP can certainly work in a remote 
community like Huntington. The project in Huntington failed, not because of flaws in 
CIP, but because the wrong people managed the trust and facilitation was not up to 
standard from the outset (interview Respondent 7). This indicates the importance of 
making a proper assessment of a community, before commencing with a CIP project. 
People dedicated to the development of the community should become trustees and 
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not politicians and/or people who want to enrich themselves. This is of course not 
easy to determine. Also, facilitation is very important. It is a recipe for failure if a 
facilitator is absent from the community and visits only occasionally. There is no 
oversight and the trustees and community members cannot consult with the 




5.3.1 People-centred development: participation and ownership 
 
TMCC was the organisation selected to facilitate the implementation of CIP in 
Tsakane. A budget was available, provided by Broederlijk Delen, and also two 
volunteers from Belgium were sent to assist TMCC with the implementation of the 
project25. TMCC is a regional council of the KwaZulu-Natal Christian Council and its 
main focus is to undertake religious work and support churches. So, there was no real 
capacity within TMCC for community development. The two volunteers had just 
graduated from university, one in a field related to community development. Both had 
never been to Africa and had no experience with development and implementation of 
development projects. 
 
When the CIP pilot project started, Reynolds came to Ladysmith for two days and 
trained a TMCC staff member, the economic empowerment programme coordinator 
and the two volunteers on CIP implementation. It was decided that the TMCC 
coordinator would make the necessary contacts in Tsakane and introduce the project 
and that the volunteers would take care of the practical implementation of the project. 
No community members were involved in the training by Reynolds. This could have 
been a mistake, in terms of ownership by the involved community from the outset. 
However, TMCC had no idea yet of what CIP was and it is important that the 
facilitating organisation understands the project first, before attempting its facilitation. 
The two volunteers had a better understanding of CIP as they had lived and worked 
with Reynolds for a month before going to Ladysmith. The training was theoretical 
and on an academic level and not translated concretely enough. Consequently, when 
                                                          
25
 I was one of the two volunteers; the other was my husband, who later became the main facilitator of 
the CIP project at the South Coast. 
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Reynolds left, the next steps were not clear to TMCC and the volunteers. It was 
basically left to TMCC to develop an implementation strategy for the pilot project, 
based on the theoretical information received from Reynolds.  
 
It was a major problem that neither TMCC, nor the volunteers knew how to 
implement the CIP pilot project. The volunteers had no practical experience with 
community development and the TMCC staff member was the project coordinator of 
the economic empowerment programme of TMCC – basically hand-outs. TMCC’s 
experience was in receiving donor funds and taking responsibility themselves. For 
example, they would go to a community, ask where they could start a brick-making 
project, put all infrastructure in place, appoint workers and do the bookkeeping. 
TMCC felt responsible for the project, as they had received the money, and wanted to 
deliver to the donor as had always been expected of them. TMCC did not understand 
that in this case, the project had to be owned and implemented by the community, 
with TMCC as a facilitator.  
 
During the training with Reynolds, it was calculated that the budget from Broederlijk 
Delen would allow a CIP pilot project for 100 adults and their children, also to a 
maximum of 100. TMCC proposed to run the project from a crèche in Tsakane, with 
the children and their parents as the beneficiaries of the project. It was also decided to 
involve the African Cooperative Action Trust (ACAT), a local NGO supporting 
community gardening projects. They would assist with the facilitation of income-
generating projects in Tsakane. Hence, preliminary meetings took place with the 
principal of the crèche. She fully seemed to understand the project and agreed that the 
CIP pilot could be run from the crèche. It was indicated that the crèche belonged to 
the community of Tsakane, where all parents could bring their children. 
Consequently, a community meeting was called by TMCC at the crèche, where the 
purpose of the CIP project was explained, and that parents could voluntarily become 
part of the CIP pilot project on a first-come first-serve basis. A number of people 
signed up, but there were never 100 adult participants. Not all participants were 
parents of children at the crèche either.  
 
Reynolds had instructed TMCC to ensure ownership by the community from the 
beginning. This could be done by ensuring that people would voluntarily form a 
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community trust, work on the trust deed and get involved with the project planning, 
decision-making, etc. Under TMCC guidance, a community trust, Qedusizi Trust, was 
established as the legal body of the project. Membership was free. Trustees were 
elected by the trust members and from the trustees a chairman, treasurer and secretary 
were appointed. The trustees drafted a trust deed, with assistance of TMCC. The 
principal of the crèche was appointed as trustee. From the start, there was a core 
group of about twenty trust members that would always show up at meetings and 
would participate in new income-generating projects. This core group included the 
trustees.  
 
In the beginning, numerous meetings took place with the trustees and the trust 
members to explain the CIP concept and plan the income-generating projects (see 
5.3.2). However, TMCC took full ownership of the CIP project and the lead in 
implementing it, as they were used to do. These actions made it difficult for trust 
members to see TMCC as a facilitator of the project, with the community running it. 
Trust members therefore had the wrong expectations of TMCC. The two volunteers 
were initially too inexperienced to notice this, and when they did understand, it was 
already too late. Reynolds, who did have the necessary experience and was the main 
facilitator in Huntington, was based in Johannesburg and no funds were available for 
frequent visits by him. 
 
The facilitators’ limited understanding of the CIP programme in Tsakane was a 
serious problem. How could the community be expected to understand CIP and its 
differences from ‘hand-out’ projects when TMCC did not understand themselves? 
The volunteers developed a board game to explain CIP to the trustees. However, it 
was in English and, given that both volunteers were academically schooled, the 
question could be raised as to how much of the game the mostly illiterate non-English 
speaking trustees understood. The game was played only with the trustees. The 
TMCC staff member was present when the board game was played, to translate into 
Zulu. The trustees could speak some English. However, could they understand the 
CIP concepts? Other members of the trust only received some information about CIP 
during the first community meeting. So, the members were insufficiently trained and 
it was unclear whether or not the trustees understood CIP. In addition, it might be that 
the introduction of CIP concepts was too ‘theoretical’. Hands-on training would have 
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been preferable. It is in my view not necessary to give community members a 
theoretical background of CIP. They will get to know CIP by doing it, and benefitting 
from it. This assumption became more plausible when, during project 
implementation, some trustees began to understand CIP for the first time. Hence, over 
time they got frustrated with the leadership role TMCC took on itself, as the 
community should have taken responsibility. 
 
It should be noted here that it is probably inappropriate and short-sighted of many 
Western development NGO’s or government-bilateral development projects to send 
inexperienced academic graduates to developing countries to implement 
‘development’ projects without proper guidance. If TMCC had been more 
experienced, it might have guided and trained the volunteers adequately, but that was 
not the case here. Also, the assumption that local NGO’s in developing countries, like 
TMCC, which do not even work in development, are capable of implementing 
complicated projects like CIP is short-sighted. Reynolds should perhaps have known 
better, but he was probably just happy that he had at least found one donor to support 
the implementation of a CIP pilot project. 
 
Another major problem was the fact that the CIP pilot project was run from the 
crèche, and that the crèche was seen as a community asset. When the project started, 
it was assumed by TMCC that the crèche belonged to the Tsakane community. The 
community trust assumed then that the crèche belonged to the trust. However, the 
trust represented only a small part of the community and a legal transfer of ownership 
was never initiated. The principal of the crèche also acted as ‘the owner’ and wanted a 
kind of ‘veto’ right over all trust decisions affecting the crèche. After about a year, it 
seemed that the crèche was no longer owned by the community but by the principal. 
The principal had ownership papers in her name. She had received the crèche from a 
German donor organisation years earlier. She did support the CIP pilot project from 
the beginning and allowed new investments and budgets to run projects from the 
crèche, like a community garden, brick-making project, hair salon and food kitchen 
(see 5.3.2 below). So basically, community budgets were turned into personal 
investments by her. When other trustees and trust members wanted to use the crèche 
and assets invested by the trust, she would act as if it all belonged to her and refuse 
the removal of certain items from the crèche. However, it should be added that the 
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nature of this woman and the respect she had in the community justifies the 
conclusion that she did not deliberately turn the community assets into personal 
assets. She had a lack of understanding of the CIP project and the community trust 
and, secondly, she had always been given ‘hand-outs’ from either TMCC or other 
donors, and probably assumed that this project wanted to upgrade the crèche and its 
surroundings.  
 
The conclusions are that, firstly, sufficient training on CIP and ownership had not 
been conducted for the trustees and the principal; secondly, that the correct 
expectations were not raised by the facilitators; and, thirdly, incorrect expectations by 
the trust members were not rectified. The facilitators had not done a proper 
investigation into the ownership of the crèche – they simply assumed it belonged to 
the community. If a proper mapping exercise had been done in the community before 
the implementation of the project, this issue could have been avoided (interview 
Respondent 4, conversations with Broederlijk Delen).  
 
When the CIP pilot was closed down in mid-2009, a TMCC staff member confiscated 
all assets from the different income-generating projects (e.g. sewing machines, hair 
salon equipment and gardening tools) as these ‘belonged to TMCC’. However, in 
principle the assets belonged to the community trust. It was clear that the staff 
member never had fully understood CIP. There was no real ownership of the project 
and the community trust by the community or trust members. This is supported by the 
fact that the trustees did not come forward with any ideas on continuation of the 
project when this was requested by TMCC and Broederlijk Delen. A number of 
income-generating projects had started as part of the investment rights 
implementation (5.3.2 below). Within one year, most of these projects collapsed and 
none of them was sustainable in the longer term. The donor, Broederlijk Delen, asked 
the trustees to come up with a plan to sustain the projects and was willing to support 
such a plan. However, neither the trustees, nor the members of the trust came forward 
with a plan. As real ownership was never expected from the trustees in the past, it is 
of course no surprise that they did not come forward with a plan. They might have 
been unprepared for this task. The fact that Broederlijk Delen asked these questions 
when things started going wrong, is also not surprising. It is not that Broederlijk 
Delen knew from the outset how CIP worked and advised TMCC and the volunteers 
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accordingly; they also did not know. While implementing the project, it became 
clearer what CIP was and the donor learned step by step, as TMCC and the volunteers 
did. 
 
It can be concluded that there was no participation and ownership from the start of the 
CIP implementation in Tsakane, as the control of the project was held and kept by the 
facilitating organisation. No real opportunity was given to the involved community 
members to participate and take ownership.  
 
5.3.2 Becoming self-reliant: knowing the resources available and a working 
local economy 
 
One characteristic of CIP well understood by the facilitators was that the local income 
multiplier in Tsakane should go up so as to improve wealth creation in the 
community. One way to achieve this was to create local production and local demand 
for the production. 
 
The concept of ‘rights programmes’ was introduced in this regard, namely investment 
rights and child rights. Trust members did not know how much funds were available 
for the project in Tsakane. Neither did they know how much funds were allocated to 
the different rights programmes as described below. TMCC made these decisions 
after learning from the CIP pilot in Huntington that informing the community up-front 
about available resources and giving them access to it, could lead to problems. TMCC 
was not aware at that stage that ‘knowing the resources available’ was an important 
aspect of CIP. All funds were managed by TMCC, but the trust was involved in some 
planning and decision-making with regard to the spending of the money (e.g. a 
number of possible income-generating projects were put forward by TMCC after 
some feasibility study was done and the trust members could then decide which 
project to start). 
 
The child rights evolved around the children of the crèche; they had to get healthy 
food and a good education. The crèche would create the local demand for food, so it 
was decided by TMCC and approved by the trust that a community garden should be 
established on the premises of the crèche and that members of the trust should work in 
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this garden. The produce from the garden would be sold to the crèche by the 
gardeners. The funds used to establish the garden were called ‘investment rights’. The 
other facilitating organisation came on board at that stage, namely ACAT (African 
Cooperative Action Trust), which was specialised in gardening. They gave free 
training to the selected trust members who became gardeners using organic gardening 
techniques and maintained the garden. 
 
The gardeners were selected by introducing the system of ‘use rights’. As explained 
in chapter 3, these rights can be used when a community asset, in this case the garden, 
should be divided amongst, in this case, the trust members. Obviously, not everybody 
could work in the garden, but who would get the opportunity? As the majority of trust 
members were unemployed, each received ‘use rights’ to the value of R5 and it was 
explained to them that they could trade these amongst each other. The trust members 
who had the highest number of use rights after one week of trading had ‘bought’ the 
right to work in the garden. Each year, a new round of use rights would be 
undertaken, to give other people the opportunity of working in the garden. After a 
week, five people came forward to become the gardeners. It was not clear to the 
facilitators whether they had actually bought the use rights from others, or just asked 
them. It was afterwards believed the majority of the trust members did not understand 
the purpose of the use rights. In any case, ‘use rights’ were introduced in the Tsakane 
CIP project. 
 
The idea of the community garden selling vegetables to the crèche did not go well, as 
no proper daily meals were cooked in the crèche. A kitchen was installed in the 
crèche with trust funds and a lady from the community was appointed as cook to 
provide the meals. Rather than using vegetables, the children often received a 
sandwich or pap. The gardeners tried to sell the vegetables in the community, but 
there was insufficient demand. The trustees negotiated with the local primary school 
and high school to provide the produce to the school feeding scheme, but the scheme 
was sourced out on an annual basis to large suppliers. Small community projects did 
not stand a chance. Hence, after a while, the gardeners abandoned the garden as they 





Besides the community garden project, a brick-making project had started behind the 
crèche, on crèche land, as it was decided that bricks were in high demand in Tsakane 
and there was no brick supplier in the community itself. TMCC had decided, even 
before the volunteers arrived and the CIP project officially started, that a brick-
making project should be introduced. TMCC had done this in many other 
communities and believed it to be a good project. The brick-making project operated 
from the crèche premises as well and the community members working in it were 
selected by TMCC. When the trust was established, they became trust members. 
However, no business plans were made when income-generating projects were 
started. For example, the brick-making project made a loss from the start. But the 
demand for bricks did exist – in fact, the six people working in the project could not 
keep up with the demand. What was the problem? The input costs to produce the 
bricks, namely sand and water, were too expensive. The sand had to be bought in 
town and the water had to be bought from to the municipality. Water from the river in 
Tsakane could not be used as the river was mostly dry. The wages of the workers 
were very low, R30 per day, and wages were the least of the production costs. As 
more bricks were produced, more water and sand were needed, and this is where the 
problem was. This eventuality was not considered before the project started. The 
brick-making project was therefore closed down after six months. This caused much 
anger and frustration among the workers and the community trust. They did not 
understand why the project had to be closed as they did not see the losses – TMCC 
was handling the buying of materials and paid the bills and wages. The workers 
handled only the selling of the bricks and saw money coming in, but not going out, so 
they did not believe the project made a loss. As the ownership of the project was with 
TMCC, not with the trust and not with the workers, the question can be asked whether 
this was community development as nobody was developing and nobody was even 
learning. 
 
A sewing project was also started, as was a hairdressing salon and a chicken project. 
These income-generating projects were identified by the members of the trust and 
would hopefully improve money circulation in Tsakane. The hairdressing salon was 
located on the premises of the crèche as well, the sewing project was located at the 
house of one of the ladies in the project and the chickens were held at trust members’ 
houses. The trust paid for the equipment to start all these projects and each project 
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had to repay the trust in some way. This was agreed beforehand between the trust and 
the project owners on the suggestion of the facilitators. For example, the trust 
members participating in the chicken project got five chickens from the trust and they 
had to ‘pay back’ this investment by providing 100 eggs for free to the crèche. The 
hair salon and the sewing project had to pay a percentage of their income to the trust. 
The need for the products and services was certainly there, but the demand was stifled 
by competition from town. The sewing project, for example, could not make clothes 
cheaper than outlets in town. Only certain church uniforms or school uniforms, not 
sold in Pep and Jet, were making money. But that was not enough to sustain the 
project as these were often once-off needs. Also, new locally produced goods were 
not always trusted. Rather buy from a trusted brand than something from a 
community member whose products were unknown.  
 
The interest of the community in the CIP project grew after the first visible results of 
the income-generating projects emerged. Community members who were in town 
would also pop in at the TMCC office (located in Ladysmith) to ask for more 
information about the project and how they could get involved. People could at any 
time become members of the trust as long as the total did not exceed 100. More 
people started participating in the income-generating projects initiated by the 
community trust, but rather because they saw the opportunity of making some money, 
not really because they were interested in CIP or in managing the project. This 
attitude could have been caused by the fact that the community members knew the 
crèche was owned by the principal. Hence they did not see the income-generating 
projects as ‘community projects’. Also by the fact that TMCC was managing the 
project, obviously not expecting any real input from community members.   
 
The facilitators fully understood that a market could enhance local demand. Tsakane 
had no market, but on pay-day, when pensions were paid out in the local community 
hall, many traders were seated near the hall to attract pensioners who just had been 
paid out. TMCC hence considered building a marketplace, or market stalls, near the 
community hall, where trading would take place weekly, not only monthly on pay-
days. Negotiations were initiated with the municipality to build a marketplace in 
Tsakane where all community members could sell whatever they wanted. The 
marketplace would be managed by the trust. Negotiations got to an advanced stage 
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and plans were made available for a marketplace. These negotiations were once again 
conducted by TMCC and not by the trustees or members of the trust. The ownership 
of the marketplace was once again jeopardised. The marketplace never materialised as 
the entire CIP project collapsed (interview Respondent 4). 
 
It does not follow from the failure of all income-generating projects in Tsakane that 
such initiatives will not succeed elsewhere. It rather indicates that a number of issues 
were not addressed when these projects were started. Firstly, demand for the products 
and services should be considered before starting an income-generating project. For 
example, to sell the vegetables, negotiations with the primary school should have 
started much earlier. The entire produce from the garden could never have been 
bought by a small crèche. Other buyers could have been sourced as well, like 
supermarkets in town, or old-age homes. Secondly, when local income-generating 
projects are started, a lot of awareness has to be created in the community about the 
availability of these goods, and also why buying them locally is creating economic 
growth in the community. Thirdly, the income-generating projects should receive 
management support from an NGO, in this case TMCC, for a certain period of time. 
TMCC gave some support, but the people themselves had to run the business. In 
principle, this is how it should be, but most of them had no relevant experience. When 
problems arose, they would come to TMCC to solve the problem, or ask for money. 
No proper training had taken place and TMCC was seen as the guardian angel ‘who 
would come’ and solve the problem. This underlines the participation and ownership 
issue as described in 5.3.1. The community was accustomed to TMCC taking the 
initiative and making the decisions. 
 
We can conclude that the CIP pilot project in Tsakane attempted to implement the 
principle of ‘a working local economy’ and ‘becoming self-reliant’, with mixed 
results and mistakes made. Once again, these mistakes could be the source of 
learning, by the community as well as the facilitators.  
 
5.3.3 Learning process: self-esteem and dignity 
 
The CIP pilot project in Tsakane started when the CIP pilot project in Huntington was 
already showing some of the problems that eventually led to its collapse. As a result, 
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for example, the facilitators in Tsakane decided not to mention the available funds to 
the trust members, or to let them decide what to do with the funds, as there was a fear 
of misappropriation as happened in Huntington. So some learning by the facilitators 
did happen, but little learning by TMCC happened in terms of what CIP was all about, 
even when this became clear to the trust members who challenged TMCC in this 
regard. As mentioned in 5.3.1, there was learning among the trust members in terms 
what CIP was. Even though CIP was not well understood at the beginning, when the 
project started showing benefits and more discussions took place on CIP, some trust 
members ‘learned’ what CIP was all about. This resulted in these trust members 
getting very frustrated over time with TMCC as they realised that no ownership and 
responsibility was given to, or even expected of them. TMCC was taking all the 
decisions related to the project. They did ask trust members for input, but often just 
forced down the decision already taken beforehand by TMCC. Eventually TMCC also 
realised this was a problem and a member from the community was appointed as 
‘manager’ of the project: somebody living in the community that knew everybody 
well and understood the local dynamics would be better positioned to continue with 
project implementation. However, the community manager they appointed was not 
the right person and her ‘standing’ in the community was not high enough for her to 
play a significant role. Also, the manager would just follow instructions from the 
facilitators and not take the initiative.  
 
As mentioned in 5.3.1, the donor, Broederlijk Delen, did also not know what they 
were getting themselves into when they decided to fund a CIP pilot project. They 
were convinced by the enthusiasm of Reynolds and by the fact that the ‘hand-out’ 
type of community development project was not working. They were ready to try 
something new, but they had no idea what CIP was all about. Hence, Broederlijk 
Delen also learned along the road.  For them, while implementing the project, it 
became clearer what CIP was and the donor learned step by step, as the volunteers 
did. The then representative of Broederlijk Delen in South Africa made his own 
analysis of the CIP pilot collapse in Tsakane. He mentions that the Tsakane 
community might have been too fragmented as a testing ground for CIP. Tsakane was 
only established after 1994 and people from all over, with different backgrounds, 
settled there (emails representative Broederlijk Delen). However, I do not agree with 
this assessment as the community trust was not for the community at large, but only 
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for the beneficiaries – the children of the crèche and the adults who signed up to 
become members. Any group of people can implement a CIP project, as long as the 
group is united into a common purpose and wants to work together (Reynolds and 
Drew 2005:4-30; Swanepoel and De Beer 2001:62).  
 
CIP is a community development programme that is shaped over time and adapted 
and changed as per the community where it is implemented. So there is no ‘practical’ 
blueprint available for practitioners on how to implement CIP. This is what 
community development is all about, to let the involved community decide how the 
project is implemented and how it evolves over time. However, there should be some 
form of ‘blueprint’ or at least ‘guidance’ from the facilitators as to what should 
happen. In the case of Tsakane, neither TMCC, nor the volunteers knew much about 
community development and were hence incapable of giving ‘guidance’ to the 
community. TMCC implemented the project as they were used to do, by ensuring 
accountability to the donor. This once again indicates how important it is for the 
facilitator of a community development project to understand the project. Ideally 
facilitators should also have relevant experience.   
 
In terms of the involved community members growing in self-esteem and dignity, no 
evidence was gathered in this regard. However, some trust members involved in the 
income-generating projects, like the sewing project, the hair salon and the food stall, 
did gain skills and were obviously very proud of the fact that they were now running 
businesses. This was obvious from discussions I had with them, and observations 
made. One lady who was part of the sewing project had sewing training and 
afterwards came to me and said she had learned to use scissors properly. For the first 
time, she said, somebody had taken the time to teach her how to cut and this made her 
feel acknowledged. She had also learned a new skill, sewing, which would help her 
take better care of her family. Also, one of the trustees had the opportunity to travel to 
Johannesburg a few times to address workshops on his experience with forming a 
trust and CIP. He had never before been asked to share his experiences about anything 
and said he felt hugely empowered and acknowledged by the fact that he was asked to 
go to Johannesburg to tell his story. So, it can be assumed that some community 
members involved did gain self-esteem due to the CIP project implemented in 




5.3.4 Project sustainability and conclusion 
 
Due to the collapse of the income-generating projects and the absence of ownership 
taken by, or given to, trustees and the members of the project, the donor decided to 
stop the funding (interview Respondent 4). This was only a year and a half after the 
CIP pilot project started. The donor announced its exit, but an opening was given to 
the trustees as they were requested to submit a plan – how they saw the future of the 
trust and the project (see 5.3.1). However, the trustees never came forward with such 
a plan. Some trustees tried to mobilise the others, but there was not enough interest. 
Therefore, the donor withdrew completely and the CIP pilot project stopped. 
 
As can be seen from the above, a number of mistakes were made in the 
implementation of the CIP project. However, all the mistakes are related to the 
facilitation of the project and are no indication that CIP as such is not viable. The fact 
that the trust members and trustees were not even given the chance to take ownership, 
jeopardised the project from the start. It was probably the biggest mistake made by the 
facilitators. The fact that the facilitators did not have the capacity to facilitate the 
project was another mistake. Therefore, these mistakes should be taken into account 




The analysis of the CIP pilot projects in Huntington and Tsakane are of the utmost 
importance for learning about the implementation of CIP. In December 2007, 
however, Reynolds passed away and could no longer reflect on the problems in 
Huntington, which was near collapse then, and the emerging issues in Tsakane. The 
project manager in Huntington had already resigned before Reynolds passed away, 
and the donor had already stopped funding the trust. The two volunteers, who at that 
stage were involved in the Tsakane project, had followed the developments in 
Huntington and had a meeting with the project manager of Huntington. Also, reports 




This meeting and the reports were crucial for the CIP pilot project at the South Coast, 
where the implementation of the CIP project still had to commence. One of the two 
volunteers agreed to be the main facilitator for the CIP project at the South Coast and 
the lessons he took from the Huntington and Tsakane projects were crucial for the 
success of the CIP project at the South Coast. Broederlijk Delen had initially 
committed to fund two CIP pilot projects and they wanted to give a second pilot a 
chance, as they believed that CIP could possibly work if implemented under different 
circumstances. So the donor had also learned from Tsakane and did commit to fund 
another CIP pilot project. This was very open-minded of them as few donors are 
prepared to acknowledge their mistakes and invest again in a similar project.   
 
The main facilitator (respondent four) took a number of general lessons into 
consideration when he started the facilitation of a new CIP pilot project at the South 
Coast: 
 
• To very carefully select the community where the CIP project will be 
implemented. Proper consultations should take place with the applicable 
leadership structures, community members and outsiders, so as to determine 
the dynamics and decision-making structures in the community. Preferably 
full support should be ensured of all leadership structures before commencing 
with implementation; the underlying power structures, if any, should be 
known to the facilitators. 
• The facilitators should study the area where the community is located. What 
are the market dynamics? Which income-generating projects could work and 
which not? Which are already present? What skills are available in the 
community? Which income-generating projects are present in the community? 
Who ‘owns’ them? Are they profitable? 
• Facilitators should be open to setting up a governance structure for the CIP 
project only after the community has seen the benefits of the project. 
Communities may have seen many development projects in the past and their 
expectations may influence the success of the project. For example, if they 
expect a ‘hand-out’ project, where they ‘get’ something without doing 
anything in return, a CIP-type project might fail. Also, the community might 
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never have been asked to ‘govern’ a project before and they may be 
suspicious. By starting with an income-generating project, the right 
expectations could be created and a relationship of trust could be developed 
between the facilitators and the community. This may also help the facilitators 
to identify the ‘wrong’ people from a community that should not be involved 
in the governance of the project. However, it remains up to the community to 
decide who governs and who does not. 
• To deliberately, from the start, take the role of facilitator – as opposed to 
owner – and let the community take ownership of the project. 
• The most important lesson probably is that the facilitator who introduces a 
project in a community should be experienced, in terms of community 
development in general, but also in terms of relevant and sound knowledge of 
the project that has to be implemented, in this case CIP. The facilitator should 
not have preconceived ideas of how things should be done, but should have an 
open mind, be willing to learn and be willing to make adaptations along the 
way. This means that whoever pays the facilitator (a foreign donor or 
government) should also be flexible enough to re-allocate funds and deviate 
from pre-conceptualised budgets and project deliverables. 
• To involve locals from the start in the facilitation of the project, people who 
know the local language and understand community dynamics. Gaining the 
trust of the community before starting implementation is crucial. Hence, the 






6: FINDINGS OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
Findings related to the CIP pilot project at the South Coast, Kwa-
Zulu Natal 
 
6.1 Introduction: description of the sample area 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, empirical data were gathered of one CIP pilot project, 
namely at the South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal. This is the only CIP project still 
operating at the time of writing. 
 
The beneficiaries of this CIP project are all smallholder farmers, living in a rural area 
at the South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal, in the Hibiscus Coast Municipality which is 
part of the Ugu District. The area is about an hour and a half’s drive south of Durban. 
Due to its proximity to the Indian Ocean, the weather is wet throughout the year and 
very hot in the summer. The wet and warm climate allows vegetables to grow 
throughout the year and some crops can be harvested numerous times per year. 
 
The identification of the relevant communities from this area was done very carefully, 
over a one-year period. The facilitator had gathered information about the Huntington 
CIP pilot project and brought some lessons from the CIP pilot project in Tsakane (see 
chapter 5). He visited a number of communities and had discussions with community 
members and NGOs about the most suitable community for a CIP project. Once a first 
community was identified, Nositha, the facilitator did a mapping exercise with a 
number of community members and obtained support from the traditional and 
political leadership of the community. He also decided that for now, he would not 
start with the creation of a governance structure, such as a trust, but would first focus 
on the creation of income-generating activities that would demonstrate the benefits of 
CIP and make the community members eager to become involved in its management. 
Later on, two other communities were added, Kwanzimakwe and Gcilima, and only 
then a governance structure was created (interview Respondent 4). 
 
At the time of gathering the empirical data (August to October 2012), the total 
smallholder farmer population forming part of the CIP project at the South Coast was 
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230. Of course, there are more smallholder farmers in the area, but they are not 
members of the CIP project. From the 230, a total of 117 respondents participated in 
the survey. The participants were from Nositha (16 respondents), Kwanzimakwe (59 
respondents) and Gcilima (42 respondents). Nositha is a rather small community 
while the other two are larger. Each community has a different traditional leadership. 
Farmers who participated in the survey were chosen randomly, depending on 
availability and presence at farmers’ association meetings. This is why more farmers 
from Kwanzimakwe and Gcilima completed the survey questionnaire. 
 
A sample of 117 respondents out of 230 means a confidence interval of 6.5 and a 
confidence level of 95%. A confidence level of 95% means that the sample represents 
the total smallholder farmer population. The confidence interval indicates the possible 
variance between reality and the measured results and in this case, 6.5 is a good 
interval for social science research, meaning that the results do reflect reality 
(Creative Research Systems 2013; Terre Blanche et al. 2006:235-238). 
 
In total, 46 questions were asked, in the following categories: 
Category Variables (questions) Percentage 
1. Demographics  1, 2, 3, 4, 5 10.87% 
2. People-centred development: participation 
and ownership 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 30, 31, 
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 
32.61% 
3. Becoming self-reliant: a working local 
economy  
15, 16, 17, 18, 26, 38, 39, 
40 
17.39% 
4. Becoming self-reliant: knowing the 
resources available  
19 2.17% 
5. Learning process: learning society, self-
esteem and dignity  
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 
41, 42, 43 
21.74% 
6. Sustainability and success of the CIP 
project  
13, 14, 27, 28, 44, 45, 46 15.22% 
Figure 5: Categories and variables 
 
As described in chapter 4, the data was captured in a ‘Pivot table’. This is a data 
summarisation tool in Microsoft Excel to automatically sort data and provide tables 
and other information related to the data. The data were sorted in the above categories 
and so simplified the analysis. The findings in each category will be presented below. 
I used the scores for each question and an interpretative framework to analyse the data 




It should be noted that the responses given in the questionnaires were all very positive 
for the CIP project. Hence, I reflected on why the farmers responded so positively. 
Could it be because they feared a negative answer might be detrimental to the 
funding? Could it be because of my husband’s involvement in the project as the main 
facilitator? Or because they feared other negative consequences? There is no 
quantitative proof that the farmers were not influenced in this manner, but there is 
also no proof to the contrary. The following observations indicate that the farmers 
most likely answered honestly, without fear for negative consequences: 
 
• The data was gathered in three farmers’ association meetings and in a number 
of personal interviews. All the farmers gave positive answers on the different 
occasions. The communities are too far apart for the farmers to have spoken to 
each other or agree beforehand that they would all give positive answers. The 
fact that data were collected on different occasions in different circumstances 
(group and personal interviews) strengthens the likelihood that the farmers 
answered honestly. 
• At the beginning of each meeting/interview, it was explained that I was doing 
a survey about the CIP project as part of a D.Litt. et Phil. dissertation for 
UNISA. That was the reason for gathering the data. It was never mentioned 
that the data were gathered for the purpose of providing donors with proof of 
success of the project, or that the data were gathered to see if the project was a 
success, and that if not, the project would be closed down. It was only 
mentioned that the survey might be used to convince the South African 
government to roll out the project in other communities. 
• Siyavuna Development Centre (SDC), the NGO that started the CIP project at 
the South Coast, had conducted baseline and impact surveys in the involved 
communities before. Hence, the farmers were familiar with surveys and SDC 
indicated they never gained the impression that the farmers were being 
dishonest; in fact, most farmers were pleased to participate in a survey. When 
surveys were conducted in the past, there were never negative consequences 
for the communities or farmers. SDC uses the data for statistical purposes. 
• Probably not many opportunities are available to the farmers (and community 
members) due to poverty, limited investment and the small number of projects 
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in the community. Therefore, it might be that community members are keen to 
participate in every new opportunity coming their way. This could explain the 
farmers’ keenness to participate in the CIP project, and the positive answers. 




6.2.1 Collection of data 
 
Figure 6 (below) indicates that the majority of the questionnaires were completed 
during group sessions in each community. These took place at the monthly farmers’ 
association meetings. At the meetings, some farmers, who could not write or read, 
were interviewed separately by one of the facilitators. After the farmers’ association 
meetings, a small group of farmers was approached individually to complete the 
questionnaire in order to reach a larger sample.  
 
 





Most respondents are female (91%) as most smallholder farmers in this area of 







female. Discussions with SDC management revealed that in the local tradition, small-
scale farming is a task for women. The males are involved in larger-scale farming or 
animal farming (like goats and cattle).  
 
 
Figure 7: Gender of respondents 
 
6.2.3 Distribution per community 
 
Figure 8 (below) indicates that 50% or 59 of the 117 respondents are from 
Kwanzimakwe (NZK), 36% or 42 from Gcilima (GCM) and 14% or 16 from Nositha 
(NOS). The distribution is not representative of the full population of the area. 
However, Kwanzimakwe and Gcilima are much larger communities than Nositha, and 








Figure 8: Distribution of respondents per community 
 
6.2.4 Age distribution 
 
Figure 9 (below) indicates that the majority of respondents are 55+ (53%) and 78% of 
respondents are 45+. We already know from 6.2.2 that the majority of small-scale 
farmers are female, and we can now conclude that the majority of farmers 
participating in the CIP project are female farmers older than 45. As explained in 
6.2.2, traditionally small-scale farming is a task for women. The reason younger 
women are not involved, is more complex. SDC management indicates that young 
women are no longer interested in farming. They rather want a job in the urban areas 
with more money and status. However, no data are available to prove this. 
 
 




















6.2.5 Level of education 
 
Figure 10 (below) indicates that the overall majority (83%) of respondents does not 
have matric, which can be explained by the fact that most farmers are older than 45. 
The 11% with matric are younger than 25 (67%) or between 25 and 35 (20%). 
However, this is not reflected in the graph below. 
 
 
Figure 10: Level of education 
 
6.2.6 Government grants 
 
Most respondents (76%) receive a government grant, and some even two (e.g. old age 














Figure 11: Government grant 
 
6.3 People-centred development: ownership and participation in the CIP project 




The extent to which the beneficiaries of the project (rural smallholder farmers) own 
the project is called ‘ownership’. This means the farmers know about the goal(s) of 
the project, are involved in the planning of the project, make vital project decisions 
and act on their own behalf (Reynolds 2004c:3-6; Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:53). 
An important way to achieve ownership is to put a governance structure in place that 
will ensure the total involvement of the beneficiaries in the project, in this case the 
farmers. Secondly, the manner of facilitation is an important factor.  
As described in the introduction, the governance structure for the CIP project at the 
South Coast was only created after some time, when a large income-generating 
project had been started in the three involved communities. This income-generating 
project had shown the benefits of participation to the community, with the intention of 
raising their interest and thus involvement in the project and its management. The 
facilitator of the CIP project at the South Coast indicated that he took this decision 
because of the negative experience with the formation of a community trust in 













A description of the governance structure of the CIP project at the South Coast is 
given below, followed by a description of the way the facilitation was done by the 
SDC, which was established in 2010 by the facilitator to implement the CIP project in 
communities. The facilitator commenced with research related to the implementation 
of the CIP project in the area as early as 2008, although he was then hosted by another 
NGO, ‘Give a Child a Family’. This NGO takes care of orphaned children in the area 
and searches foster families for them. These foster families were often in dire 
financial straits and therefore the NGO was investigating ways of supporting them. As 
the focus of this NGO was very different to that of CIP, the facilitator and 
management of Give a Child a Family decided to establish a new NGO to focus 
exclusively on the facilitation of CIP projects. SDC was formally established in 2010, 
when the CIP project had already started in Nositha.  
 
SDC has a board of directors and is funded by international and national donor 
organisations and the South African Government (through local government). SDC 
facilitates the implementation of CIP projects at the South Coast (and beyond). As 
such, it does not feature in the governance structure below but its staff takes part in 
the farmer association meetings, the cooperative board meetings, the marketing and 
selling, etc. (see description under figure 12 below). 
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Figure 12: Governance structure of the AGRI-CIP project at the South Coast (Siyavuna Development Centre 2012:18-21)
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Each community involved in the CIP project (Nositha, Gcilima and Kwanzimakwe) 
has a farmers’ association. Each farmer that wants to be part of the project has to pay 
a membership fee of R20 annually and a membership card is provided every year. 
Membership benefits are agricultural and management mentoring for running a 
garden, guaranteed access to a weekly market (meaning guaranteed demand for fruit 
and vegetables), and association meetings where challenges can be discussed and 
decisions related to the project are taken. Everybody in the community may receive 
agricultural gardening training. During the training, the project and the possible 
membership are also explained. Only the farmers who decide to become part of the 
project and pay the membership fee may sell to the cooperative and get the additional 
services. Membership is open to all and voluntarily. This ‘membership’ was only 
introduced after a year, when many farmers were trained, selling to the cooperative 
and experiencing the benefits of the project. Hence, when the membership was 
introduced, farmers were eager to join due to the benefits associated with 
membership. 
Secondly, there is the cooperative (Agri-marketing cooperative), which is managed by 
a person from the community assisted by volunteers from the three communities. The 
cooperative has a board of directors: the chairperson and secretary of each farmers’ 
association, buyers of the produce, the general manager of the SDC and a few 
independent people who have agricultural and/or management experience. The 
cooperative board is the main independent decision-making body of the CIP project 
and the board meets once a month. The general manager of SDC has no vote as she is 
attending the board meetings as advisor and facilitator. 
 
The cooperative has different collection points in each community, depending on the 
size of the community. Every collection point is open once a week for a fixed period 
and operated by volunteers from the community. The manager of the cooperative will 
collect the fruit and vegetables at the closing time of the collection point and then 
distribute the fresh produce to sales points in the area. The manager receives a 
monthly salary from the cooperative’s income and the volunteers a stipend. 
 
Farmer members of the project in a community have their own farmers’ association. 
The chairperson and secretary of the farmers’ association are board members of the 
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cooperative. The farmers’ association meets once a month, before the cooperative 
board meeting, to give feedback about the previous cooperative board meeting and to 
discuss any new issues to be raised at the board meeting by. These meetings are 
supposed to be led by the chairperson, but sometimes it is done by SDC staff, if 
requested by the chairperson. Attendance at meetings of the farmers’ association is 
very high. Meetings take place on fixed days and times (e.g. every first Wednesday of 
the month, in the morning) at a central meeting place in the community. Here farmers 
receive feedback of decisions made at the previous cooperative board meeting as well 
as financial feedback from the previous month. The management of the project is 
discussed and issues may be raised – the chairperson will take these to the next 
cooperative board meeting. Farmers can also exchange information on growing their 
vegetables, or ask advice from SDC staff, e.g. what to do when there is a certain 
insect in the garden. 
 
SDC plays a facilitating role in all of this. After a thorough mapping exercise, Nositha 
was identified by the facilitator as the community in which to start CIP. Later, when 
SDC was established, more mapping was done and Kwanzimakwe and Gcilima were 
identified. After the mapping SDC obtains support for the project in the community 
and donor support for the implementation of the project. It then assists the selected 
community to set up the cooperative and the farmers’ associations. Before the 
governance structure is established, farmers receive gardening training and may start 
selling to the cooperative, experiencing the benefits of the project. Once the 
governance and technical structure is set up, SDC continues to provide support to the 
farmers’ association, the farmers and the cooperative. SDC participates in cooperative 
board meetings (without voting rights) and a staff member of SDC is always present 
at a farmers’ association meeting. SDC’s role is to facilitate the project, which means 
they assist a community in getting the project off the ground, support the community 
where needed and provide training on farming and management. The fact that SDC 
deals with the donors, is very beneficial to the farmers as they do not need to occupy 
themselves donor demands but can fully focus on farming and selling. SDC is 100% 
donor-funded and seeks funds for the establishment of CIP projects (including the 
input costs for equipment needed by the cooperative). Once the set-up has been done, 
SDC helps the cooperative to become sustainable in terms of covering overhead costs 
(the manager’s salary and volunteers’ stipends, fuel, packaging, etc.). The longer-term 
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goal is for the cooperative to survive without donor funding, but this is not yet the 
case at the time of writing. 
 
A community trust, the CIP governance structure preferred by Reynolds, as described 
in chapter 3, was not implemented at the South Coast. The facilitator (respondent 4) 
indicated that he did have a discussion with the farmers in Nositha to establish a 
community trust. However, the community was not 100% convinced this was the 
right structure and he had his own doubts because of the events at Huntington and 
Tsakane. Hence, the facilitator postponed the governance issue until the establishment 
of SDC, a cooperative serving more than one community and the farmers’ 
associations. He felt more comfortable with this arrangement. So did the involved 
communities as they were familiar with a cooperative.  
 
From the above description, it is clear that a good governance structure is in place, 
with the farmers at its centre. Much thought, time and effort were put in by the 
facilitator and SDC. This is a good starting point to ensure the full involvement of the 
farmers. Its success was investigated in the survey questionnaire, with questions to 
discover whether farmers did indeed feel they were involved, could participate, take 
decisions and plan the project.  
 
The main characteristics of CIP include the active participation of the community and 
the ownership of the project by the community.  Korten (1980:484), Swanepoel and 
De Beer (2011:68-72) and Westoby and van Blerk (2012:1084-1093) indicate that the 
role of the facilitator or facilitating organisation can make or break a community 
development exercise. Facilitators should facilitate the project in a community; not 
perform the tasks themselves. They should also be in close proximity to the 
community so that they can anticipate problems and adapt implementation if needed. 
In this way, the implementation of a project remains a learning process. They should 
also ensure good planning and sufficient funding to start and implement the project, 
and take action where and when needed. They should never make empty promises. As 
discussed in chapter 5, there was little participation and ownership in the CIP pilots in 
Huntington and Tsakane, contributing to their collapse. The facilitator (respondent 4) 
was aware of this when he started facilitation of CIP at the South Coast. Discussions 
with him, other SDC staff, farmers as well as observations have convinced me that the 
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facilitation of the project by SDC has been done in a professional manner, seeking to 
ensure community involvement every step of the way. One of the observations made 
when attending farmers’ association meetings was that the farmers present knew very 
well how the project works. They knew for example that if they raised an issue, the 
chairperson of the farmers’ association would take the matter to the cooperative board 
for discussion and then give feedback at the next farmers’ association meeting. This 
shows that SDC taught the farmers the procedure. Also, when farmers put questions 
to SDC staff instead of the chairperson, the SDC staff would not reply even if they 
knew the answers, but instead refer the questions to the chairperson. Discussions with 
SDC staff indicated that SDC implemented the project step by step with the 
community, always aware of the importance of ownership. They knew that before 
doing something, for example buying new equipment for the cooperative, they had to 
suggest the action to the cooperative board, which had to agree and, in turn, ask the 
chairpersons of the farmers’ associations to take the matter to the farmers and discuss 
it with them. This would sometimes delay implementation, but SDC, in most cases, 
attempted to follow the governance structure to ensure that farmers take ownership of 
the project. The facilitator (respondent 4) said that the issue of ownership was taken 
very seriously as they believed that, in the absence of ownership, the project would 
collapse sooner or later. The fact that SDC is aware of this, take it seriously, and 
actively try to ensure ownership, is an important factor for the success of the project. 
The data below data will further indicate whether or not this is indeed the case.  
 
6.3.2 Findings related to participation 
 
Participation questions  Score Interpretation of the findings26 
Do you know about the Kumnandi 
cooperative in your community? 
99% The project is well-known amongst the farmers 
of the community 
Do you know about the farmers’ 
association in your community? 
98% There is a high awareness about the presence of 
the farmers’ association in the community 
Do you sell fruit and vegetables to the 
Kumnandi Cooperative? 
90% Most farmers do sell to the cooperative and 
therefore do participate in the project, besides 
knowing about the project. 
                                                          
26
 The answering options to all questions were properly explained to the respondents by a Zulu-
speaking facilitator (see chapter 4 for the methodology). 
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Do you participate monthly in the 
farmers’ association meeting? 
97% The majority of the farmers do voluntarily 
participate in the monthly farmers’ association 
meetings. 
Are farmers encouraged to take part in 
the farmers’ association meetings? 
97.2 An agreement score of 97.2 indicates that 
respondents strongly agree that SDC and the 
local chairperson of the farmers’ association 
encourage farmers to take part in the meetings.  
 
The above percentages and index score indicate that all three communities are aware 
of the presence of the CIP project in their community. Awareness of the presence of 
the project does not yet mean participation, but 90% of the farmers indicate they sell 
to the cooperative and 97% indicate they participate in meetings. Selling produce to 
the cooperative does not yet mean that they participate in the project in terms of 
wanting to be involved in the planning and decision-making. However, the fact that 
almost all farmers who are members of the project are participating in the farmers’ 
association meetings (97%), even if they are not selling or not regularly selling 
produce to the cooperative, is in indication that they are interested in more than just 
selling to the cooperative – at these meetings, planning related to the project is done 
and decisions are taken. Farmers who want to sell to the cooperative are not required 
to attend these meetings, however most of them they do so. If beneficiaries become 
interested and attend meetings where decisions are made and planning is done, we can 
say there is participation in the project.  
 
Besides the above data, the annual uptake of membership also says something about 
participation. Once the farmers realise the benefits of the project, namely that a 
guaranteed weekly market is available for them to sell fruit and vegetables, as well as 
training and support, they are asked to become members of the CIP project. Any 
farmer may become a member of the project. Membership needs to be renewed 
annually by paying R20 (at the time of writing). Without paying the membership fee, 
a farmer cannot sell produce to the cooperative. The graph below indicates that most 
farmers pay early in the year (February, March), which indicates they are keen to be 
part of the project and sell to the cooperative. If they were not interested in 
participating, they would not become members. New members may join any time 
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during the year, which explains the high numbers in July and to a lesser extent August 
and October. 
 
Figure 13: Annual uptake of membership – 2012 
 
Cooperatives involved in community development projects should be managed well. 
This was Reynolds’s opinion and it is confirmed by David Korten (Korten 1980:481-
485), Westoby and van Blerk (2012:1084-1093) and Yachkaschi (2010:195-202). 
Reynolds said in the 1980s that cooperatives could work, but should be managed well 
to ensure that all members of the cooperative are benefitting. That is why, in his 
opinion, it is difficult to have a cooperative representing a whole community. SDC 
has understood this and hence the cooperative is open to any community member who 
wants to farm and sell to the cooperative. Members of the community who do not 
farm cannot benefit from it directly. It is entirely up to the individual community 
member to decide whether or not to join. The annual membership contributes to this 
arrangement. In addition, an accountability structure is in place and the cooperative 
manager can be held accountable by the farmers. The fact that the cooperative board 
includes members of the community and independent individuals also enhances the 
accountability, transparency and professionalism of the cooperative. 
 
6.3.3 Findings related to ownership  
 
Ownership questions  Score Interpretation of the findings 
Can farmers participate in discussions 
during farmers’ association meetings? 
98%  Almost all respondents agree that they can 
participate in discussions during these meetings 







Annual uptake of membership - 2012
158 
 
Can farmers raise questions during 
farmers’ association meetings? 
97% Almost all respondents agree that they can ask 
questions during these meetings. 
The chairperson of the farmers’ 
association has been democratically 
elected 
96.6 An agreement score of 96.6 indicates that 
respondents strongly believe and strongly agree 
that the chairperson has been elected 
democratically 
I trust the chairperson of the farmers’ 
association 
97.4 An agreement score of 97.4 indicates that 
respondents strongly trust the chairperson 
The chairperson of the farmers’ 
association acts in the interest of the 
farmers 
97.0 An agreement score of 97.0 indicates that 
respondents strongly believe and strongly agree 
that the chairperson acts in the interest of the 
farmers.  
I trust the manager of the Kumnandi 
cooperative 
92.5 An agreement score of 92.5 indicates that 
respondents strongly trust the manager of the 
cooperative. 
At the farmers’ association meeting, 
farmers are involved in the planning and 
decision-making of the Kumnandi 
cooperative   
90.0 An agreement score of 90.0 indicates that 
respondents strongly believe and strongly agree 
that the farmers are involved in the planning 
and decision-making of the cooperative. 
At the farmers’ association meeting, 
farmers receive enough feedback from the 
cooperative board regarding the 
cooperative 
94.0 An agreement score of 94.0 indicates that 
respondents strongly believe and strongly agree 
that the farmers get enough feedback from the 
cooperative board. 
I, as a farmer, can make suggestions to 
the Community Field Worker27, the 
chairperson or SDC staff with regard to 
the project if I want to 
96.2 An agreement score of 96.2 indicates that 
respondents strongly believe and strongly agree 
that they can make suggestions with regard the 
project. 
The below questions were asked under the sustainability category (see 6.7), but they are also 
applicable for ownership: 
Do you think the Kumnandi cooperative 
will be able to run on its own without 
help from SDC? 
24% 24% of respondents answered yes on this 
question and think that the cooperative can run 
on its own without help from SDC.  
                                                          
27
 The Community Field Worker (CFW) is a volunteer from the community who assists the cooperative 
manager with the collection of the vegetables. The CFW is always present at the collection point 
during collection times, and farmers may also raise issues with the CFWs. The CFWs are in regular 
contact with the cooperative manager and SDC staff and pass on messages/issues brought to them by 
the farmers. The CFW also participates in the farmers’ association meetings and may follow up on any 
requests from farmers. 
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Do you think the farmers’ association will 
be able to run on its own without help 
from SDC? 
24% 24% of respondents answered yes on this 
question and thinks the farmers’ association can 
run on its own, without help from SDC. 
After a few years, I think the community 
can run the cooperative without the help 
of SDC 
71.5 An agreement score of 71.5 indicates that the 
respondents agree and believe that the 
community can run the cooperative without 
help from SDC after a few years.  
 
There is a broad agreement amongst the respondents that farmers can and do take part 
in the management and planning of the project. In the community itself, the project is 
associated with the cooperative, which is managed by community members who 
collect fruit and vegetables in the community. This cooperative is fully managed by 
the community. SDC provides support with financial management when needed and 
the sourcing of markets for the cooperative. Interviews with the chairpersons of the 
farmers’ association and the cooperative manager confirm the above findings. The 
chairpersons say they may raise any issues at meetings, participate in the discussions 
and even reverse decisions taken if they were not in the interest of the farmers. For 
example, sometimes a decision is taken at the cooperative board meeting and when 
the farmers hear of it, they may not agree. The chairperson raises this issue at the next 
monthly cooperative board meeting and if it is indeed in the interest of the farmers, 
the decision will be reversed.  
 
The chairpersons are senior community members who are trusted and respected by 
the other community members. Two chairpersons are female (in Nositha and 
Kwanzimakwe) and one is male (in Gcilima) at the time of writing. I attended some 
of the farmers’ association meetings and the females mostly ask SDC staff to chair the 
meetings. It seems that the female chairpersons are not confident enough to lead the 
meetings themselves. This might be a gender issue based in local tradition, a lack of 
confidence or a lack of experience in public speaking. It also indicates that 
community members elect a person who is respected and old and not necessarily the 
right candidate for the position. When I interviewed the female chairs, they appeared 
to be very outspoken, confident and proud, so it might indeed be a public speaking 
issue. When I questioned SDC staff about it, they indicated that the female 
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chairpersons had been in the chair for only since six months and that they might not 
be confident enough yet. 
 
As indicated in 6.3.2, there is a high participation rate in the farmers’ association 
meetings, which may be evidence of ownership of the project as the farmers 
voluntarily attend meetings and take part in them. Genuine interest by the farmers in 
participation and management is indicated by the high attendance rate, active 
participation in discussions and their raising of issues at the meetings. 
 
The question of whether or not farmers really ‘own’ the project is difficult to answer 
at this stage. The farmers are thoroughly involved with the project; they are aware, 
participate, and take part in decision-making. The governance structure is set up to 
ensure full farmer representation and the cooperative is managed by the community, 
with the assistance of SDC. SDC has, in my opinion, still a crucial role. When farmers 
were asked if the community could run the cooperative and the farmers’ association 
without any help from SDC, 76% say that this would not be possible. However, when 
asked if it would be possible in a few years’ time, the respondents were much more 
optimistic. An agreement score of 71.5 indicates that a majority of the respondents 
agree and believe that the community will be able to run the cooperative without help 
from SDC in a few years’ time. Further reflection on the question of sustainability is 
done under point 6.7 below. 
 
At this stage it is not clear if the farmers really understand what it means to run the 
project on their own. It seems, therefore, that there is positive evidence of ownership 
of the project, but as long as SDC remains involved in assisting the community and 
while the community is not yet running the cooperative on its own, it is too soon to 
say full ownership has been established. It remains to be seen if the community can 
indeed run the cooperative on its own without help from outside. However, the 
question should be asked: is it realistic to expect a rural community to run such a 
developmental project without help from outside, whether from an NGO or the 
government? It would be in the interest of the communities as well as the government 
to set up a structure to assist communities with the management of such projects, 
which obviously have a positive impact on the livelihood of many rural families. If 
the government does not have the capacity to do this, they can collaborate with NGOs 
161 
 
like SDC or community-based organisations to assist CIP-type projects in 
communities. The NDP does say ‘that people should be involved in their own 
development’ (National Planning Commission 2011b:2), ‘the government should 
stimulate small-scale agriculture in rural areas, however public institutions should be 
strengthened to make this possible’ (NPC 2011b:117), and ‘the path of dependency 
should be broken down; all sectors of society should now contribute to make the 
economy work’ (National Planning Commission 2011b:133-134). The NDP therefore 
seems to understand that small-scale agricultural projects in rural areas should be 
supported, not by taking the lead, but by letting people take the initiative and by 
supporting them, if needed. 
 
When talking about ownership, the question of a common, genuine concern should 
also be asked. Why would the community be interested in having this project? Why 
would they invest time in it? These questions were asked to the chairpersons and the 
secretaries of the farmers’ association and SDC staff. The reason people are interested 
in starting to farm and selling to the cooperative is mostly to get some extra income as 
poverty is rife in the communities; most people are unemployed and depend on a few 
working family members and government grants. 76% of the respondents receive a 
grant from the government and some even two, e.g. old age and child support. Only 
3% of the respondents are formally employed. They indicated that participating in the 
project empowers them, gives new meaning to their lives and gives them a form of 
independence they never had before. I will elaborate on this in 6.6 below under 
‘learning society: self-esteem and dignity’. 
 




One of the main characteristics of CIP is that citizens should become more self-reliant 
and that his may be achieved by developing a working local economy where they live. 
A working local economy is an active economy at the local level where production 
and selling takes place on a daily basis. Such an economy would stimulate the ‘local 
income multiplier’, meaning more local exchange leading to increasing local wealth. 
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Local income multiplier means ‘the cash that circulates in a locality and how it 
multiplies its value’ (Reynolds 2005a:14). 
 
One of the main priorities of the CIP project at the South Coast is and was to create 
this working local economy. They do this by stimulating local production and local 
demand, because production without demand is useless. On the demand side, the 
cooperative buys production on a weekly basis, at different collection points in the 
communities. The farmers sell for immediate cash at the collection point. They can 
sell fruit, vegetables and some processed foods like jam and marmalade. The fruit and 
vegetables are washed, checked for quality, weighed and packaged at the collection 
point. For most fruit and vegetables, there are no quantity restrictions. The exceptions 
are fruit and vegetables usually sold in bulk, such as spinach, bananas and onions. 
These minimum requirements are clearly indicated on a board, which also shows the 
prices of the products. Prices are revised quarterly, based on average retail prices and 
factoring in production costs. The farmers are paid up to 60% of the average retail 
price (Siyavuna Development Centre 2012:38-39). So the local farmer knows that 
whatever produce he/she might have of the right quality, there will be a market for it 
every week and he/she will get immediate cash in return. 
 
So as to further stimulate local money circulation, the cooperative provides additional 
services to the farmers at the collection points. Farmers are able to buy seeds, 
seedlings, organic inputs and gardening tools at reduced prices as the cooperative 
buys in bulk. Farmers are also encouraged to buy produce from each other.  
 
On the production side, SDC offers organic gardening training to all interested 
community members. Those who wish to sell to the cooperative have to become 
members and comply with the quality requirements for the produce, as decided by the 
cooperative board in agreement with the farmers’ associations. The organic gardening 
training does not ‘teach’ the farmers how to farm, but rather informs them about 
techniques for improved farming without the use of pesticides. The farmers bring 
their own knowledge and share experiences. Local and indigenous fruit and vegetable 
production is encouraged (like growing ‘Zulu spinach’). Every farmer, even those 
with only a very small plot, is shown how to grow with the assets they have 




As was indicated in the literature review, stimulating agricultural production in rural 
communities will increase consumer demand in the community due to increased 
incomes. Even more important, the study of Browne et al. (2007:567), where data was 
gathered in a rural area adjacent to this survey’s data collection area, indicated that 
increasing incomes would lead to increased purchases of locally produced goods and 
services (like vegetables, traditional foods and medicines, housing materials and 
repairs and childcare facilities). Purchases outside the local community (mostly 
clothes and furniture) would also increase, but for this study it is important to know 
that when people have more disposable income, they will spend part of it in the 
community (Browne et al. 2007:567). It is therefore also important to stimulate local 
production as people will buy when the products available.  
 
Of course, I wanted to know if the extra cash available to the farmer’s part of the CIP 
project is indeed spent in the local economy and if the extra cash they earn is making 
a difference in the lives of the farmers. Therefore, the questions below were asked. 
 
6.4.2 Findings related to becoming self-reliant: a working local economy 
 
Working local economy questions  Score Interpretation of the findings 
The income that I earn by selling to the 
cooperative is the main income of my 
household 
34%  Only 34% of the respondents say that the 
income earned by selling to the cooperative is 
the main income of the household. This is 
understandable as the average weekly sales of a 
farmer is R47.12, so if a farmer sells every 
week this means an income of R 188.48 
monthly which is very low (data from SDC 
bookkeeping). Most respondents (76%) also get 
a government grant, which is always higher 
than R 188.48. 
The income that I earn by selling to the 
cooperative is an additional income of my 
household 
85% For 85% of the respondents, the income earned 
by selling to the cooperative is an additional 
income. This confirms the above finding. 
The income that I earn by selling to the 16% 16% of respondents say that the income earned 
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cooperative is enough to sustain my 
household 
by selling to the cooperative is enough to 
sustain the household. These are the farmers 
that do not receive government grants. 
I spend some of the income that I earn by 
selling to the cooperative IN the 
community 
83% 83% of respondents indicate that they spend 
some of the income that they earn by selling to 
the cooperative IN the community. This is a 
significant finding as it indicates that the local 
money circulation indeed increases due to the 
CIP project. 
I am planting with the intention of 
making money 
89% 89% of respondents indicate that they plant 
with the intention of making money. This is a 
significant finding as it means that farmers, 
knowing that their produce can be sold, are 
producing more which contributes to a working 
local economy. 
 
The findings indicate that the introduction of the CIP project on the South Coast is 
stimulating local money circulation and therefore contributing to a working local 
economy. The fact that 83% of respondents indicate that they do spend some of the 
cash they earn from the cooperative by buying in the community is significant. 
Interviews with some community members revealed that this cash is often spent on 
consumable goods like sugar, coffee, tea or cooking oil, bought in the tuck shops of 
the community. Many women also say they can now buy airtime once in a while and 
give pocket money to their children to buy a sweet during school break.  
 
However, the extra cash earned by selling to the cooperative is not a lot. The average 
is R188.48 per month at the time of writing, but this does make a big difference 
according to the local chairpersons I interviewed. It made me realise that the amount 
is not the only issue; the mere fact that there is extra money available for the 
household also matters! One women said that just being able to buy a R5 voucher of 
airtime made her so happy and proud as she had earned this R5 herself. I will go 
deeper into this under 6.6 below, ‘dignity and self-esteem’. 
 
These findings are in line with those of Browne et al. (2007:567-569), which indicate 
that there is potential for agricultural demand-led growth in rural communities on the 
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South Coast. If households get more income, they will spend more and part of the 
expenditure will be on locally available and produced products. Increased demand 
leads to increased production, which creates more employment opportunities and even 
small enterprises (like jam-making). However, Browne et al. (2007:578-579) also 
indicate that increased income will be spent on goods like clothing and furniture, 
which are usually not available IN the community, so this means a direct leakage of 
income out of the local economy. It is important for the CIP project on the South 
Coast to identify which goods and services will attract the extra income and to 
determine the possibility of producing those goods and services IN the community. 
Browne et al. (2007:580) do indicate that if uncooked food (like maize meal and 
vegetables) is used in end products (like bread and jam), such food will be bought, 
thereby stimulating the local economy and reducing leakage to the first economy.  
 




Another important characteristic of CIP is that the resources available should be 
known to communities. Giving decision-making power to communities means little 
without resources. Communities should know which budgets are available and they 
should have the power to firstly, decide what to do with the budget and, secondly, be 
involved in the spending of the money. In principle, the budget should be known to 
the communities before they start organising themselves. The availability of resources 
will open up opportunities and, trigger processes that otherwise might not happen. 
This, says Reynolds, will enhance the self-reliance of the involved community and 
contribute to a working local economy (Reynolds 2005a:31). 
 
From interviews with SDC management and the cooperative, it became clear that the 
communities do not know about the resources available for the start-up of the CIP 
project. With this I mean the funds available to start up the cooperative and the funds 
SDC uses to train farmers, provide resources, etc.  
 
Members of the project do know which resources are available to the cooperative, as 
well as the income and expenditure of the cooperative. Once the cooperative is in 
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place and has all the resources it needs (like a truck, refrigerator, scale, etc.), it will 
attempt to  break even (pay salaries, petrol, insurance, etc.) or even make a profit, 
meaning that in the first years SDC will still have to support the cooperative in case 
they do not achieve the break-even point. At each cooperative board meeting, the 
cooperative manager gives feedback on income and expenditure. Farmers present, the 
chairpersons and secretaries of the farmers’ associations, may also give inputs on how 
profits, if any, will be put to use. If new resources are available for investment, 
allocated by SDC from donor funds, they may also decide how such resources will be 
spent.  
 
The chairpersons give feedback about the cooperative’s finances at the farmers’ 
association meetings so that all farmer members are informed. This is crucial as the 
cooperative is managed by the community itself. Eventually the cooperative should 
run on its own without outside funding. However, at the time of writing this has not 
happened. Assistance from SDC is still needed, including financial assistance in 
months when a loss is made. 
 
To conclude, the community (involved farmers) knows about some resources 
available to them, namely the resources allocated to the cooperative, and also about 
the income and expenditure of the cooperative. The community does not know about 
the resources available to SDC for running the centre. This is not a problem in 
principle as SDC is the facilitating and supporting organisation, obviously with 
running costs, as long as the community knows which resources are specifically 
allocated to their community for developing the cooperative. 
 
As interviews with the management of SDC indicated that farmers only know about 
the resources of the cooperative and not the resources available to them but spent on 
their behalf by SDC, I decided to only ask a question about the decision-making 
power farmers have with regard to the resources of the cooperative. 
 





Knowing the resources available 
question  
Score Interpretation of the finding 
At farmers’ association meetings, farmers 
can take decisions regarding resources 
allocated to the cooperative 
86%  86% of the respondents indicate they can take 
decisions regarding resources allocated to the 
cooperative. 9% say they do not have decision-
making power when it comes to resources 
 
This finding indicates that farmers do feel they can take decisions with regard to the 
resources allocated to the cooperative. As mentioned above, the farmers do know 
about the income of the cooperative, the expenditure and the monthly loss or profit. 
They can decide what to do with profits. If SDC manages to get extra funding for the 
cooperative from a donor, the farmers can decide to a certain extent what should be 
done with these funds (interview Respondent 4). It indicates that the system described 
in the introduction is working, namely that the chairperson of each farmers’ 
association is indeed giving feedback to the farmers with regard to the finances of the 
cooperative, and that their input is asked when decisions about the finances have to be 
taken. It is not clear why 9% said no and the remainder answered ‘don’t know’.  
 





Reynolds held the opinion that CIP could not be a blueprint for the development of all 
communities in South Africa as communities differ and have their own dynamics. CIP 
is offered as a method for development, which should be guided by a facilitator and 
take shape over time. Which shape it takes, will depend on the involved community. 
Therefore the implementation of CIP should be ‘a learning process’ and the 
community implementing CIP is ‘a learning society’. There should be space for 
learning, and consequently, making mistakes (Reynolds 2005a:29).  
 
Korten (1980:499-500) said the same in 1980 when he described the ‘three stages of a 
learning process’. Observing the CIP pilot project at the South Coast indicates that it 
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has experienced these three stages: 
 
1. Learning to be effective, meaning the facilitator gets to know the community 
to develop a project that fits its needs and that is adaptable when mistakes are 
made. At the South Coast, the facilitator commenced in late 2008 with visits to 
different communities in the area, getting to know them and finding out what 
their needs where. Based on this assessment, it was decided that Nositha 
would be a suitable starting place. He then did a mapping exercise and a 
baseline study in Nositha before the project started. Fruit and vegetable 
production was identified as an income-generating project, and meetings took 
place with the community on governance of the project. An ‘interim trust’ was 
formed, but the facilitator as well as the community had their doubts. The first 
training in organic gardening took place and the first vegetables were collected 
in the community and sold elsewhere, however not yet efficiently (interview 
Respondent 4). 
2. Learning to be efficient. In 2010, it was decided that a new NGO should be 
created to support the CIP project, that a cooperative should be created to 
manage the production and sale of the fruits and vegetables, and that farmers’ 
associations should be formed to represent each community delivering to the 
cooperative. Only one ‘supporting’ NGO would be needed, which could assist 
all involved communities. The idea of forming community trusts was 
abandoned and SDC was established. The cooperatives were established, 
collection points were set up, the sales strategy was enhanced, a marketing 
strategy was developed and a cooperative manager was appointed. The project 
became more mature, focusing on strengthening the cooperative and project in 
Nositha. Slowly, approaches were made to other communities in the area, to 
include them in the cooperative. In 2011 Kwanzimakwe became part of the 
project and Gcilima followed in 2012 (interview Respondent 4). 
3. Learning to expand. From mid-2012 onwards, a new cooperative was set up in 
another area on the South Coast (Umdoni) with three communities delivering 
to it. The set-up of the project in Umdoni went much quicker as all lessons 
learned in Nositha and neighbouring areas could be taken into account. SDC 
had significantly expanded its organisational capacity as well. In the second 
half of 2013, a new area for a project has been identified. Other NGOs in 
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South Africa were approaching SDC to share their model for implementation 
elsewhere (interview Respondent 4).  
 
From the above, we can conclude that initially the facilitators and later SDC have 
gone through a learning process while implementing the CIP project. The facilitator 
(respondent 4), SDC and the donor were open-minded and self-critical enough to do 
this. The involved community, especially Nositha, has also learned as they indicated 
their issues with certain ideas and were willing to be the ‘experimental ground’ in the 
first two years of implementation (interview Respondent 4). This is exactly what CIP, 
and community development in general, is about: let a project take shape over time, 
growing from the bottom up until it is in a shape that will make a real difference for 
the communities involved.  
 
No further data with regard to ‘learning society’ were gathered with the 
questionnaires. 
 
Self-esteem and dignity 
CIP is about more than just developing a community economically, i.e. creating 
income. CIP aims to be a full development programme, also taking into account other 
aspects of development. Reynolds said if people were able to decide about their own 
development, their self-esteem would grow over time. Hence, I decided to focus on 
the concepts of self-esteem and dignity in the empirical research. These two concepts 
are closely interrelated in the context of this project. Self-esteem in this context means 
how farmers’ perceptions of themselves have improved due to participation in the 
project. Dignity in this context means how farmers, by taking part in the project, have 
fulfilled their lives better and have been given the opportunity to reach their potential 
(or approach it), besides the monetary benefits. 
 
It is difficult to measure these concepts and therefore the data gathered in this regard 
should be interpreted with caution. To determine if a person’s self-esteem or sense of 
dignity has grown, one could ask them if they felt it had, if they saw new 
opportunities, if they could better reach their potential, if they could decide 
themselves about their lives (project participation) and if they were given recognition 
for what they were doing. Also, being more self-sufficient contributes to self-esteem 
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and a greater sense of dignity (Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:49-50). Some data do 
seem to indicate increased self-esteem, for example, but no definite conclusions can 
be drawn. 
 
I therefore asked the questions below. The question of self-sufficiency was not asked 
under this category as I already knew self-sufficiency would be improved by 
participation in the project – the farmers would produce their own fruit and 
vegetables, for own use or for selling to gain an extra income they never had before. 
Also, from the findings under 6.3, we knew that the farmers were involved in 
planning and decision-making at the cooperative and therefore the question was not 
repeated here. 
 
6.6.2 Findings related to self-esteem and dignity 
 
Dignity and self-esteem questions  Score Interpretation of the findings 
The training I received when joining the 
Kumnandi cooperative was enough to 
start my garden 
97% 97% of respondents indicate that they were 
satisfied with the training they received to start 
their garden.  
I get enough support and mentoring to 
run my garden successfully 
94% 94% of respondents indicate that they get 
enough support and mentoring (from SDC and 
the cooperative) to run their garden 
successfully. This is important as it is an 
indication of the recognition they are given as a 
farmer from both SDC, but also from the 
cooperative itself, which is managed by fellow 
community members. 
I learned how to grow new crops, which I 
had never grown before 
99% 99% of respondents indicate they learned to 
grow new crops which they had never grown 
before which is significant. It means that the 
farmers were given new opportunities, namely 
to learn something new, and that all of them 
indeed learned to grow new crops. 
I gained more confidence in farming 
since I am part of the Kumnandi 
cooperative 
96% 96% of respondents gained more confidence in 
farming since they are part of the cooperative.  
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My local community field worker visits 
me enough times during the year 
84% 84% of respondents indicate that their 
community field worker visits them enough 
during the year. The community field worker is 
a volunteer from the community that is trained 
by SDC to provide services and support to the 
farmers.  
I am planting with the intention to feed 
my family and myself 
84% 84% of the respondents indicate that they plant 
with the intention to feed their family and 
themselves. 
I had a garden before I was trained and 
joined the cooperative 
93% 93% of the respondents indicate that they were 
having a garden before the project started. 
My self-esteem has grown since I am part 
of the cooperative 
97.6 An agreement score of 97.6 indicates that 
respondents strongly agree and strongly believe 
that their self-esteem 28has grown since they are 
part of the cooperative. This is an important 
finding and means that the impact of the project 
is probably going further than just creating an 
extra income stream, but also having an impact 
on the mental wellbeing and development of 
the farmers. 
The presence of the cooperative in the 
community has created new opportunities 
96.5 An agreement score of 96.5 indicates that 
respondents strongly agree and strongly believe 
that the presence of the cooperative in the 
community has created new opportunities. 
Having access to new opportunities as an 
individual could contributes to a greater sense 
of dignity and a higher self-esteem. 
I am given recognition as a farmer as I 
have a membership card 
95.7 An agreement score of 95.7 indicates that 
respondents strongly agree that they are given 
recognition due to the membership card 
(functioning of membership system is 
explained in 6.3.2). Being recognized as an 
                                                          
28
 The contextual understanding of the word ‘self-esteem’ was well grasped by the farmers. This is so 
because Zulu, the native language of the involved farmers, has a word for ‘self-esteem’. In addition, the 
facilitators were asked to explain the concept to farmers in simple language when asking the question 
(see methodology, chapter 4, for more detailed information). The facilitators understood the concept 
well, as I noted when I asked them to explain it to me in English.   
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individual contributes to a greater sense of 
dignity (Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:50). 
I have a better life since I am selling to 
the cooperative 
94.7 An agreement score of 94.7 indicates that 
respondents strongly believe that they have a 
better life since they are part of the project. 
I think that the cooperative is helping the 
community and gives people a better life 
98.5 An agreement score of 98.5 indicates that the 
respondents strongly believe that the 
cooperative is helping the community and gives 
people a better life. 
 
Some of the above data seem to indicate that farmers participating in the CIP project 
did get more self-esteem and a greater sense of dignity. However, only one question 
enquires directly if self-esteem was improved. All the other questions enquire 
indirectly whether, for example, the self-esteem of involved farmers could have 
grown.  
 
The farmers themselves indicate that their self-esteem has improved since becoming 
part of the project (agreement score of 97.6). They also indicate that they have better 
lives since becoming part of the project, and that they strongly believe other 
participating members’ lives have also improved. These findings are important as 
they could indicate that the project has succeeded in not only addressing the economic 
aspect of development, namely improving income streams, but also the abstract need 
of enhancing people’s dignity. However, it remains an assumption that self-esteem 
and dignity have increased due to participation in the CIP project. It cannot be said for 
certain what farmers ‘perceive’ when they are asked about self-esteem. For example, 
it might be that a farmer’s self-esteem has increased over the past years, but for other 
reasons than participation in the CIP project.  
 
According to Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:49-50) and Reynolds, control of one’s 
own life and being part of decisions affecting one’s life do contribute to a greater 
sense of dignity. Dignity can also be enhanced by becoming more self-sufficient, 
learning new things and getting recognition. Hence, farmers’ participation in the 
planning and decision-making of the CIP project in their communities, their taking 
charge of the cooperative and its management – giving them control over a project 
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that has an impact on their lives – and their new knowledge of crop-growing could 
indicate that their self-esteem and dignity have indeed increased. The farmers are 
given due recognition by SDC in the form of a membership card, training, individual 
mentoring sessions, farmers’ association meetings, cooperative board meetings, 
participation in the cooperative management and access to the community field 
worker for information and advice. Giving the farmers recognition as farmers, but 
also as individuals, could have enhanced their self-esteem. However, no valid 
conclusions can be drawn with regard to the above. 
 
Another question that could indirectly indicate increased self-esteem among the 
involved farmers deals with the creation of new opportunities by the CIP project. 
Access to new opportunities and the ability to decide what to do with them, help 
people to live fulfilling lives. Therefore they feel better about themselves and have a 
greater sense of dignity (Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:49-50). The project created 
new opportunities for the farmers, firstly by giving them access to an income by 
providing a market, secondly by teaching them new farming methods, and thirdly by 
creating job opportunities (cooperative management and community field workers). 
Also, the farmers’ associations gave opportunities to a few to become chairpersons 
and secretaries and join the cooperative board. The chairpersons I interviewed were 
very proud of their positions and indicated that the fact that they were trusted to 
represent the farmers of their communities gave them a great sense of responsibility 
and dignity. Besides the direct opportunities created by the CIP project, a number of 
indirect opportunities were also created, such as farmers employing people for the 
first time in their lives to help in the garden, or being enabled by the extra income to 
do something or buy something that they could never do or buy before. However, 
once again, these questions and their answers cannot prove that the self-esteem and 
dignity of the involved farmers have indeed improved. It can, however, be assumed 
that the self-esteem of some farmers was enhanced. 
 






Sustainability29 in the context of this research refers to the viability of the CIP project 
at the South Coast, namely survival of the project in the longer term, will it still exist 
in a few years’ time. The word ‘sustainability’ is used in different contexts and can 
have different meanings. In many cases, sustainability looks at the environmental and 
social impact of a project, as the project should do no harm to the environment and 
should improve the socio-economic situation of its participants. The project should 
also ensure that what it does today will not have a negative impact on future 
generations and the future environment. Obviously, CIP projects also have to be 
sustainable in this sense. However, the data gathered in terms of ‘sustainability’ do 
not deal with these issues. In the context of this research, ‘sustainability’ means the 
project’s continued existence for a number of years. When referring to sustainability 
in the text, this meaning is implied and not environmental sustainability. 
 
In terms of environmental sustainability, the project is mostly working with fruit and 
vegetable production in an organic way. No pesticides are used, farming methods are 
used to preserve the soil, and local seeds are used where possible as well as 
indigenous plants that do not harm the environment. Water is no problem as the South 
Coast area has ample rain and the rainwater is collected for watering plants. Use of 
these methods guarantees that there will be no harm to the environment for future 
generations. 
 
There is no proof so far that a CIP project can become sustainable in the longer term. 
The pilot projects in both Huntington and Tsakane collapsed, and only the project on 
the South Coast is showing signs of sustainability (see below). In this context, 
sustainability is closely related to the concept of ownership – without ownership, 
there will be no sustainability. This means that, if the project is owned and managed 
by SDC and not by the community, the project will collapse once SDC withdraws. If 
community members were not involved in the planning, management and decision-
making of the project, they cannot be expected to keep it alive once SDC withdraws. 
However, as already mentioned, the question should be asked: Is it realistic to expect 
a rural community to run a developmental project on its own without outside 
assistance, either from an NGO or the government?  
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Besides the chosen governance structure for the project, is the production of fruit and 
vegetables sustainable? Is the cooperative sustainable? If these collapsed, for example 
because the cooperative is not making enough money, the whole project could 
collapse. 
 
To many observers the project is a real success because it has been operating since 
May 2009, while the other pilot projects collapsed after little more than a year. I 
therefore asked the management of SDC and farmers what they thought were the 
successes of the project, which could then indicate something about its sustainability. 
 
6.7.2 Findings related to sustainability 
 
The findings are based on the scores below (quantitative survey) and the interviews 
with SDC management, cooperative management and farmers. 
 
Sustainability questions  Score Interpretation of the findings 
Do you think the Kumnandi cooperative 
will be able to run on its own, without 
help from SDC? 
24% 24% of respondents answered yes on this 
question and think that the cooperative can run 
on its own without help from SDC. 76% of 
respondents therefore say they think the 
cooperative cannot run without help from SDC. 
Do you think the farmers’ association will 
be able to run on its own, without help 
from SDC? 
24% 24% of respondents answered yes on this 
question and thinks the farmers’ association can 
run on its own, without help from SDC. 76% of 
respondents therefore say they think the 
farmers’ association cannot run without help 
from SDC. 
After a few years, I think the community 
can run the cooperative without the help 
of SDC 
71.5 An agreement score of 71.5 indicates that the 
respondents agree and believe that the 
community can run the cooperative without 
help from SDC after a few years.  
Will I be a member of the cooperative 
next year? 
91% 91% of the respondents will be a member of the 
cooperative next year. 
Will I be a member of the cooperative in 93% 93% of the respondents will be a member of the 
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three years’ time? cooperative in three years’ time. 
I believe the project in my community is 
a success 
97.2 An agreement score of 97.2 indicates that the 
respondents strongly believe that the project in 
the community is a success.  
 
The production of the fruit and vegetables is guaranteed as long as there is a 
guaranteed market. Therefore, the sustainability of the cooperative is very important 
as it buys the produce from the farmers every week. The running costs of the 
cooperative (staff member, stipends of volunteers, truck maintenance and petrol, input 
cost of the produce bought, packaging material) should be covered by the sales of the 
produce, which, at the time of writing, is mostly not the case. SDC management 
indicates that, when large quantities are produced (which depends on the weather), the 
cooperative sometimes covers its costs, but in most months it does not and SDC will 
then ‘fund’ the cooperative. SDC applies for funding from donor organisations to do 
this. However, the cooperative made small profit in 2013. It is unsure what will 
happen in 2014, depending on the sales of the cooperative, but it looks as if the 
cooperative can at least run break even. 
 
Year Projected loss/profit Explanation 
2010 Loss of R 23 220 In 2010, the running expenses of the cooperative 
where still low as the staff were only paid low 
stipends and the cost of the maintenance of the 
truck was carried by SDC. 
2011 Loss of R 34 210      The costs increased as the cooperative manager 
received a full salary and all costs related to the 
truck were booked under the cooperative. 
2012 Loss of R 32 189   The costs further increased due to salary 
increase cooperative manager and hiring of more 
assistants; the income however also increased, 
but not enough to cover the loss 
2013 Profit of R 1 626 There is a small profit. 
2014 ?  
Figure 14: Profit/loss table Kumnandi cooperative (Siyavuna Development Centre 2012:49-51, 
income statements HCM Cooperative and interviews Respondent 4 and 10) 
 
SDC has funds available until the end of 2014 to support the cooperative financially if 
needed. If not, SDC says it will ensure funding is available to give the cooperative 
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more time to become sustainable. It looks, for now, that the cooperative can run 
breakeven which is important in terms of longer term sustainability.  
 
If it is assumed that the cooperative – ensuring guaranteed weekly demand for the 
fruit and vegetable production and covering its own costs – is sustainable financially, 
the question remains: Will the community be able to manage the cooperative without 
help from SDC? The community itself has strong doubts, as only 24% of the 
respondents replied positively. However, when asked if the community could do it 
alone ‘in a few years’, the situation is reversed with an agreement score of 71.5 – 
meaning they ‘agree’ and ‘believe’ that, in a few years, the community do it alone. 
This is an interesting finding as it indicates that farmers are not yet confident enough 
to run the cooperative alone, but they are confident they will be able to do it in a few 
years’ time. This, of course, does not mean they will in fact be able to do it in a few 
years’ time; that is only their current perception. Most farmers indicate they will 
remain members of the cooperative in the years to come, which indicates the positive 
impact of the project and that community participation in the coming years is 
guaranteed.  
 
An interesting finding in this regard is that in Nositha, farmers strongly believe they 
can run the cooperative without help from SDC after some years (score of 91.1). In 
Gcilima and Kwanzimakwe the scores are 66.7 and 70.3, which indicates they believe 
it is possible, but there is obviously some doubt. Nositha is the community where the 
project was first started in 2009, and the project is more mature in this community. 
The fact that the farmers in Nositha see themselves running the cooperative on their 
own indicates that they do take ownership of the project and that is a good sign for the 
sustainability of the project in the longer term. They have managed the project for a 
longer time in their community and gained more confidence in this regard, while the 
farmers in the other two communities are still going through this process. Also, 
Nositha is a much smaller community than Gcilima and Kwanzimakwe, with fewer 
farmers taking part in the project. This means that management of the project in 
Nositha is easier, as there are fewer opinions from the different farmers. However, 
discussions with SDC management indicated much friction between farmers in 
Nositha and therefore reluctance from them to take ownership of the project. They 
preferred relying on SDC, as this would reduce the friction. However, SDC pushed 
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them to take ownership and withdrew from the management of the cooperative to put 
them on the spot. This eventually worked out, but it took time. 
 
So, it is too early to tell whether or not the CIP project at the South Coast is 
sustainable, i.e. capable of surviving once SDC withdraws. The above scores indicate 
that the farmers do participate in the project and do take some form of ownership by 
participating in meetings, playing a role in decision-making and contributing to the 
planning of the project, but they are not sure that they will be able to manage the 
project once SDC withdraws. There are good indications of sustainability, but it is too 
early to say the project is sustainable.  
 
Another important question concerns the success factors of the CIP project on the 
South Coast – how has it managed to survive thus far. The two other CIP pilot 
projects collapsed after less than two years. To find an answer, I asked one qualitative 
question in the questionnaire and with an agreement score of 97.2 it is clear that 
respondents strongly agree that the project is a success. In addition to the quantitative 
question, I asked one open question where respondents could say why they found the 
project a success (or not). I then measured the success of the cooperative by means of 
an analysis based on Korten’s contributory prerequisites for a successful cooperative 
(see below - 1980:485-486).  
 
53 of the respondents who answered the question ‘why the project is a success’, said 
it was successful because it provided extra income for them by guaranteeing their 
sales. As they know the cooperative will buy their produce every week, they have the 
security to continue planting and put in extra effort with different vegetables to 
diversify the market. Without the guaranteed demand, some would not farm at all, or 
not much. Some replies also identified greater independence as a reason for the 
project’s success. This was confirmed by interviews I had afterwards with the 
chairpersons and secretaries of the farmers’ associations and the manager of the 
cooperative. During these interviews, three female farmers told me that the little bit of 
money they gain by selling vegetables truly empowers them as it enables them to give 
pocket money to their children or buy airtime. They do not have to put this money in 
the household or give it to their husbands; it is their money, for themselves. They 
never had a cash income before besides the government grants, which are invested in 
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the household. Two other respondents gave the same reply in the one-on-one 
interviews. 
 
26 of the respondents who answered this question said they found the project a 
success because it provides them with food; now they can always feed their families. 
Some also referred to the fact that they now had ‘healthy food’ which helped them to 
cope better. 46 said the project was a success because they could now farm or farm 
better and provide for themselves. Also, learning new farming skills was a success 
factor for many. 
 
The answers show how the project is a success for the farmers – they get extra 
income, eat better, learn a new skill – but not how this success was created, e.g. due 
to the good cooperative manager or the good facilitation. These were the answers I 
was looking for, but it might be that this question was not fully understood by the 
farmers.  
 
According to Korten (1980:485-486), a number of conditions have to be met for a 
cooperative to be successful. These are met in the South Coast project. Firstly, the 
cooperative is accessible to all community members, also the poorest of the poor. 
Hence, nobody feels excluded or has reason to feel jealous as everybody who wants to 
can benefit. Secondly, the cooperative is well-managed by the community and well-
supported by SDC. Thirdly, the same, agreed, prices are paid to all farmers, who 
experience it as fair. The prices ensure that some profit is always made by the farmer. 
Fourthly, proven local farming methods are used and farmers can bring in their own 
knowledge when training takes place. The planting of indigenous fruit and vegetables 
is promoted. Fifthly, all involved farmers are properly trained by SDC; the training 
staff members all have diplomas in local agriculture and are well mentored by senior 
staff.  Sixthly, farmers are paid out immediately when they deliver fruit or vegetables 
to the cooperative, which reduces the opportunities for corruption. The manager or 
volunteers conducting the payments have to account to SDC management weekly and 
to the cooperative board and farmers’ associations monthly regarding the income and 




It can therefore be concluded that the two crucial aspects contributing to the success 
of the CIP project on the South Coast are, firstly, the efficient governance structure 
involving the farmers in the management of the project and, secondly, the 
professional facilitation of the project by SDC. Neither of these aspects was properly 
addressed in Huntington and Tsakane. They are on the South Coast, indicating that 
these two aspects are crucial for the implementation of a CIP project and probably 
any community development project. 
 
6.8 Differences between the three communities 
 
The above data are the results from all farmers who completed the questionnaire. 
Below is a comparison of the data per community, as there are some interesting 
differences. Only the questions that indicated a significant statistical difference 
between the percentages or scores are mentioned. A statistically significant difference 
implies that the difference between the scores of the different communities is not the 
result of coincidence or chance and that it can be extended to the larger population. A 
significant difference it not determined simply by the difference in the score, so even 
a difference of only 1.5% can still be a statistically significant difference. The size of 
the sample has an influence as well and therefore, for example in question two below, 
there is a significant difference between Gcilima (GCM) and Kwanzimakwe (NZK), 
but not between Gcilima and Nositha (NOS), although the difference in percentage is 
the same. This is because of the different sample sizes of the three communities. 
 
Question NOS GCM NZK Explanation 
1. Do I sell 
monthly to the 
Kumnandi 
cooperative? 
88% 48% 74% There is a significant difference between 
NOS and GCM and between GCM and NZK. 
NOS was the first community the CIP project 
started, followed by NZK and GCM, where 
the project only started in the beginning of 
2012. According to SDC management, this 
explains the lower sales in GCM as 
production is not yet up to the scale of 
allowing regular selling. 
 
2. The income 
that I earn by 
selling to the 
cooperative is the 
43% 19% 43% There is a significant difference between 
GCM on the one hand and NZK on the other. 
More people in NZK say that the income 
they earn by selling to the cooperative is the 
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main income of 
my household 
 
main income of the household than in GCM. 
This is because in GCM the project is not yet 
at full speed, so sales are not yet that 
frequent. Secondly, SDC management 
indicates that NZK is a more rural and poorer 
community than GCM, which is closer to 
town and where quite a lot of people have a 
job. The difference between NOS and GCM 
is not significant. 
 
3. My local 
community field 
worker visits me 
enough times 
during the year 
93% 67% 95% More farmers in GCM indicate that their field 
worker is not visiting them often enough than 
in NZK and NOS. The difference between 
GCM and NZK as well as between GCM and 
NOS is significant. A field worker helps the 
farmer with the garden and any questions 
he/she may have. SDC management says that 
the reason for GCM farmers’ views is that 
GCM was the last of the three villages to 
become part of the CIP project. SDC is in the 
process of hiring more staff to conduct the 
field visits in GCM and this problem should 
resolve itself then. It is important to do so to 
ensure that the farmers feel they are 
recognised and to prevent them from losing 
interest in the project. 
 
4. I am planting 
with the intention 
of making money 
100% 78% 93% The farmers in NOS all say they plant to 
make money, while fewer farmers say so in 
NZK and even fewer still in GCM. The 
difference in both cases is significant. There 
is no clear reason for the differences, but the 
assumption is that NOS is a smaller, poorer 
community where few people have jobs. 
GCM is a large community, near an urban 
area and with more people in formal 
employment. NZK is more rural, but also 
much larger than NOS, offering more 
opportunities.  
 




Figure 15: Significant differences per community 
 
Only the above four questions showed a significant difference. However, I felt a 
further two questions also provided relevant information as the difference in score 
between the communities said something about the sustainability of the project. 
 
Question NOS GCM NZK Explanation 
5. After a few 




without the help 
of SDC 
91.1 66.7 70.3 Interesting here is that in NOS, farmers have 
a much stronger belief that, after a few years, 
they will be able to run the cooperative 
without help from SDC. The reason is 
probably that the project has been running in 
NOS since 2009, while it only started in 
GCM in 2012. NZK lies in-between. The 
farmers in NOS know the project longer and 
have the confidence to take over:  91.1 means 
the farmers strongly believe they can run the 
cooperative without help from SDC. This is 
an important finding as it indicates that the 
farmers gain more confidence about 
managing the project over time. It is a sign of 
ownership and potential sustainability.  
 
6. Do you think 
the farmers’ 
association will 
be able to run on 
its own, without 
19% 17% 31% Interesting that in NZK more farmers believe 
the farmers’ association can run on its own, 
in comparison with NOS and GCM. 
According to SDC management, this is 
because NZK is a community characterised 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Do I sell monthly to the Kumnandi
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The income that I earn by selling to the
cooperative is the main income of my
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help from SDC? by weak traditional leadership and 
government structures. So people are more 
used to be doing things on their own without 




The findings from this chapter indicate that the CIP project at the South Coast has a 
well-developed governance structure, ensuring full representation of the beneficiaries 
(in this case smallholder farmers) who are involved in the decision-making and 
planning related to the project. There is good participation in the project and there are 
signs that the beneficiaries own the project. However, due to the still considerable 
involvement of SDC, the facilitating NGO, it is too soon to tell if ownership is at a 
stage where the beneficiaries could run the project without help from SDC. A 
recommendation, however, would be that the expectation that the beneficiaries should 
run the project on their own is not realistic. It is in the interests of the beneficiaries 
and the South African government to have supporting NGOs or other structures 
available at all times to support community-run projects. This will enhance the long-
term sustainability of these projects and the fact that the beneficiaries have access to a 
guaranteed income, even if not a large amount. 
 
The findings indicate that the local economy has strengthened in the areas where the 
project is active. A local market is now in place, guaranteeing weekly purchasing of 
produce. This stimulates the sales of other products and services available in the 
community. As a result, community members spend more of their disposable income 
in the community, which contributes to local money circulation, which contributes to 
wealth creation, which is what reduces poverty. 
 
The beneficiaries have partial knowledge of the resources available; they know of the 
resources of the cooperative. They do not know of the budget SDC has available to 
invest. However, once the cooperative was up and running, the farmers knew about 
the expenses and income of the cooperative and participated in decisions on the use of 




The question of sustainability is closely related to the question of ownership. As 
indicated above, there are some positive signs of ownership, which would contribute 
to sustainability, meaning beneficiaries would be able to run the project on their own. 
But it would be better if a supporting body, either SDC or another body, remained 
available. Also crucial for sustainability is the ability of the cooperative to cover its 
running costs from its sales. As indicated in point 6.7.2, this is not yet the case, but 
there are positive signs that it could happen in the near future. It is indicated that at 
least five years of donor or government support to the cooperative is needed to cover 
losses. 
  
We now have an analysis of the running CIP project and the previous chapter 
analysed the two collapsed CIP projects. A number of lessons can be taken from these 
three projects which complement the CIP model as envisaged by Reynolds, but also 
indicate some problems. In the next chapter, an analysis will be made by comparing 




7: CONCLUDING CHAPTER 
Interpretation of the findings from the CIP pilot projects in relation 
to CIP as conceptualised by Reynolds and recommendations for 




In the problem statement in chapter 1, I indicate that the purpose of this research is to 
conceptualise CIP in an understandable document to be used by practitioners for 
implementation. This is to be achieved by describing CIP as conceptualised by 
Reynolds and also by studying and analysing the three CIP pilot projects in 
Huntington, Tsakane and on the South Coast. In chapter 3, CIP is described as 
conceptualised by Reynolds, indicating the different characteristics of CIP. In 
chapters 5 and 6, an analysis is made of the CIP pilot projects in Huntington, Tsakane 
and at the South Coast, to see which characteristics of CIP where implemented and 
why, and to determine whether the implementation of CIP was a success or not and 
why.  
 
The question to be answered is this: Is CIP is a realistic community development 
programme for South Africa? It can be answered by reflecting on the characteristics 
of CIP and how they turned out in the three CIP pilot projects. Hence, this chapter 
will compare the analysis and findings made in chapters 5 and 6 with CIP as 
conceptualised by Reynolds, as described in chapter 3. The purpose is to determine, 
firstly, whether or not CIP as envisaged by Reynolds was fully implemented or tested 
in the pilot projects. Secondly, to determine which characteristics of CIP caused 
problems when they were implemented and why. Lastly, to indicate recommendations 
to ease the implementation of CIP, summarised in the revised CIP model as indicated 







I will use the interpretative framework, as described in chapter 4, to make this 
comparison. I will again follow the different categories and under each category refer 
to the three CIP pilot projects to see how the category was implemented (or not). 
 
Category  Level of 
implementation of each 
category 
Level of success of 
implementation of each 
category 
A. People-centred development 1. No implementation 
2. Partly implemented 
with description of 
what is implemented 
3. Almost full 
implementation 
4. Full implementation  
5. Very successful 
6. Successful  
7. Neither successful or 
unsuccessful 
8. Unsuccessful 




B. Becoming self-reliant 
B1. Knowing resources available  
B1.1  Investment rights 
B1.2 Child rights 
B1.3 Health rights 
B1.4 Use rights 
B2. Creating a working local 
economy 
B2.1 Local production and selling 
B2.2 Market 
B2.3 Local bank and currency 
C. A learning process with 
attention for all aspects of human 
development 
C1. Learning process and society 
C2. Self-esteem and dignity   
Figure 4: Interpretative framework 
 




The implementation of CIP should be people-centred. Firstly, CIP should be 
implemented by ‘a group of people’ with a common purpose so as to ensure 
participation and ownership by the involved community. The extent to which the 
beneficiaries of the project own the project is called ‘ownership’. This means that the 
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beneficiaries should know about the goal(s) of the project, be involved in the planning 
of the project, make vital project decisions and act on their own behalf (Reynolds 
2004c:3-6; Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:53). An important way of achieving this is 
to ensure that a governance structure for the project is in place to ensure the total 
involvement of the beneficiaries.  
 
In terms of governance, Reynolds mentioned a number of important points that have 
to be present when implementing CIP. Firstly, ‘a group of people’, which Reynolds 
called a community, should have a common purpose and decide to work together to 
achieve this purpose. Secondly, they should organise themselves in a ‘legal structure’ 
with elected representatives. Reynolds preferred a community trust as the preferred 
legal structure (see chapter 3 for more detail in this regard). Thirdly, ownership of the 
CIP project by the community and the active participation of the community are of 
vital importance. A good governance structure is crucial to achieve this. 
 
Below is a brief description of the governance structure for each CIP pilot project, and 
of the means of addressing participation and ownership.  I will also say something 
about the manner in which facilitation of the project was done, as this is related to 
participation and ownership. This brief description is based on the information 
gathered in chapters 5 (CIP pilot projects in Huntington and Tsakane) and 6 (CIP pilot 
project on the South Coast). I will reflect on how it was implemented, on whether it 
was successful, and on how it deviates from Reynolds’s conceptualisation of CIP (as 
described in chapter 3). In the summary (7.5.5), I will outline a number of 
recommendations to be taken into account when implementing the governance of a 





As Reynolds himself was involved in the implementation of the CIP pilot in 
Huntington, he firstly introduced a community trust as the legal vehicle. It was the 
first activity in terms of the implementation of CIP in Huntington. As described in 
chapter 5, the process of forming a trust took more than a year and much effort was 
put in to ensure that the governance of the project was solid and that there would be 
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ownership from day one. People specialised in trust legislation and set-up assisted 
with the Trust Deed and other legal requirements.  
 
So in terms of governance, we can say that the community was organised in a 
community trust, with elected representatives and a common purpose, namely the 
implementation of CIP in the community. However, the implementation of the 
governance structure in Huntington was unsuccessful – not because the proposed CIP 
governance structure cannot work, but because of the problems mentioned below.  
 
Firstly, the question should be asked as to whether a common purpose was in fact 
identified by the community itself. Secondly, the trustees had ‘personal enrichment’ 
in mind instead of the development of the community. The facilitators were not aware 
of this, at least not fully, and assumed the trustees were acting in the interests of the 
community. They were indeed elected by the community, but as mentioned in chapter 
5, they were elected due to issues of power, existing clientship systems, witchcraft 
and family traditions. The facilitators did not know this, as no proper assessment was 
made when selecting the community. This was the third problem, as Huntington was 
chosen because the donor wanted to assist this village and the facilitators did not 
know or understand the underlying tensions and dynamics in the community. If the 
facilitators had made a proper assessment of the community before implementing 
CIP, they could have considered another legal vehicle or the introduction of income-
generating projects before a legal vehicle. However, this might not have solved the 
problem, as the community could still have elected the same trustees, or the same 
community members with bad intentions to run the income-generating projects. But 
the facilitators could have decided against Huntington and opted for another 
community with fewer issues. 
 
Fourthly, in terms of participation the community did participate in the process of 
forming a community trust and electing representatives. However, no other 
‘participation’ was required from the start, as the governance structure was first set 
up. The fact that other aspects of CIP were not implemented simultaneously with the 
trust, or shortly thereafter, is a problem – the community did not see any benefits. 
Why should they get involved in a trust if nothing really happens?  If the community 
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does not see the benefits of a project, or does not know what to expect, how can they 
‘own’ the project from the start?  
 
A last mistake was that the facilitators were not present often enough in the 
community. They lived far away from Huntington. Hence, the community could not 
ask for advice and reflect on the project, or learn and the facilitators could not learn 




The facilitating organisation and Reynolds also decided on a community trust as the 
legal vehicle for the CIP project in Tsakane. Their intention was not to involve the 
entire community of Tsakane, but, for reasons of the budget, only parents of the 
children in the crèche and other interested community members, up to a maximum of 
100 adults.  This was not an issue as the number of community members interested in 
participating never reached 100. CIP was explained during a community meeting so 
that potential trust members had an idea of the benefits of the CIP project and what to 
expect. A trust was formed and trustees were elected as in Huntington. However, 
income-generating projects were introduced at the same time. So community 
members saw other aspects of the CIP while the trust was being set up. The elected 
trustees were a mix of respected community members and only one of them was 
politically connected. The trustees had the community at heart and did not at any time 
abuse resources.  
 
So a governance system was implemented according to the Reynolds vision of CIP. A 
number of problems still arose, but different from those of Huntington. The 
implementation of the governance structure in Tsakane was also unsuccessful. 
 
Firstly, the facilitating organisation (TMCC) took full ownership of the CIP project. 
No ownership was expected from and consequently taken by the trust members. A 
trust was set up, but the important decisions were taken by the facilitating 
organisation. Input from the trustees was usually asked, but after decisions were 
taken. The trustees were also not involved in the initial planning. Trustees were asked 
only towards the end of year one which income-generating projects they wanted to 
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start. Until then, the facilitating organisation had decided on the income-generating 
projects (a brick-making project and a community garden). In addition, participation 
was not expected from trustees and trust members. A number of trust members did 
participate actively, mostly those who played direct roles in the project – the trustees 
and the employees of income-generating projects like the garden, the brick-making 
project and the sewing project.  
 
The reasons for the facilitating organisation taking full ownership of the project are 
described in full in chapter 5 (5.3.1) and relate to the inexperience of the organisation 
in the facilitation of proper community development projects, the misunderstanding of 
the nature of CIP and the hand-out culture to which the organisation was accustomed.  
 
7.2.4 South Coast project 
 
As indicated in chapter 6, the facilitators took a long time identifying and getting to 
know the communities in the area, before deciding on a community for the CIP 
project. In each community, a meeting was called with full consent of the traditional 
leadership where the CIP project was explained and people were invited to start 
household gardens and attend training in organic gardening if interested. These were 
not empty promises made by the facilitators; funds were available to start with the 
project immediately. The assessment of the communities and fundraising had been 
done before the meetings were called to avoid promises that could lead to unrealistic 
expectations from the community. 
 
The governance structure of the CIP project on the South Coast is explained in detail 
in chapter 6. It was introduced only after some time, when the project was already 
running in Nositha. The facilitators and the community postponed the decision on 
governance to ensure full involvement of the project beneficiaries (in this case the 
farmers). As a cooperative was already established (to buy the produce from the 
farmers), it was decided that the cooperative would be the legal vehicle for the CIP 
project as well – as an umbrella organisation for a number of farmers’ associations 
(representing the farmers) selling to the cooperative. In this way, there would be no 
need to form a community trust. The facilitators were reluctant to do that due to the 
experiences of Huntington and Tsakane. Also, more support from the South African 
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government could be expected as government favours cooperatives and has a number 
of beneficial funding schemes available for them. Another consideration was that 
school feeding schemes give preference to cooperatives. Lastly, a cooperative is better 
known to people than a trust. 
 
Decision-making is democratic in the sense that each community has two 
representatives (the chairperson and the secretary, who are elected by the community) 
on the cooperative board. Each community therefore has two votes. Besides the six 
community representatives, the board has five other members. These are a 
representative from SDC staff, the cooperative manager, an agricultural specialist, a 
board member from Siyavuna and a local NGO representative. Decisions made at the 
cooperative board meetings first have to be discussed at farmers’ association 
meetings. Farmers’ meetings are always held one week before the cooperative board 
meetings. The chairperson has to provide feedback about decisions taken at the 
previous board meeting. Interviewed chairpersons indicate that the farmers have a real 
say and that the other board members listen to them. Sometimes decisions of the 
cooperative board are reversed if farmers protest about them at the next farmers’ 
association meeting.  
 
So, a solid governance structure is in place in the CIP project on the South Coast. It is 
democratically structured, with a high level of participation and involvement by the 
beneficiaries. A community trust, as proposed by Reynolds, was not implemented. 
However, while a trust is the preferred legal vehicle, it is not a CIP requirement. It can 
hence be concluded that the governance structure on the South Coast has been very 
successful so far, for the following reasons:  
 
Firstly, the facilitators considered the opinion of the community members when 
choosing the governance structure. A community trust, as per Reynolds’s guidelines, 
was initially considered, but it was rejected in favour of a cooperative with farmers’ 
associations. The fact that the facilitators listened to the community and changed their 
strategy accordingly, is very positive for the stimulation of ownership.  
 
Secondly, as indicated in chapter 6, the process was activated before a governance 
structure was set up. The household gardening project had begun; community 
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members attended training and sold their produce weekly. They could already observe 
the benefits of the project. Hence, they were interested to participate in the 
governance structure once it was set up. This is supported by the very high attendance 
rate at farmers’ association meetings.   
 
Thirdly, the project has benefits for individuals and the community as a whole. On the 
individual level, each community member may participate, at his or her own pace, by 
working a household garden and selling to the cooperative. Production volume is up 
to the individual and no collaboration with other farmers is required. On the 
communal level, very few people are employed and poverty levels are very high. 
When more people gain income by selling to the cooperative, they have cash to spend 
in the community, which benefits the whole community. This is a very powerful 
‘common purpose’ which was not created or determined beforehand by the 
facilitators, but which grew from the ground and became evident to the community 
members as the project went along. This further explains the high participation rate in, 
for example, the farmers’ association meetings as community members want the 
project to succeed and be sustainable as they see the benefits for themselves and the 
community.  
 
Fourthly, people from the involved communities were asked to come forward and run 
the cooperative, instead of hiring people from outside. This further contributes to 
ownership. The staff of SDC, which facilitates the project, is appointed on a 
competitive basis – hiring the right person for the job. However, if community 
members from the involved communities with the right qualifications apply, 
preference will be given to them.  
 
7.2.5 Recommendations with regard to people-centred development: 
participation and ownership  
 
To implement CIP in the future, a number of recommendations should be taken into 
account when it comes to ensuring that the involved beneficiaries are the people 




Firstly, the facilitating organisation (international or local NGO, government 
department, CBO, etc.) should take the time to make proper contact with the 
community where CIP will be implemented. This includes an assessment done with 
the community to identify the existing power relations and leadership structures in the 
community if any, identify existing income-generating projects and determine 
existing resources and assets. The facilitator should get to know community members 
and gain their trust. If there is no trust between the community and the facilitator, the 
project implementation will not succeed. If a decision is taken to begin a CIP project 
in the community, further consultations should take place, consent should be sought 
from the leadership structures and, very importantly, the facilitator should ensure that 
no unrealistic expectations are created in the community and that no empty promises 
are made.  
 
Secondly, the community should be the centre of the development project. This can 
only happen when the facilitating organisation does not take ownership, but asks and 
expects this of the community. They should be constantly aware of their own role as 
the facilitator and avoid taking the lead in decision-making. This danger always 
exists, as many decisions have to be taken when setting up a project, but facilitators 
should be prepared to change their minds or review decisions when the community is 
not happy with them. In fact, the facilitating organisation should also go through ‘a 
learning process’ and be open to that. 
 
Thirdly, the facilitating organisation should understand the CIP concept and know 
about the principles of community development in general. A development project 
cannot be implemented by somebody who does not fully understand it.  
 
Fourthly, as CIP cannot be a blueprint for development, the facilitator should be 
present in the community to learn from the community and revise the implementation 
strategy if needs be. So the facilitator should be based close to the community where 
the project is implemented. 
 
Fifthly, CIP has many aspects and setting up a proper governance structure is an 
important characteristic. But it is not a requirement to set up the governance structure 
first, before starting with other aspects, for example the implementation of income-
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generating projects. It is mostly detrimental to the success of a community 
development project if abstract structures are put in place before benefits are ‘visible’ 
to the involved community. Once benefits are clear to a community, they are more 
eager to participate and ownership can grow from the bottom up. The governance 
structure should also not necessarily be a community trust. It can be any legal 
structure. 
 
Lastly, the facilitating organisation should not necessarily ‘withdraw’ at a certain 
point from supporting the project. As David Korten (1980:497) indicated in 1980, the 
role of a supporting organisation is crucial for any community development project or 
programme to succeed. The role of ‘the facilitating organisation’ will change over 
time, as the project will be implemented and running smoothly after a while. The 
facilitator should then become a ‘supporter’ who is available for the community if and 
when required.  
 
The recommendations above should be taken into account when setting up the 
governance structure, to avoid failure of the project. 
 





As mentioned in chapter 3, one of the important characteristics of CIP is that 
communities should know what budgets are available to invest in their communities, 
and they should have the power, firstly, to decide what to do with this money and, 
secondly, to play a part in the spending of the money. Decision-making power should 
be accompanied by resources. In principle, the budget should be known to the 
communities before they start organising themselves as the availability of the 
potential resources will give them opportunities and could trigger processes that 
otherwise might not happen. The other important point here is that these budgets 
should be ‘on offer’ to communities. So they can decide whether they want to take a 
certain budget, for example child rights, to invest in the schools and crèches in their 
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community. The budgets should therefore not simply be given to communities. This is 
important to break the ‘hand-out’ culture of donors and government. 
 
The budgets on offer to communities should also contribute to the creation of a 
working local economy. This is another important aspect of CIP and contributes to the 
self-reliance of the community. A working local economy stimulates the ‘local 
income multiplier’, creating more local exchange and leading to increasing wealth on 
the local level (Reynolds 2005a:14).  
 
Below, I will briefly discuss knowledge of resources in each CIP project and whether 
or not an attempt was made to create a working local economy. What attempts were 
made and did they work? No economic study has been conducted as part of this 
survey on whether or not the money circulation did indeed improve due to the 
introduction of CIP. A number of questions were asked in the questionnaire at the 
South Coast, e.g. if farmers spend extra income earned from the CIP project IN the 
community. An existing study was used (Browne et al. 2007), where monetary data 
was gathered with regard to local money circulation. These data were gathered in a 
community adjacent to the South Coast communities involved in the CIP project, and 
are also used in this analysis. Once again, in the summary (7.3.5), I will outline a 
number of recommendations to be taken into account when implementing the aspect 




In Huntington, the community knew from the beginning that R150 000 would be 
made available to the community trust by the Sabi Sabi Trust. This money had to be 
invested for the benefit of the community, and it was up to the community to decide 
what form the investment would take. The trustees had access to the bank account of 
the trust and three of them had to sign before money could be withdrawn. However, it 
was not for the trustees to decide what to do with the money; this had to be decided 
by the community. The trustees had to execute the decisions of the community. The 
R150 000 was not offered in different budgets in the form of investment rights, child 
rights and use rights. The concept of rights programmes was not introduced in 




In terms of Reynolds’s vision of CIP, knowledge of resources was fully implemented 
in Huntington as he envisaged it. However, the implementation went wrong from the 
start as the trustees abused the funds, as described in chapter 5. The project manager 
in Huntington said the fact that the community knew what the available funds were 
before the trust was formed, was the reason it failed. Everybody was focused on 
getting some of that money, rather than thinking of projects that could benefit the 
community as a whole.  
 
However, the fact that knowledge of the available resources went wrong in 
Huntington, does not mean it cannot succeed elsewhere. Good examples of projects 
where budgets on offer to communities did work, are provided by the many projects 
the Independent Development Trust ran in the period just before 1994. In these 
projects, small farmer communities were informed of a small budget. They could 
decide themselves what to do with the budget, how to spend it, and they had direct 
access to the budget through an innovative system (see chapter 3.1 for the Busiesvlei 
case study). They even had to do the bookkeeping themselves. Respondent 5, who 
worked for the IDT at the time, said the system worked really well and in most cases 
the funds were not abused.   
 
Regarding the creation of a working local economy, this did not happen in 
Huntington. All existing income-generating projects in Huntington were identified in 
year one, when the trust was established. However, none of those projects was 
financially sustainable; they operated on hand-outs. People involved with the projects 
were promised that they would benefit from the trust and that the trust would assist 
them when possible. However, some projects received money from the trust to invest 
in their business while others did not. Criteria for receiving funds seemed to be 
absent, creating conflict in the community from the outset. The project manager also 
indicates that the assistance given to some projects was in the form of hand-outs, 
without a strategy behind them. The money from the trust was intended for 






In Tsakane, the available budget was not known to the community and the trustees. 
The facilitating organisation received the funds from the donor and had to account for 
it. If the community had to make expenses for trust-related activities, they first had to 
get two signatures from the relevant trustees and then go to the office of the 
facilitating organisation to receive the funds. Receipts had to be handed in to prove 
expenses were made correctly. 
 
From the start of the project, the creation of a working local economy was a priority 
for the project facilitators and the trustees. The concept of rights programmes was 
introduced in Tsakane, albeit slightly adapted from that envisaged by Reynolds, as the 
funds were limited. Firstly, child rights were introduced, so that all the children of the 
crèche could get proper nutrition and education. A garden was started on the premises 
of the school, where seven parents worked. The vegetables grown there were sold to 
the school. The funds to buy these vegetables (and other food items) were called the 
‘child rights budget’. In addition, the child rights budget was used to buy educational 
toys for the children and to send one of the two teachers on Early Childhood 
Development training. The budget was made available from the funds TMCC had 
received from the donor. The parents who started the garden received ‘an investment 
budget’ to buy tools, seeds, a fence and the like (which TMCC bought). Their wages 
were paid from the investment budget as well, but the thinking was that wages would 
in due course be paid from the sales income of the vegetables. This never happened as 
not enough vegetables could ever be sold.  
 
The parents working in the garden were not simply appointed; they had to buy ‘the 
right to work in the garden’, or ‘use rights’. All the parents had the right to do so, but 
the thinking was that only those willing to pay would be motivated. Seven trust 
members bought use rights and their payments were invested in the trust. The seven 
gardeners were not all parents, some were grandparents and others just trust members. 
The use rights system is described in detail in chapter 5. 
 
In addition to the garden, interested trust members could receive five chickens from 
the trust. In return, they had to deliver 100 eggs to the crèche as payment. This never 
happened as the chicken system was only introduced at the end of the project, when it 




Other income-generating projects were started with the trust making an investment, 
for example to buy the equipment needed for the project. These investments had to be 
paid back over time by the businesses. In this way, a sewing project started, as well as 
a hair salon, a brick-making project and a restaurant. These services were never 
present in Tsakane before, so they all stimulated the local economy as people actually 
bought their products and services there. However, none of the projects was profitable 
and therefore sustainable. The trust was supporting most of the projects financially 
and when its funds were exhausted, all projects collapsed and no payments were made 
to the trust. The reason for the projects not becoming sustainable is that local prices 
were too low. This was done to compete with the same products and services ‘in 
town’, as otherwise people might not buy in the community. Competition from the 
‘first economy’ thus prevented local projects from becoming sustainable. Tsakane is 
close to an urban area, even within walking distance, which increased competition 
from the first economy. It is impossible to produce a white school shirt in the 
community at a lower price than Pep Stores. Villagers could be encouraged to buy 
‘locally’, but people will buy what is most affordable. Secondly, perhaps some of the 
projects could have become financially sustainable over time, with growing demand, 
but all income-generating projects in Tsakane existed for less than a year as no further 
support funds were available. It obviously takes time for businesses to become 
sustainable, as the cooperative at the South Coast project has shown. Therefore, these 
projects might have succeeded if given more time. 
 
To further stimulate the local economy, the trustees and TMCC negotiated with the 
local municipality to build a marketplace in Tsakane where people could trade their 
products. The negotiations got quite far as land was allocated and building plans for 
the market were made. The expectation was that the market would further stimulate 
the local economy. However, when the CIP project collapsed, plans for the market 
were abandoned. 
 
To conclude, the introduction of investment and child rights was understood by the 
community, but did not yet work well. The community understood the system and the 
concept of repayment – if the trust made an investment, the beneficiaries had make 
payment in some way. Profits for the trust were not intended, rather funds for other 
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income-generating activities. However, this never happened as the CIP project was 
closed down. ‘Use rights’ was a difficult concept and people did not really understand 
why it was necessary. Not many trust members were interested in gardening, so there 
was no real competition for the use rights, which defeated their purpose. 
 
7.3.4 South Coast project 
 
The three communities on the South Coast were not informed of the resources 
available for the implementation of the CIP project at the beginning. SDC did the 
fundraising and allocated funds to each community for the start of the CIP project. 
Once the farmers were benefitting, by selling fruit and vegetables to the cooperative, a 
governance structure was set up (see chapter 6). Then they learned about the funds of 
the cooperative and the funds SDC invested in the cooperative. SDC management felt 
that once farmers observed the benefits of the project, their interest would be sparked 
and they would support accountable spending of the funds, so that they could 
continue benefitting. 
 
So, after a while the farmers do know about the resources available to the cooperative 
and its income and expenditure. This is crucial as the community manages the 
cooperative. The farmers may give inputs on the use of profits, if any. When new 
resources are available for investment, allocated by SDC from donor funds, they may 
decide on how to spend these funds, subject to the agreement with the donor. If the 
farmers identify a need (e.g. a new refrigerator for the cooperative), SDC will raise 
the funds. The cooperative has its own bookkeeping system and bank account, which 
is coordinated by the cooperative manager and the different volunteers from each 
community. SDC does check the bookkeeping on a weekly basis. If funds from sales 
are short, for example, the manager and volunteers have to pay in the difference 
themselves. So far, no cooperative resources have been abused. The cooperative 
manager and other farmers do not have direct access to the bank account of the 
cooperative, only SDC has. An effective accountability system is in place. The 
cooperative manager has to report to the farmers on the income and expenses of the 
cooperative. The farmers can question this and ask for clarification. So there is 
accountability between the farmers and the cooperative management, but also 
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between the cooperative management and the cooperative board, and between all of 
these and SDC.  
 
The CIP project on the South Coast has followed a compromise route in terms of 
community knowledge of the available resources. SDC does the fundraising for the 
CIP project, but also has facilitation expenditure. These costs are not known to the 
community. The budget available specifically for the cooperative, to set it up for 
example, is known to the farmers, and when the cooperative cannot cover its costs in 
any month, SDC will provide the difference. There is a reciprocal relationship 
between SDC and the cooperative (represented by the farmers). This system seems to 
work so far. On the one hand, the farmers are pleased they know about the resources 
of the cooperative as well as its income and expenses. On the other hand, SDC keeps 
control and manages the relationship with the donors as, in the end, SDC is 
accountable to the donors.  
 
From the start of the CIP project on the South Coast, creating a working local 
economy was a priority. The facilitators thought that, if they could show the 
community the benefits of the project from the start, before creating governance 
bodies, the buy-in and ownership would be greater afterwards. And so it was. 
 
To stimulate local production and local demand, a system of ‘guaranteed demand’ 
was created. The cooperative buys weekly in the three participating communities, on 
fixed times and at fixed places. In Gcilima and Kwanzimakwe, which are large 
communities, there are different collection points so that the farmers do not have to 
walk far with their produce. The farmers sell for immediate cash at the collection 
points. They sell fruit, vegetables and some processed foods like jam and marmalade. 
There are no volume restrictions. The farmers get an honest price, at least 60% of the 
selling price. So, each week, local farmers know that, whatever produce they have of 
the right quality, there will be a market for it and they will get immediate cash in 
return.  
 
The availability of immediate cash is very powerful in stimulating the creation of a 
local economy. Increases in income lead to increased expenditure, which leads to 
increased demand for certain goods and services, which leads to increased production 
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of these goods and services, which leads to employment opportunities and 
entrepreneurship opportunities (Browne et al. 2007:567-569). This is indeed what 
happened in the communities on the South Coast. Of course, not all extra income is 
spent in the local economy, but part of it is spent in the local economy. 83% of 
respondents to the questionnaire indicate that they spend the extra income from the 
cooperative by buying IN the community. Also, some farmers interviewed said they 
now have ‘a business’ as they employ people to help them in their gardens. So besides 
the farmers and their families benefitting from the CIP project, other community 
members who are not members of the project also benefit as they find jobs and gain 
some income.  
 
To ensure that the local economy benefits in future from the extra income community 
members earn, the CIP project should identify the goods and services on which 
people will spend their extra income and determine if it is possible to produce those 
goods and services IN the community. Browne et al. (2007:580) indicate that if 
uncooked foods (like maize meal or vegetables) are processed in end products (like 
bread or jam), the sale of such products stimulate the local economy and reduce 
leakage into the national economy.  
 
Another important aspect of the South Coast project is that, at the weekly collection 
points, a market is created. Besides the fruit, vegetables and some jams that farmers 
sell to the cooperative, the collection point has also become a meeting point. Farmers 
use the opportunity to meet each other, discuss issues, sell produce to one other and 
exchange seeds and seedlings. The cooperative also sells seeds, seedlings, organic 
inputs and gardening tools at reduced prices at the collection points, as they buy in 
bulk.  
 
Besides the market created in the communities, other markets had to be found by the 
cooperative for the produce bought from farmers. The philosophy of the cooperative 
is to sell ‘fresh, natural produce from the local community’, so therefore, markets 
were identified in the proximity of the communities. The produce is sold to local 
shops in urban areas, to some retailers, schools and an old-age home. In addition, the 
cooperative manager has weekly stands at the Saturday market in town and on 
weekdays at the local chicken supermarket. The creation of this market is very 
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important – if the produce cannot be sold, the cooperative will collapse and so will the 
project. 
 
The concept of rights programmes has not been introduced at the South Coast and no 
budgets as such are put on offer to the farmers. 
 
7.3.5 Recommendations with regard to becoming self-reliant: knowing the 
resources available and a working local economy 
 
In terms of ‘knowing the resources available’, the compromise option used in the CIP 
project on the South Coast is at this stage probably the best way to introduce the 
concept of informing the community about ‘the resources available’. The lesson from 
Huntington is that the community had all kinds of expectations when they knew about 
the money available to the trust beforehand and some community members worked 
out a way to get access to the money for personal enrichment. At the South Coast this 
was impossible as SDC controlled the programme budget.  
 
The question begging an answer is this: Does the system in the South Coast project 
not defeat the purpose of ‘knowing the resources available’? CIP wants, firstly, the 
community to know about the resources available, have access to it and have 
decision-making power over it. Budgets should be put ‘on offer’ and not ‘pushed 
upon’ the community. The first condition is not fully met at the South Coast, as the 
community does not know about all the resources, and the second condition is not met 
either. Budgets were not put on offer, but they were also not pushed upon the 
communities.  However, the purpose of this research is to find which aspects of CIP 
cannot be implemented realistically, and how these aspects may be adapted to become 
more realistic. From the three CIP pilot projects, it is clear that the concept of 
‘knowing the resources available’ worked best at the South Coast. Mutual 
accountability is in place and no abuse of resources has taken place. Donors are 
reluctant to give communities direct access to funds, even though the IDT drought 
projects proved that budgets put on offer to communities were used very well and not 
misappropriated. However, these projects were implemented a long time ago, in the 
early 1990s, and the South African government after 1994 did not embrace the IDT 
approach (see chapter 1). The way development is currently approached, is to ‘hand 
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out’ money and projects. With the compromise or middle-way option of the South 
Coast, beneficiaries are much more involved and do know what is available to them, 
while the facilitator and donor keep control over the budget. Over a period of time, all 
the resources could be made available to communities, as Reynolds proposes. But this 
can only happen when donors and the government are on board. Hence, a 
recommendation would be to implement this aspect of CIP with caution, and to, 
preferably, go for a middle way as in the South Coast project. Other options besides 
those introduced in Huntington and the South Coast may be available, but these are 
not known to me at this point in time – this could be a topic for future research. 
 
In terms of creating a working local economy, only the CIP pilot project on the South 
Coast has succeeded. The one in Tsakane could have succeeded if more time was 
given to the income-generating projects that had started. Browne et al. (2007:567-
571) say that stimulating the local economy is indeed difficult, due to competition 
from the first economy. But, the local economy can always offer products and 
services used by the locals and not available in the first economy. For example, 
traditional medicines, traditional clothes and items, traditional food (cooked and 
uncooked, like ‘Zulu spinach’), home-made beer, uniforms for local schools and 
church groups, counselling services in the local language, etc. It has been proven that 
if these services are made available in the community, people will buy them.  
 
This aspect of CIP, creating a working local economy, is probably the CIP aspect 
most visible to communities once implemented. Hence, when starting with a CIP 
project, it would be a recommendation to start with this aspect as it would show 
community members what CIP can do for them. This will gauge their appetite to 
participate and become involved. Ownership of the project could grow from the 
bottom-up. 
 




Reynolds stressed that CIP was not just an economic development programme, but 
inclusive of the social, cultural and psychological aspects of community development. 
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Communities and community members should be trusted to reach their potential and 
gain self-esteem. Community development should be a bottom-up process, where the 
community is assisted by a facilitator but not told what to do, and hence, community 
development should be a learning process, where there is space for learning and, 
consequently, for making mistakes. If people cannot participate meaningfully in the 
development of their own lives, they will not be able to reach their potential and, in 
this way, regain or develop their self-esteem (Korten 1980:498; Reynolds 2005a:29; 
Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:46; 56-57). An elaborate discussion in this regard can 
be found in chapter 2 (2.2.7) and chapter 3 (3.3.3). 
 
Reynolds stressed that the implementation of CIP should be ‘a learning process’ 
where both the involved community and the facilitator learns along the way 
(Reynolds 2005a:29). This part will hence indicate the ‘learning’ that CIP itself, as an 
alternative approach to development, has undergone when it was implemented in the 
three different pilot projects that were studied. The mistakes, for example, that were 
made in Huntington, the first CIP pilot project, were avoided in the second (Tsakane) 
and third (South Coast). Also, the CIP programme as such was adapted every time to 
suit the needs of the beneficiaries involved and to become more responsive.  
 
The concepts of self-esteem and dignity are not easy to measure. Also, there is a 
difference between individual and collective (communal) dignity and self-esteem. No 
specific data in this regard were gathered from the Huntington and Tsakane projects. 
For the South Coast project, data were gathered from individuals to determine if the 
farmers that participated at the South Coast have gained self-esteem through their 




As Huntington was the first CIP pilot project, a lot of learning could have taken place. 
This has happened to a certain extent for the facilitators as facilitation of the project 
was adapted along the way (appointing a project manager closer to the community, 
more training for the trustees). However, due to the fact that the facilitator was not 
close enough to the community, emerging problems were noticed too late and changes 
made by the facilitator were too late. The project manager arrived too late and could 
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no longer address the problems already there. Some learning by the donor could have 
taken place as they had a long history of allocating funds for community development 
in the area. However, no data in this regard are available. 
 
In terms of the learning the community underwent, no data are available in this regard 
either. From documents and the interview with Respondent 7, I can conclude that the 
intentions of the trustees were not in line with what CIP wanted to achieve, namely 
community development. It is not clear whether the trustees and trust members 
understood that they had to take the lead in implementing the project. 
 
In terms of enhancing the self-esteem and dignity of the involved community 
members, it is not clear how much attention the facilitators paid to this aspect. It was 
probably assumed that enhanced self-esteem would flow from the project after a 
while. However, most attention was focused on setting up the community trust and 
nothing was really achieved besides that, such as supporting income-generating 
projects that would show real benefits to the people. The trustees were already 
powerful in the community and it is not clear whether ‘being a trustee’ improved their 
self-esteem further. The bicycle project might have contributed to the self-esteem of 
students involved, who gained bicycles to ride to school as well as the responsibility 
to take care of their possessions, but this is an assumption. 
 
It can be concluded that the CIP pilot project in Huntington went through a learning 
process and was flexible enough to adapt, but the facilitators made a wrong start and 




The implementation of the CIP project in Tsakane was a learning process for the 
facilitating organisation as well as the involved community members. Due to the 
limited experience of the facilitating organisation and the involved volunteers, much 
learning took place in terms of ‘how to facilitate community development’. This 
‘learning’ was important for the implementation of the CIP project on the South 
Coast, which started later with the same facilitator. He learned about CIP and 
development facilitation in Tsakane. How much of a detrimental effect did the 
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inexperience of the facilitators have on the implementation of CIP in Tsakane? Could 
it be that the project collapsed due to the inexperience of the facilitators? On the one 
hand yes, but on the other hand no. During 2008, the facilitator (respondent 4) moved 
to the South Coast to start implementing a CIP project there. At that stage, the CIP 
project in Tsakane had not yet collapsed and TMCC was still supposed to support the 
project, with guidance from the facilitator. By this time the facilitator (respondent 4) 
knew about the mistakes that were made in Tsakane and he tried to address them as 
far as possible. He made monthly visits to Tsakane and at other times the trustees and 
TMCC were supposed to solve the issues (like closing down loss-making income-
generating projects, starting up a cooperative garden project, solving the ownership 
issue with the crèche), which they did do to a certain extent. However, when the 
facilitator (respondent 4) and the donor asked the trustees to come up with a 
continuation plan for the project in Tsakane, they failed to do so. Numerous 
opportunities were given to them, but as they did not seem to be interested, the donor 
decided to stop the funding. Funds were still available, but the absence of any 
initiative by the trustees caused the donor’s withdrawal. This lack of initiative could 
be because the trustees were not supposed to take initiative (and ownership) in the 
earlier stages as TMCC took all ownership, or maybe because they were just not 
interested.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that there was little ownership in the Tsakane CIP project, 
the involved community members learned much in terms of collaborating in the 
different projects, in terms of what the concept ‘working local economy’ means and 
its role in enhancing wealth creation in Tsakane, and in terms of dealing with conflicts 
in the community and resolving them. Some community members were particularly 
empowered by their active participation in the project. Some started their own 
businesses, inspired by the project and the concept of a working local economy. Some 
community members took part in CIP workshops in Johannesburg, Cape Town and 
Durban and shared their learning with other communities – which empowered them in 
many ways as they had never made long trips or met people from other communities. 
Sharing their experiences and getting acknowledgement for it was very powerful in 




One particular case is worthwhile mentioning, namely the case of a lady from 
Tsakane who became a member of the trust. She was always very interested and 
attended all meetings, participated in projects and so forth. She was a young lady with 
three children and her husband was a local ANC politician. When the trust needed a 
manager, she applied for the position and was the best candidate. She had a hard time 
in the beginning, as she had never worked, but she learned quickly, travelled in South 
Africa and grew substantially as a person. She could reach her potential. After about 
six months she suddenly resigned. The facilitators did not understand it, as she 
seemed to enjoy the job. Afterwards they realised her husband was the cause. He saw 
his wife becoming an important person in the community and reaching her potential 
and he probably felt threatened. He wanted her to stay at home with the children. It 
was a sad ending to a wonderful growing process.  
 
So even if the project in Tsakane has not contributed much to the self-esteem of the 
community, it has contributed to the growth of the self-esteem of a number of people 
living in the community.  
 
The aspect of a learning society was perhaps not implemented consciously by the 
facilitating organisation, but some learning by some community members did take 
place, and there certainly was learning by the facilitating organisation. 
 
7.4.4 South Coast project 
 
The learning process was handled well at the South Coast CIP project. The facilitator 
(respondent 4) started with small experiments, talking to leadership structures in 
different communities before choosing a first community, community mapping, 
listening to the problems and needs of communities, doing research about 
cooperatives and so on. Only after a year of preparation did he start setting up an 
income-generating project in one village, Nositha, namely a household fruit and 
vegetable project. He progressed slowly, constantly adapting the project and project 
deliverables to suit the needs of the village and their expectations, but also looking at 
the business side of the project. Gradually the project took shape, a cooperative was 
set up, production systems were matured, sales and marketing got up to speed. It 
needs to be mentioned that respondent 4 treated comments and suggestions from the 
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involved community members as important and he took them into account. After a 
year and a half, SDC was created – a supporting organisation to assist with 
implementation. When the project had taken shape, it was rolled out to other villages 
(Kwanzimakwe and Gcilima), but stayed open to adaptations if and when required. 
Slowly but surely, a CIP implementation method had been designed that worked well 
and corresponded with the needs of the communities involved. 
  
In terms of self-esteem and dignity, as mentioned in chapter 6, it is difficult to 
measure these concepts and therefore, the data gathered in this regard should be 
interpreted with caution. It is obvious from the data (see chapter 6) that the 
communities are involved in the decision-making and planning of the project, that 
they feel they are part of the CIP project and that there is some degree of ownership of 
the project. The facilitating organisation has put a lot of effort into ensuring 
ownership by the community, allowing a long period for learning, understanding the 
concepts and forming the necessary governance structures. This extended process 
obviously pays off. When people feel they are part of the project, they will gain some 
self-esteem. When people learn new things, get recognition and become more self-
sufficient, their dignity is enhanced. As mentioned in chapter 6, when farmers from 
the South Coast project were asked why they thought the project was a success, many 
answered because ‘they learned how to farm’, and ‘it provides them with extra 
income’. The farmers also indicated in the questionnaires that their lives had become 
better and that new opportunities became available to them. This could mean that 
their self-esteem has grown, or that it was enhanced, however no conclusive remarks 
can be made in this regard. In chapter 6 (6.6.2), I elaborate in detail about this.  
 
An important development when individual community members start working 
together is the building of trust in the community. People in communities have to 
learn to trust each other to collaborate efficiently. The manager of the cooperative, for 
example, handles the finances of the cooperative, and the community have to trust the 
manager to do it without taking advantage. Hence, the manager comes from the 
community itself to ensure social control as well.   
 
Besides individuals gaining self-esteem, the community as such may also gain self-
esteem. For example, because the involved communities got recognition for assisting 
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community members in building a better life. Nositha, in particular, was used as an 
example to share the story with other communities, donors, the local media and the 
municipality. The cherry on top was the recognition for the CIP project at the South 
Coast when it won the ‘Driver of Change Award’ on 31 October 2013. This is an 
annual award by the Southern Africa Trust and the Mail & Guardian for civil society 
initiatives that are innovative and make a real difference in the lives of poor people on 
grassroots level, and have the potential to influence policy (Southern Africa Trust 
2013). The award was great recognition for SDC and the involved communities. 
 
So, it can be concluded that in the South Coast CIP project, there was a definite 
attempt by the facilitators to focus on the concept of ‘learning society’ (by doing 
community mapping exercises, by having conversations with community leaderships 
structures and community members, by conducting baseline surveys and follow-up 
impact studies, by listening to inputs by community members, by setting up a 
governance structure which allows for genuine community participation) and that 
hence this aspect of CIP was implemented successfully.  
 
7.4.5 Recommendations with regard to learning process: learning society, self-
esteem and dignity 
 
Firstly, implementing a community development project, in this case CIP, should 
always be a learning process for the facilitators as well as for the community 
involved. CIP, as a new programme for community development, was first introduced 
in Huntington. Some lessons were learnt there by the facilitators and the mistakes 
were avoided in Tsakane, and again at the South Coast. Hence, this indicates the 
learning that CIP itself underwent, as a new programme for community development, 
and indicates the flexibility that CIP inherently possesses to adapt to the context 
where it is implemented. This made it clear that there was a need to change CIP as 
conceptualised by Reynolds. CIP allows for flexibility and that is important for any 
community development approach: the programme should be adjustable to suit the 





The government and facilitating organisations should understand that people, even if 
very poor and illiterate, do know things, can do things and can be trusted. If you are 
illiterate, it does not follow you are an ‘underdeveloped person’ without any 
capabilities. All people try to run their lives as best they can, according to their own 
capabilities. It is up to the government and facilitating organisations of development 
projects to make it easier for people to achieve their capabilities and run their lives. 
They should create the conditions necessary for people to enhance and achieve. 
People should not be taken ‘by hand’ like small children. They will choose their own 
development path. This is an important realisation for all facilitators as it means a lot 
can be learned from the community when implementing a community development 
project. Similarly, the community can learn. The learning exchange should be in both 
directions. 
 
This is something that the South African government, in particular, has to realise as 
they believe South Africans should be taken by the hand, should be given hand-outs 
and should be told what to do ‘as they do not know themselves’. In the past years, the 
government has slowly started to realise that this is wrong; that indeed communities 
and people are capable of doing things themselves, that they should not be treated as 
children but as development partners. The NDP seems to indicate that the government 
has realised this, as they now want communities to ‘to take ownership’ and be ‘active 
in their own development’ and ‘where government works effectively to develop the 
capabilities of people to lead the lives they desire’ (Manuel 2011; National Planning 
Commission 2011b:2-3). However, it remains to be seen when the thoughts expressed 
in the plan will become reality. 
 
Secondly, for a community development project to be a learning process, the role of 
the facilitating organisation is very important. There should be leadership from the 
facilitating organisation, intellectual discipline, the freedom to deviate from the initial 
project plan and budget, space for the community ‘to learn’ and attention for staff 
development (Korten 1980:502). If they do not allow mistakes, there will be little 
space for learning, both on an individual level and on a collective level. This aspect 
has clear synergies with ‘ownership’, as the facilitating organisation should give the 
community the opportunity to take ownership of the project, and not take it 




Thirdly, the CIP project should put ‘opportunities’ for community members and the 
community ‘on offer’. This means that it is up to the community to take these 
opportunities. If they do not take them, that is fine; they should not be ‘pushed upon’ 
the communities. Reynolds stresses this aspect as he says that in so many 
development projects, the community members do not want certain things and hence, 
a development project pushes certain ‘opportunities’ upon them, which always ends 
in failure. People should be given the choice to take an opportunity, or to decide for 
themselves whether they regard something on offer as an opportunity. It is interesting 
to note that household gardening is seen by many as an activity for women in 
communities. At the South Coast CIP project, mostly women do the farming and 
hence participate in the project. There are male farmers as well, but they have larger 
gardens, bigger than household gardens. SDC wanted to get men on board, because 
selling vegetables to the cooperative could be an income-generating ‘opportunity’ for 
men too. But due to the tradition that women are the household farmers, the men did 
not see this as an opportunity – working in a household garden would be below ‘their 
dignity’. Development projects should consider such local traditions. The project 
could have pursued the opposite of its goals if it forced men to become household 
gardeners.  
 
In terms of addressing self-esteem and dignity, these should flow naturally from the 
community development process, and going through a learning process is an 
important contributor to that.  
 
7.5 Conclusion: the potential of CIP in South Africa 
 
This final conclusion will answer the objectives and research questions as indicated in 
chapter 1 (1.2 and 1.3). The following objectives were stated, namely to conceptualise 
and analyse the critical understandings of CIP as Reynolds had envisaged them, to 
conduct research in CIP pilot projects in order to study whether CIP can be 
realistically implemented in South Africa and then to reconceptualise CIP in ‘a 




The following research questions should now be answered and will be summarised 
below: 
 
1. In which development streaming does CIP fit, and why? 
2. Why is CIP proposed as a model for economic development in South Africa? 
3. Does CIP bring something new to the development debate? 
4. What are the characteristics of CIP? What is CIP? 
5. Why did two CIP projects collapse and why is the third CIP project still 
successfully running after three years? Was it because the CIP model was not 
viable, or because of implementation mistakes? 
6. Is CIP a realistic development programme for South Africa? 
 
Chapter 2 gives an answer to question 1, in which development streaming does CIP fit 
and why. A historical background of the discipline of Development Studies is given 
in this chapter. It is clear that CIP is an example of ‘Alternative Development’, a 
streaming in development which wants to move away from conventional development 
practices and promote practices that are much more people-centred, with attention for 
participation by, ownership of and self-reliance in the communities involved (see 
2.2.5). CIP is a new approach to ‘Alternative Development’, with close links to 
Community Development practice. The main principles CIP shares with Alternative 
Development and Community Development are that development should be ‘a 
learning process’; development should be ‘people-centered’ with the ‘participation 
and ownership’ of the involved beneficiaries; attention for ‘all aspects of 
development’, not only the economic aspect but also the social, psychological, 
cultural and political aspects of development; so that development increases the self-
esteem of the involved beneficiaries.  If all of these are properly taken into account, 
development projects have a better chance of success and hence the sustainability of 
the project is enhanced.  
 
The second research question, why CIP is proposed as a development model for 
South Africa, is answered in chapters 1 and 2, namely that for historical reasons, the 
economy of South Africa has developed into a highly developed part and a 
marginalised part. Most people, especially the poor, live in the marginalised part and 
it is not possible for all of them to be absorbed by the developed economy and create 
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a better life in this way. Hence, CIP argues to stop focusing on creating ‘ladders’ to 
the developed part of the economy, rather focus on developing the marginalised part 
of the economy by creating working local economies where people live, in the 
marginalised areas. This is also the innovative aspect of CIP.  
 
The third research question, whether CIP brings something new to the development 
debate, is answered in chapters 2 and 7. In terms of ‘theory’, CIP is not a new theory 
of development. CIP is rather a new ‘model’ for development, or a new ‘approach’ 
for implementing a development project. The different aspects of CIP (people-
centered development, ownership and participation, knowing the resources available, 
creating a working local economy, learning process, enhancing self-esteem) all 
feature individually in Alternative Development theory and its approaches to some 
extent, however CIP is the first ‘model’ that brings all these aspects together for 
implementing a community development project.  
 
The fourth research question regards the characteristics of CIP, and basically asks the 
question what CIP is all about.  This could also deal with its potential shortcomings, 
based on the findings of this research. An answer to this question is given in chapters 
5, 6 and in the above part of chapter 7. I will note some recommendations that should 
be taken into account when implementing CIP in future. This will also answer 
question 6, namely whether CIP can be realistically implemented in South Africa. 
Research question 5, on the collapse of two CIP pilot projects while the third one 
survives, is answered in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
I will not elaborate in detail on the characteristics of CIP, as they are described in 
detail in chapter 3. Reynolds envisaged CIP to be a programme for the development 
of the second economy with a focus on poverty alleviation, funded by the 
government, in the form of rights budgets, which would develop the local economy 
and in this way contribute to the development and self-esteem of the involved 
community and individuals. CIP has not been tested in this way, as CIP was only 
tested in the three pilot projects in Huntington, Tsakane and on the South Coast. 
Hence, no substantiated findings can be made in this regard. However, as we know 
from studying the CIP pilot projects (chapter 5 and 6), CIP can be implemented by 
using donor funds, with or without the concept of ‘rights budgets and programmes’. 
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Donor funding, instead of government funding, was used to start the CIP pilot 
projects and keep them going. In principle the source of the funds does not matter, but 
ideally government should guarantee longer-term sustainability because it is the 
responsibility of government to create opportunities for its citizens to live a decent 
life. However, as CIP was a ‘new’ model for community development, it was a good 
idea to start implementing it with donor money in order to test it, to find the weak 
points, to improve implementation and to convince the South African government to 
use it as part of government policy. This has not yet happened, but it is one of the 
aims of this research to present it to government and demonstrate that CIP would be a 
worthwhile programme to consider. 
 
CIP calls for strong participation and ownership by the involved community to ensure 
that the project is sustainable, successful and really benefits the intended people. A 
high level of participation and ownership from the involved beneficiaries is a strong 
indicator of success. However, the facilitating organisation, donors, the government 
or other external parties can always abuse ownership by taking control of the project, 
rather than letting the community make their own decisions. Hence, participation and 
ownership is a potential weak point in CIP that should be dealt with carefully. The 
governance structure put in place for the project is therefore very important. As we 
have seen in Huntington, the wrong governance structure can break the project from 
the beginning. Hence, a recommendation here for facilitating organisations is to 
carefully consider the aspect of the governance of the CIP project. This should be 
done by selecting the right ‘community’ for a CIP project. A ‘community’ can be ‘any 
group of people’ with a common purpose e.g. the development of a certain area or the 
establishment of a cooperative, as long as they are structured in a legal entity and 
have as objective the development of ‘their community’. The ‘community’ should be 
well-defined, have a clear, tangible goal and be open to other people who wish to join 
‘the community’. This is very important as CIP aims to offer ‘budgets’ to 
communities. The concept of ‘community’ and what it means for community 
development could be a topic for further research. Besides selecting the ‘right 
community’, a mapping exercise should be conducted to get to know the community 
and meetings should take place with existing leadership structures, community 
members and outsiders to determine the dynamics and decision-making structures of 
the community. Preferably, full support should be obtained from all leadership 
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structures before commencing with implementation. The right governance structure 
will contribute to the level of participation and ownership in the community.  
 
As we found in the pilot projects in Huntington and Tsakane, participation and 
ownership of the involved community can be jeopardised by the facilitation. If the 
facilitating organisation takes ownership of the project themselves, or if they do not 
take the time to get to know the community, or if they are not often present in the 
community, or if they do not understand CIP or community development principles in 
general, the result can be a community that does not or is not able to participate and 
take ownership, which can lead to the collapse of the project. Hence, a second 
recommendation here is that the facilitating organisation should ensure that they do 
not take ownership of the project, that they stay ‘a facilitator’ and not ‘a controller’. 
The facilitator should allow the community to take ownership of the project.  
 
A third recommendation is that the facilitator who introduces a project in a 
community should be experienced in terms of community development in general, but 
should also have proper and sound knowledge of the project that has to be 
implemented, in this case CIP. The facilitator should not have preconceived ideas of 
how things should be done, but should have an open mind and be willing to adapt the 
project along the way and be willing to learn. This means that whoever pays the 
facilitator (donor or government) should also be flexible enough to re-allocate funds 
and deviate from pre-conceptualised budgets and project deliverables. The facilitator 
should also be regularly present in the community. 
 
People will not participate in a project if they hear only about ‘abstract benefits’. They 
should see ‘tangible benefits’ before they will participate and take ownership. As was 
seen in Huntington, getting started by setting up a governance structure for the CIP 
project did not work. In the South Coast project, the governance structure was only 
set up when tangible benefits were already visible and real for the community 
members. Hence, community members were eager to participate in the project and in 
its governance, taking ownership. Therefore a fourth recommendation would be to not 
necessarily start with setting up a governance structure for the CIP project if the 
community has not yet seen what the benefits of the project could be. By starting with 
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an income-generating project, the right expectations could be created and trust may be 
formed between the facilitators and the community.  
 
Most community development projects have a facilitating ‘lifespan’, meaning that a 
facilitating organisation should implement the project and withdraw after a certain 
period for the community to run the project on its own. In principle, CIP is not a 
project but a programme that should continue in time. The community itself should 
run it, with assistance from the government (or a facilitating organisation). Annually, 
new budgets are put on offer to communities, as part of the overall budget of the 
government and in line with budgetary allocations. CIP then operates as a government 
programme to deliver services to its citizens. In this way, CIP would be sustainable. 
Of course, the income-generating projects should become financially sustainable and 
could even serve as investment vehicles for other community projects/activities. 
Hence, a CIP project should be seen by the government and/or donors as a type of 
‘social economy’ project. ‘Social economy’ is the part of the economy where public 
and private entities work together to achieve social goals without making a financial 
profit (CIRIEC 2007:17-18). The purpose of a social economy project is to achieve an 
economic and/or social goal in a society without focusing on profit. For example, the 
cooperative at the South Coast could be a social economy project with the goal of 
establishing money circulation in the local community, to reduce poverty. The 
government should have an interest in funding or investing in the cooperative as it 
addresses an important goal of government policy, namely to reduce poverty. 
Similarly it addresses the government goal of reducing unemployment as community 
members are now working in their own gardens. South Africa aims to be a 
developmental state, assisting the less fortunate in society, Rather than giving hand-
outs to the disadvantaged, it would be more beneficial for government and people 
alike to get the disadvantaged involved by funding social economy projects. Should 
the social economy projects become financially sustainable, this would be an 
additional benefit to employment creation and poverty relief. Nevertheless, the 
financial sustainability of CIP projects should not be a prerequisite. Financial 
backstopping of social enterprises will retain the advantages of employment for the 
poor and poverty alleviation. Hence, a fifth recommendation is for the government or 
a facilitating organisation to show a long-term commitment to CIP projects, both in 
terms of providing the necessary finances and in terms of providing the necessary 
217 
 
support. Perhaps certain income-generating projects under a CIP project should be 
expected to become financially sustainable, but not the project as a whole. Reynolds’s 
vision was that every year, communities could apply for new ‘rights budgets’ from 
the government to invest in their communities. Hence, the government should develop 
a policy for the promotion of the social economy in both rural and urban areas and 
should implement CIP projects as part of this policy.  
 
In terms of keeping some kind of supporting structure in place, once CIP (or any 
community development project) is implemented in a community, it is not realistic to 
expect from a rural community to run a developmental project on its own without 
help from outside, either from an NGO or the government. It would be in the interest 
of communities as well as the government to set up a structure for assisting 
communities with the management of such projects, which obviously have a positive 
impact on the livelihood of many rural families. If the government does not have the 
capacity to do this, they could collaborate with NGOs like SDC or Community Based 
Organisations to assist CIP-type projects in communities. The NDP does say ‘that 
people should be involved in their own development’ (NPC 2011b:2), ‘the 
government should stimulate small-scale agriculture in rural areas, however public 
institutions should be strengthened to make this possible’ (NPC 2011b:117). The 
NDP therefore seems to understand that small-scale agricultural projects in rural areas 
should be supported – not by taking the lead, but by letting people take the initiative 
and providing support for them if needs be. 
 
In addition, CIP projects could be much more than just ‘social economy projects’. 
They could be vehicles for local government, thus a system of more decentralised 
government. They could assist the government in bringing government and services 
to the people and let them have a direct say in what happens in their communities. A 
possible topic for further research could be to determine what social economy projects 
are in place in South Africa and the potential of these projects to enrich the 
development of disadvantaged communities. 
 
CIP calls for communities to know the resources available before they start with a 
CIP project. From the CIP pilot projects, this seems to be the most difficult aspect 
when implementing CIP. Hence, it should be handled with care. Funds put on offer to 
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communities could be abused if not well managed, as with the CIP project in 
Huntington. Also, for donors or the government literally to put money in the hands of 
people and leave them to their own devices would be going too far. At any rate, the 
South African government with its tendency to control and centralize is unlikely to 
follow that road. Neither will donors, fearing corruption and abuse of resources while 
letting go of the control most donors want to keep. Hence, the sixth recommendation 
would be to approach this aspect of CIP with caution and to determine the best way to 
go for each individual community. For instance, instead of making funds accessible 
from the start – putting the budget in the hands of the community – they could be 
given only the decision-making power (what should be done with the budget). 
Perhaps the community could persuade the government and donors after a period of 
time to give them direct access to the resources. Or a good governance structure could 
be put in place with well-arranged accountability mechanisms before resources are 
made accessible. The projects run under the IDT in the drought period (see chapter 1), 
and the example from Uganda (see 3.3.3.1), prove that it is workable to put direct 
cash on offer to communities, without abuse of the funds. It is a matter of finding the 
right way of doing so. The best way of introducing budgets in communities, with 
practical examples, could be a topic for further research. 
 
CIP calls for the creation of a working local economy. This is a very strong aspect of 
CIP as the creation of an income for the many poor people in South Africa is a very 
powerful tool, not only in terms of the money but also to improve their self-esteem. 
This aspect of CIP is easier to implement than the others and hence it is a good 
starting point, with the extra benefit of demonstrating the benefits of the project to 
potential beneficiaries. A seventh recommendation would therefore be to start with 
implementing this aspect of CIP, before starting with a governance structure. ‘Process 
should come before structure’ to show benefits of the project and gauge appetite from 
the beneficiaries for participation and ownership. An eight recommendation would be 
to ensure that the income-generating projects supporting a working local economy 
are well-researched and feasible. In addition, the community should believe them to 
be important. For example, starting a garden, as in Tsakane, to sell produce to schools 
without establishing beforehand that the schools will buy the produce, is short-sighted 




Lastly, CIP calls for a project to be a learning experience for a community, which will 
lead to the development of the community as well as individuals. Not only economic 
development, but also social, cultural and psychological development. This aspect of 
CIP, focusing on the enhancement of self-esteem and dignity, cannot be implemented 
directly; it flows from the good implementation of other aspects of CIP. Hence, 
building communities and growing people will contribute to the overall development 
of a country and possibly increase individuals’ self-esteem. No conclusive findings 
can be made in this regard from the CIP pilot projects, however a ninth 
recommendation would be to explore this in further research and dig into this aspect 
of CIP, namely how a CIP project could improve the self-esteem of individuals and 
communities. Reynolds argued once that it could ‘resolve the physiological scars that 
apartheid has brought upon communities in South Africa’. This is a strong comment, 
and definitely worthwhile exploring. 
 
In terms of ensuring that the implementation of CIP is a learning process, it should be 
noted that this learning should be for both the involved community as well as the 
facilitating organisation. A last recommendation here, to ensure that learning takes 
place, is to put CIP, and all its aspects, ‘on offer’ to communities. So that the 
community can choose what they want to implement, and how they want to do it. This 
will enhance chances of successful implementation and reduce the chances of failure. 
 
There is a strong case that CIP can be realistically implemented in South Africa. The 
fact that two of the three CIP pilot projects collapsed does not mean that CIP cannot 
work, as the collapses resulted from flawed implementation in the involved 
communities. Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:45) also indicate that many good 
community development projects collapse due to bad implementation. Nevertheless, 
the failed CIP projects were crucial for learning about CIP in general and about 
successful ways of implementation, in line with good principles of community 
development. 
 
To conclude, CIP, as conceptualised by Reynolds, needs some slight adjustments: 
 
• When CIP is implemented, the facilitating organisation should carefully 
consider the governance of the project. The right community, sharing a 
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common purpose, should be selected. The facilitator should get to know the 
community by conducting a mapping exercise, spending time with them and, 
together, setting up the right governance structure. 
• The facilitating organisation should not take ‘ownership’ when implementing 
CIP and remain ‘a facilitator’; the community should participate in the 
implementation of CIP from the start. 
• The facilitating organisation should be experienced, both in terms of 
community development in general and in terms of CIP, and should be present 
regularly in the involved community. 
• The facilitating organisation should expect to go through a learning process 
themselves, just as is expected from the involved community. 
• Structure should follow process when implementing CIP. The involved 
community should first experience the benefits of the project before a 
governance structure is established. 
• The facilitating organisation should make a long-term commitment to the 
community, in providing the necessary finances as well as in providing the 
necessary support. 
• The aspect of informing the involved community of the resources available to 
them for the implementation of CIP should be approached with caution, for 
each community individually (full information upfront or some compromise). 
• A feasibility study of income-generating projects to contribute to a working 
local economy should be done and the community should indicate which 
income-generating projects they wanted. 
• CIP should be put ‘on offer’ to communities. 
 
Hence, the CIP model as presented in chapter 3.5 remains largely the same. 
Successful implementation is determined to a large degree by the facilitating 
organisation, as the above recommendations indicate. The only major change regards 
informing the community about the resources available. This should be done 
cautiously and not necessarily upfront.  
 
A last recommendation would be to conduct further research on a number of themes, 




• Studying the concept ‘community’ and what it means for CIP. This concept 
has been studied extensively, but not in relation to CIP. It was beyond the 
scope of this research to study the relationship. The outcome of such research 
could assist the facilitator in identifying the right ‘community’. 
• Studying the concept ‘social economy’ and what is in place in terms of social-
economy projects in South Africa. The outcome of such research could show 
how these projects may enrich the development of disadvantaged communities 
and guide policy development in this regard. 
• Studying the introduction of budgets (known resources) in communities, with 
attention to practical examples, to identify optimal methods. Putting budgets 
directly on offer to communities was introduced by the IDT in the drought 
period (see chapter 1 and 2). There are other examples like in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil or Uganda (see chapter 3 and 6). The outcome of such research could 
assist the facilitator with the implementation of this aspect of CIP. 
• In relation to the above, the concept of rights programmes in the form of 
budgets could not be researched as this aspect of CIP was not introduced in 
the pilot projects. Further research could explore rights programmes in relation 
to CIP in more detail, and could also experiment with implementation to 
explore workability. 
• Studying a working local economy and, more specifically, which local 
businesses could contribute. What would community members buy in the area 
where they live? Which goods and services would be bought, and how feasible 
would it be to produce them locally? Is it possible to compete with the first 
economy?  
• Studying a CIP project’s contribution to the self-esteem of individuals and 
communities. The outcome of such research could assist the facilitator, but 
also the community, to focus on certain aspects of CIP (or not) and to review 
aspects in order to further enhance the growth of self-esteem. Such a study 
cannot be ‘general’ and should be done in every community where CIP is 
implemented, if possible. 
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• Lastly, and most importantly, a theme for future research would be to 
determine how CIP could concretely be aligned with and complement existing 
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Annexure 1: Questions used in interviews 
 
Research questions for key informants related to CIP (friends and colleagues of 
Reynolds) 
 
The number of questions varied between 6 and 11 as certain key informants had information 
that others did not have.  Herewith a list of all the questions with an explanation of why they 
were asked and to whom: 
 
1. How did you get to know Dr Reynolds and CIP? The aim of this question was to 
understand the relationship between the research participant and Reynolds, as well as 
the participant’s involvement in CIP. All participants were asked this question. 
2. What is CIP according to Dr Reynolds? The aim was to learn the participant’s view 
of CIP, as meant by Reynolds. All participants were asked this question. 
3. What are the characteristics of CIP? The aim of the question was to get a better 
understanding of CIP. All participants were asked this question. 
4. Why did you get convinced that CIP could work for local economic development in 
South Africa? This question was asked as CIP is perceived as a revolutionary model 
for local economic development. Why did the research participant get interested in 
CIP? All participants were asked this question. 
5. CIP became part of the LED white paper 2006-2011. How did this happen? The aim 
was to understand how the government got involved in CIP and how they were 
convinced it would work. This question was put to the former director of the dplg, 
Marjorie Jobson, and to Lucy Thornton.  
6. Why was CIP never implemented or tested or rolled-out up until today by the 
government you think? Despite being part of the LED white paper, CIP has not been 
implemented. This question probed why this happened. The former director of the 
dplg, Lucy Thornton, and Wiseman Nkuhlu were asked this question. 
7. Do you still believe CIP can work? As CIP was not implemented by the government 
and two of the three pilot projects collapsed, the question tested the views of the 
participants on the viability of CIP. All participants were asked this question. 
8. Do you think that the South African government at this stage will be interested in a 
CIP model for local economic development? The aim of this question was to 
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understand more of the context of the research, so as to learn whether or not certain 
research participants saw another opportunity for approaching the government on 
CIP. The former director of the dplg, Lucy Thornton, and Wiseman Nkuhlu were 
asked this question. 
9. What do you think is needed to implement CIP nationwide? The aim was to gather 
more information on the needs for the implementation of CIP. All participants were 
asked this question. 
10. Are you aware of other government-driven projects, besides the Eastern Cape project 
you spoke about in our conversation last week, that incorporate CIP 
elements/characteristics? This was a follow-up question put to the former director of 
the dplg.   
 
Research questions for key informants from the CIP (pilot) projects 
 
The facilitators in Tsakane, at the South Coast and in Huntington were asked the questions 
below: 
 
1. What is your involvement in the CIP pilot in/at South Coast/Tsakane/Huntington? 
This question was asked to understand the roles the facilitators played in the 
respective projects. 
2. Did Dr Reynolds play a role in the start-up/implementation of CIP in/at South 
Coast/Tsakane/Huntington? This question was asked to learn if and how Reynolds 
was involved in CIP implementation. 
3. Why was the South Coast/Huntington/Tsakane identified as an area to implement 
CIP? The aim was to learn why a CIP pilot was started in a certain place and how 
that might have influenced the implementation of CIP. 
4. Which characteristics of CIP have been implemented or tested in/at South 
Coast/Tsakane/Huntington and which ones not? This was asked to improve 
understanding of CIP and the challenges with certain of its characteristics during 
implementation. 
5. Why was it that some characteristics were not implemented/tested? This was asked to 
improve understanding of CIP and the challenges with certain of its characteristics 
during implementation.. 
6. The characteristics that were implemented, do they work? Is it possible to implement 
them? Asked to learn whether characteristics were changed in any way to make them 
more viable for implementation. 
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7. Why is the South Coast project the only surviving CIP pilot? Where lays the success 
you think? This question was asked to identify crucial success factors for 
sustainability when implementing CIP. 
8. Do you think that CIP is a good and workable model for local economic development 
in South Africa? Why or why not? This question was asked to learn whether 
facilitators of the projects believed CIP could work for local economic development 
in South Africa. 
 
The chairperson and secretary of the CIP project at the South Coast were asked the 
questions below:  
 
1. Governance 
• Do you know who the board members of the cooperative are? 
• Were they democratically elected? 
• Do you trust them? 
• Do they act in the interest of the farmers, according to you? 
• Is there political meddling in the project in Nositha? 
• I should ask why the chairperson and secretary are fulfilling these roles. Is it because 
they want to serve the community or out of self-interest? 
• To whom do they feel they are accountable? 
• In whose interest do they act? 
• To whom do you report? 
 
2. Ownership 
• Can you as the chairperson/secretary raise issues at a coop board meeting? 
• Do you feel you are part of the decision making of the coop? 
• Do you have a say in planning of how the project is run in Nositha? 
• Do you know the goals of the project in Nositha? 
• Do you think the farmers know this too? 
• Are you aware that, at a certain point in time, the coop and farmers association could 
be run by the community itself? Do you think that is possible? Why and why not?  
• What kind of things should happen before SDC can withdraw? 
 
3. Resources 
• Do you have a say, at coop board meetings, on how the resources should be spent? 
• Do you know how many resources are available for the project in Nositha? 
• The income that you earn by selling to the coop, is it enough to sustain your 
household? Or is it rather an additional income, some extra money? How much of a 





4. Self-esteem and dignity 
• Do you agree that your life has become better since you are part of the coop?  
 
5. Project success and sustainability 
• What are the successes of the project so far according to you? 
• What are the failures/challenges of the project so far according to you? 




Annexure 2: Questionnaire, CIP Pilot Project South Coast 
 
 









2. What is your age category? Please tick the correct box with an x. 
 
18 – 25 years 25 – 35 years 35 – 45 years 45 – 55 years 55+ 
     
 








      
 
4. What is your employment situation? Please tick the correct box with an x. 
 
Formally employed Self-employed Unemployed Volunteer 
    
 
5. Which government grants do you receive, if any? Please tick the correct boxes with an 
x. 
 
Child support grant Old age 
grant 
Foster parent grant Disability grant None 




Please tick the applicable box with an X. 
 
No Question Yes No Don’t 
know 
6. Do you know about the farmers’ association in your community? yes no don’t 
know 
7. Do you know about the Kumnandi cooperative in your 
community? 
yes no don’t 
know 
8. Do you sell fruit and vegetables to the Kumnandi cooperative? yes no don’t 
know 
9. Do I sell monthly to the Kumnandi cooperative? yes no don’t 
know 
10. Do you participate in the monthly farmers’ association meeting? yes no don’t 
know 
11. Can farmers participate in discussions during farmers’ association 
meetings? 




12. Can farmers raise questions during farmers’ association meetings? yes no don’t 
know 
13.  Do you think the Kumnandi cooperative will be able to run on its 
own, without help from Siyavuna? 
yes no don’t 
know 
14. Do you think the farmers’ association will be able to run on its 
own, without help from Siyavuna? 
yes no don’t 
know 
15.  The income that I earn by selling to the Kumnandi cooperative is 
the main income of my household 
yes no don’t 
know 
16. The income that I earn by selling to the Kumnandi cooperative is 
an additional income of my household 
yes no don’t 
know 
17. The income that I earn by selling to the Kumnandi cooperative is 
enough money to sustain the household 
yes no don’t 
know 
18. I spend some of the income that I earn by selling to the Kumnandi 
cooperative IN the community 
yes no don’t 
know 
19. At farmers’ association meetings, farmers can take decisions with 
regard the resources allocated to the project 
yes no don’t 
know 
20. The training I received when joining the Kumnandi cooperative 
was enough to start my garden 
yes no don’t 
know 
21. I get enough support and mentoring to run my garden successfully yes no don’t 
know 
22. I learned how to grow new crops, which I had never grown before yes no don’t 
know 
23. I gained more confidence in farming since I am part of the 
Kumnandi cooperative 
yes no don’t 
know 
24. My local Community Field Worker visits me enough times during 
the year 
yes no don’t 
know 
25. I am planting with the intention to feed my family and myself yes no don’t 
know 
26. I am planting with the intention of making money yes no don’t 
know 
27. Will I be a member of the cooperative next year? yes no don’t 
know 
28. Will I be a member of the cooperative in three years’ time? yes no don’t 
know 












30. The local chairperson of the Farmers 
Association has been democratically elected 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
31. I trust the local chairperson and secretary of 
the Farmers Association 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
32. The local chairperson of the Farmers 
Association acts in the interest of the farmers 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
33. I trust the manager of the cooperative Strongly 
agree 
Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
34. Are farmers encouraged to participate in the 
farmers’ association meetings? 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
35. At the farmers’ association meeting, farmers 
are involved in the planning and decision-
making of the Kumnandi cooperative 
Strongly 
agree 




36. At the farmers’ association meeting, farmers 
receive enough feedback from the coop board 
regarding the cooperative 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
37. I, as a farmer, can make suggestions to the 
Community Field Worker, the Farmers 
Association or Siyavuna staff with regard the 
project if I want to. 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 




Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
39. Me and my family are eating more fruit and 
vegetables since I am a member of the coop 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
40. I think that the cooperative is helping the 
community and gives people a better life 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 




Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
42. The presence of the cooperative in the 
community has created new opportunities 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 




Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 




Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
45. After a few years, I think the community can 


























Doctoral Student University of South Africa (UNISA) 
Department of Development Studies 
 
 
Dear research participant,  
 
This letter provides you with more information with regard the research topic of my doctoral 
research. Please read it carefully and reach any questions you may have, before you agree to 
take part in this research.  
 
• Name of investigator: Sofie Geerts, Malan Street 22, 0084 Riviera, 
Pretoria, 0835788806, sofiegeerts1@hotmail.com 
 
• Hosting university: University of South Africa (UNISA), Department of 
Development Studies 
 
• Name of supervisor: Prof Frik de Beer 
 
• Name of research project: A model for a community investment programme with 
reference to South African case studies 
 
• Aims of the research: The research aims to conceptualise the community 
investment programme (CIP) into an understandable 
model as a basis for implementation 
 
• Methodology: Data will be collected by literature study, interviews, 
focus groups and questionnaires. 
 
You are a relevant information source for this research, and therefore, I would like to 
interview you. Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you can cancel 
it whenever you feel to do so. You are allowed to leave questions unanswered. There are no 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers. 
 
Please note that all information you provide is strictly confidential and your identity will 
never be made known to anyone. Your name will not appear in the research report. You will 
have the opportunity to read the research before publication if you like and you are allowed to 
indicate if you want certain information not to be published.  
 
If you feel comfortable to be interviewed and have no further questions, you are requested to 









Name of investigator: Sofie Geerts, Malan Street 22, 0084 Riviera, 
Pretoria, 0835788806, sofiegeerts1@hotmail.com 
 
Hosting university: University of South Africa (UNISA), Department of 
Development Studies 
 
Name of research project: A model for a community investment programme with 
reference to South African case studies 
 
Name of research participant:   
  
1. I understand that my participation in this survey is absolutely voluntary. I am free to 
withdraw my participation at any time. Withdrawal would be free of any penalty or 
discriminatory treatment; 
2. I declare that there is no dependent relationship between the investigator and me; 
3. The purpose and the process of the survey have been explained to me. I have got an 
information sheet explaining purpose of the interview. Furthermore I was provided 
with the opportunity to ask questions about the research and received satisfactory 
answers; 
4. I hereby agree to tape record my interview as part of the research. I also permit the 
tape record to be transcribed. I will get a copy of the interviews transcription on 
request, which I will have to confirm before it is analysed in the research; 
5. I understand that any information or personal details gathered in this research about 
me are strictly confidential. Neither my name nor any identifying information will be 
used or published without my written permission; 
6. I understand that if I have any complaints or concerns about this research I can 














Annexure 4: Introduction note for farmers who completed the 
questionnaire in the CIP pilot project at the South Coast 
 
Sofie Geerts would like to do a survey amongst the PGS farmers in light of her 
doctoral research at UNISA. Her research aims to study the CIP programme, which 
was the basis for the implementation of the project here in the community. As part of 
this survey, we would like to ask if all farmers present could complete a 
questionnaire.  
 
I will distribute the questionnaire amongst all of you and go through it together with 
you. I will read the questions one by one and you need to give an answer to the 
question by ticking the right box with an X.  
 
So as to keep track of which farmer has completed a questionnaire, will you please fill 
in your PGS number on the questionnaire and provide your signature. With this, you 
indicate that you agree to participate in the survey. You have the right to see the 
survey once it is completed. 
 
Note that all answers you give are kept confidential. This means that Siyavuna 
Development Centre or Sofie will never mention your name or that you gave certain 
answers. We will use the answers from all the farmers to draw general conclusions.  
 
Thank you very much for your participation. Are there any questions? 
 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
 
